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Eric Gordy and Adnan Efendic
1.  Engaging Policy to Address Gaps Between 
Formality and Informality in the Western Balkans
This introductory chapter considers the interaction between formal and informal instituitons, 
discussing an updated theoretical approach to this complex relationship but also touching 
related empirical evidence from the Western Balkans (WB) states. The approach adopted in 
this study is that informality cannot be a priori considered as a negative phenomenon, nor 
linked to the WB region, its cultures, traditions, religions or mentality of people living in this 
European space. This chapter and following contributions draw policy makers’ attention to 
the fact that legal reforms in this region, including the institutionalisation of the EU rules, 
need to be sensitive to context, reducing informality where it is necessary by addressing the 
formal deficiencies that people resolve through informal practices operating on the ground, 
while integrating and formalising the positive contributions that are available sometimes ex-
clusively through informality. 
Keywords: formal institutions, informal institutions, informality, Western Balkan, policy
Introduction
The texts in this book are products of the Horizon 2020 research project 
INFORM, „Closing the gap between formal and informal institutions in 
the Balkans“.1 The project was carried out by a consortium of of over forty 
researchers at nine institutions in nine countries, including the six Western 
1 INFORM is a project that brings together teams from nine European countries – Al-
bania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and 
Slovenia – to conduct multidisciplinary social science research on formal and infor-
mal institutions in the Balkans. The three-year research project, launched in March 
2016, is carried out in the framework of the Eruopean Union’s Horizon 2020 research 
and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 693537. This book is one of 
the outcomes of INFORM project, in which the authors provide empirical evidence 
and related policy implications from the interactions of formal and informal institu-
tions in the process of Europeanisation of the Western Balkan states, including the 
spheres of politics, economy and everyday life.
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Balkans (WB) states that are currently at various points in the process of 
accession to membership in the European Union. The fundamental ques-
tion posed in the research was how empirical knowledge could make a 
meaningful contribution to assuring that the legal and structural reforms 
carried out as a part of the accession process could genuinely contribute, 
in a substantive way, to strengthening the capacity of states to govern, to 
consolidating processes of democratisation, and to improving the welfare, 
security, and confidence of citizens of these states. Thus, the main inten-
tion of every chapter is to come up with proposals for policy measures 
directed towards the institutionalization of EU laws and regulations based 
on empirical evidence regarding the relations between formal institutions 
generated in the process of Europeanisation of WB states and inherited 
and newly developed informal institutions in the spheres of politics, econ-
omy and everyday life. 
The research was guided by a perception – widely shared among the 
researchers in the team and repeatedly confirmed informally in private 
conversatins throughout the region – that while states had more or less 
been successful in adopting legislation that harmonises domestic law with 
the standards of the European Union, these legislative changes frequently 
amounted to „empty shells“, changes adopted exclusively at the formal 
level that states lack the capacity or will to implement (Dimitrova, 2010). 
In the face of formal resolutions that fail to regulate everyday activity, 
informal practices emerge, and very often as the substitutes for the for-
mal institutional defficiencies (Efendic at al., 2011). Some of these can 
be described as corrupt practices, in which powerful brokers are able to 
make use of deficiences in the institutional setup in order to divert public 
agencies to private purposes. Others of them, however, reflect strategies 
generated by citizens to accomplish necessary work in the context of insti-
tutional arrangements that fail to function. Still others express relation-
ships of mutual support and solidarity that are both grounded in tradition 
and guided by necessity.
One of the generally recongized insights that follows from this 
approach is that it is not productive to regard informality per se as a prob-
lem or negative phenomenon linked to the Western Balkans region, its cul-
tures, religions, traditions or mentalities. Rather, we sensed, the problem 
lies in the gap between formal legal resolutions and informal practices in 
everyday life. This means that there exist large portions of everyday life, 
including meaningful portions of the political and economic spheres, that 
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are not described by law. This insight takes on importance for policy (and 
dare we say, politics) if it is considered in the context of the historical expe-
rience of citizens in the states of Western Balkans over the past hundred 
years. They have confronted multiple projects, inspired from outside and 
bombastically announced from above, promising to fundamentally trans-
form the institutional and social orders, which have often been short-lived, 
superficial, and implemented haphazardly and incompletely. Among the 
consequences have been popular insecurity and distrust, and these have 
been of longer duration than the regimes toward which they are directed. 
The concern is widely shared among people in the region, although it may 
not be apparent to EU reformers, that the current process of liberalisa-
tion and „Europeanisation“ or „Europeanunionisation“ may represent one 
more of these ambitious but ultimately superficial initiatives. The repeated 
experience is neatly summarised in a popular parody of political slogans: 
„Hteli smo najbolje, a ispalo je kao i obično“ („We wanted the best, but it 
turned out as usual“).2 
The researchers on the INFORM project were guided by the belief 
that empirical knowledge about the gap between formality and informal-
ity could contribute to developing policy proposals that could be useful in 
addressing the risk that legal and structural forms could appear compre-
hensive but turn out meaningless, prolonging the experience of states that 
fail to function, and that experience chronic crises of legitimacy. Although 
nearly everybody, from international experts to participants in coffee shop 
conversation, recognises the gap on which our research concentrates, 
this project represents the first effort to gain systematic and region-wide 
knowledge about its scope, character, and meaning. The contributions in 
this volume elaborate the policy proposals that derive from the findings of 
our research, covering the selected topics in the speheres of politics, eco-
nomics and everyday life. The intention of this book is not to cover all 
possible examples that appear on the ground, but some of the most repre-
sentative recongized by the researchers comming from these three fields.
2 A recent iteration of the slogan appears as the title of an analysis of transgender equality 
initiatives in Serbia by Jelena Simić, „Hteli smo najbolje, a ispalo je kao i obično,“ Peščanik, 
28 December 2017, available online at: https://pescanik.net/hteli-smo-najbolje-a-is 
palo-je-kao-i-obicno/. 
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A new theoretical approach to formality and informality
Core concern motivating the research is the perception that in Western 
Balkans (including two EU countries from the region in our sample, Slo-
venia and Croatia), the accelerated pace of EU accession has contributed 
to a rush in adoption of legislative reforms proposed solely for the pur-
pose of compliance with the acquis communautaire, and frequently passed 
through the parliament without debate or substantive consideration. We 
have referred to these, as have others, as „empty shells“, although other 
labels have been suggested, among them „fabricating reforms“ and „reform 
simulation“ (e.g. Dimitrova, 2010; Đinđić and Bajić, 2018). They describe a 
situation in which legal resolutions are adopted by states which have nei-
ther the intention nor the capacity to implement them. Similar to the way 
that Verdery (1996) described a formally socialist economic system mask-
ing feudalist and capitalist practices on the ground, the adoption of liberal 
policy in the post-socialist period is marked by a disjunction between the 
world as it is described by official policy and the world that is confronted 
by citizens in their everyday experience. This results in a gap between for-
mal and informal practices, which appears to be growing as states hurry 
to generate legal and regulatory frameworks that do not respond to actual 
conditions.
This phenomenon contributes to constructing an observation that is 
all too obvious to people who live in the region but is frequently not appar-
ent to outside observers in government and media: there are large portions 
of the system by which political power and influence operate that are not 
represented by the official structures of formal power and not described by 
law. They represent, on the one hand (in their corrupt form), ways in which 
gaps in the system are exploited by people in a position to take advantage 
of them for personal gains, and in that sense are threats to the establish-
ment and consolidation of a rule-based system that is predictable, efficient, 
and bound by regulations that act to protect the interests of citizens. At the 
same time they also represent (in their complementary form) strategies 
and networks that citizens draw upon in order to accomplish tasks that are 
not facilitated by systems that have been established in law but not enacted 
into practice.
These features add up to make Western Balkans a productive environ-
ment for the study of informality. Both the extended-transition characteristics 
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of the states and what is often perceived to be the „tradition“ of informality 
in regional cultures contribute to the richness of the research environment. 
The perception of the existence of a „tradition“, however, could be mislead-
ing. Much of the research suggests that informal practices of long standing 
derive from political conditions: repeated changes of political regime over 
the past century, a corresponding repeated failure of regimes to consolidate 
formal aspects of their rule, and a consequent and apparently permanent 
deficit of trust in institutions. But the perception of tradition also contrib-
utes to the longevity of a stereotype, which sees informality as in some ways 
embedded in the cultures of the region. A homologous stereotype of „back-
wardness“ traces its path through the literature to Banfield’s (1958) study 
of southern Italy, and is neatly reproduced in a 1991 regional survey trac-
ing the „origins of backwardness“ in eastern Europe (Chirot, 1991). In both 
cases the persuasiveness of the characterisation of some parts of the world 
as fundamentally more „backward“ than others depended on the conditions 
and policies that produced „backwardness,“ and tended to disappear with 
the disappearance of those conditions. Is informality a product of cultural 
inclinations? Probably if it is, then it is so everywhere, or at least in a widely 
varying range of cultural environments (for a wide variety of examples from 
around the world, see Ledeneva, 2018). And to the degree that culture inclines 
societies to be accepting of „bad“ informality (such as bribery and the use of 
connections) it does so mostly in trivial ways (exchange of gifts, obligation 
to help family). Our research indicates that the prevalence of informality is 
primarily a product of dysfunctional regulatory environments. Evidence on 
entrepreneurs in Southeast Europe suggests that businesspeople will engage 
intensively in bribery and the instrumental exchange of gifts and favours to 
the degree that they understand these activities as being necessary for the 
conduct of their business, but that when predictable and efficient legal reso-
lutions become easily available, the volume of informal transactions declines 
(e.g. Efendic et al., 2018). Similarly, corrupt practices can often emerge as a 
consequence of a formal system seeking to expand its accessibility and reach 
beyond the level of its capacity.
Another difficulty confronting the study of informality in this part of 
Europe involves one of the problematics that lies at the heart of this collec-
tion: the close relation between the emergence of informality as a research 
problem and the challenges that accompany implementation of the Euro-
pean Union’s rule of law agenda. A consequence of this is that informality 
tends to be viewed exclusively as a problem to be eliminated, closely related 
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to corruption and obstructing the establishment of stable and reliable legal 
institutions. This view is not inaccurate, but it is also not complete. It has 
the consequence of overlooking, in particular, ways in which many infor-
mal practices emerge as responses to the failures of formal institutions, 
and ways in which informality provides means for people to accomplish 
necessary tasks in their lives. 
The mixed character of informality has encouraged the development of 
two opposing approaches to the problem, both of which are incomplete and 
extreme: condemnation and celebration. One camp advances pure formality 
as a goal and regards informality as a source of corruption and diversion that 
needs to be eliminated. The other points to the creative and „authentic“ char-
acter of informality as an organically generated set of strategies for problem 
solving, and encourages a view of it as a resource to build upon in the devel-
opment of policy. Helmke and Levitsky’s (2004) typology represents an effort 
to overcome this dualism, and as such has been widely influential – it is cited 
by several of the authors in this collection, as it is throughout the informal-
ity literature. But this solution brings with it some problems of its own. The 
main problem is that in distinguishing between „good“ (law-enhancing) and 
„bad“ (law-subverting) informality, it maintains both the dualism and the 
preference for state-based solutions that characterise the literature that pre-
cedes it. The principal obstacle to knowledge here is that an overly strongly 
drawn distinction eludes the basic interactivity of the relationship between 
formality and informality, and the fact that formal institutions function 
(necessarily) with informal practices, while informal practices develop rule-
like strategies of enforcement (North, 1990; 1990a). This interactivity is not 
necessarily a problem or a failure, but rather it is a resource for the genera-
tion of information. The scale and type of informal practices tell us about the 
limitations of formally conceived systems.
Empirically grounded research elaborated by a clear understanding of 
the cultural contexts in which the empirical facts emerge helps us to move 
beyond the unhelpful dualism that is characteristic of a good quantity of 
the existing research on informality. It should also be helpful, ultimately, 
in the development of policy. To the degree that in the accession states 
of Western Balkans, the European Union’s strategy of transposing formal 
rules from one environment to another can be viewed as having been 
unsuccessful on several fronts, it might be possible to conclude that among 
the principal sources of failure has been the introduction of formal prac-
tices into environments that have been, whether for structural, cultural or 
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political reasons, unreceptive. The contribution that researchers are able to 
make is to draw attention to aspects of the context into which new regula-
tions are introduced, and to encourage flexibility and sensibility.
Less fully explored in many discussions of informality is the role 
played by external actors in promoting and consolidating informal prac-
tices. This dimension is frequently obscured by self-promoting stereotypes 
that view outside actors as bringing the rule of law to recalcitrant political 
actors who resist it. This perception is explicitly contested, for example, in 
INFORM’s research on „leaders’ meetings,“ which notes them as instances 
reflecting „the imprecise nature of EU’s political criteria as a source of 
numerous inconsistencies ranging from vague conditions that are not 
based on EU wide standards to contradictory application” (Markovikj and 
Damjanovski, 2018). In this context “leaders’ meetings” break an impasse 
with a bypass, facilitating short-term agreements through direct consulta-
tion between the heads of political parties. While the tactic has an obvious 
appeal to EU mediators as a way of overcoming obstacles in the short term, 
the long term effect is to substitute short-term political gain on the part 
of political elites for the public interest. A clear but frequently overlooked 
conclusion is that outside actors, working with the overall intention of 
promoting legtitimacy and the rule of law, are not immune to the tempta-
tion of internalising some of the informal practices that dominate political 
activity in unconsolidated states, thereby, probably unintentionally, under-
mining the institutions that they hope to promote.
Contributions
The contributions in this volume shed light on some of the central char-
acteristics of informality in Western Balkans, while also intersecting with 
some of the basic theoretical discussions in the study of informality gener-
ally. Some of the central characteristics of WB states that make them espe-
cially interesting as sites for the study of informality include: frequently 
low levels of institutional density, repeated experience of „fundamental“ 
structural change inspired from outside and imposed from above, and 
complex interaction between formal institutions that are consolidated to 
varying degrees and requirements for reform generated through external 
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processes (in particular, through pursuit of the goal of integration with the 
European Union). It might be said that these are states that are seeking to 
establish, with partial success, democratic systems, having emerged from a 
period in which they sought, with partial success, to establish socialist sys-
tems. The gaps emerged where failed elements of both of these ambitious 
efforts to construct society-transforming political systems left ample space 
for the development of compensatory informal practices. Some of these 
practices developed into stable forms of corruption, while others made it 
possible for everyday needs to be met in dysfunctional institutional envi-
ronments. Additionally, as some of the states of the region are new states 
which have recently experienced violent conflict, the issues of institutional 
functionality and trust in institutions become more prominent.
Chapter 1 provides a parallel analysis by Ivan Damjanovski and Marko 
Kmezić, who trace processes of implementation of acquis requirements 
in Western Balkans EU accession states. The discussion concentrates on 
the degree to which, in the process of undertaking legal and institutional 
reforms, the norms underlying these reforms have also been internalised 
in the accession states. Examining the fields of judicial reform, media free-
dom, economic reform, institutional capacity, they find that while states fre-
quently meet conditions for legislative or organisational reform, the imple-
mentation of these reforms, and their transformation from words printed 
on paper to substantive improvements in the environment and daily life of 
citizens, are blocked by a number of factors. These include the low credibil-
ity of the accession process itself (a problem compounded by weak public 
information), the weak capacity of states for implementation, and political 
elites who act as gatekeepers, blocking the implementation of changes that 
do not serve their short-term interests. In addition, the legacy of previously 
existing nonfunctional systems has generated a powerful subterranean sys-
tem of informal networks and practices, which are durable and resistant to 
change, partly because of generally low levels of confidence in formal insti-
tutions. Addressing this type of legacy requires sustained engagement not 
only in terms of generating a public case for the norms that are promoted 
by means of reform, but also in recognising and diminishing the power of 
elite social actors who are able to assume the role of veto players. The risk of 
continued engagement solely on the level of form, bypassing substance, is 
that „democracy in the region will remain an empty shell” (see Chapter 1). 
Chapter 2 offers an analysis of the problems of “goldplating” and partial 
enforcement of EU-derived regulations by Miran Lavrič, Reana Senjković, 
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and Rudi Klanjšek, examining the problem through the lens of the sharing 
of meat produced by home slaughter. The issue involves a practice that is 
generally viewed positively in Western Balkans societies (including Slovenia 
and Croatia), as people consider domestically produced meat to be healthier 
and of superior quality to meat available through commercial outlets, while 
the practice itself is rooted in traditions of familial and communal solidarity 
and plays a role in religious observances. Although EU requirements in the 
area are in fact fairly minimal (mostly relating to health protection and ani-
mal welfare), several states used the opportunity of compliance with condi-
tionality to introduce legislation that was considerably more restrictive than 
the EU demanded. This had the consequence of widening the gap between 
applicable law and the capacity and will of states to enforce the law, both 
undermining the credibility of institutions and opening up possibilities for 
abuse through selective or instrumentalised enforcement. The states’ “gold-
plating” also resonates with a sometimes popular current in anti-EU opin-
ion, which sees reforms demanded from outside as threatening widespread 
and cherished cultural practices, many of which concentrate on the domestic 
preparation of food. Overall the discussion points not only to the dangers of 
“goldplating” and the overproduction of unenforceable “empty shell” legisla-
tion, but also underlines the need to harmonise formal rules to cultural val-
ues, norms, and practices that are perceived as legitimate on the local level. 
Implementing this recommendation requires policymakers to engage the 
kind of cultural knowledge that is widely shared by citizens and available 
through research in the social sciences.
In Chapter 3 Adnan Efendic and Alena Ledeneva confront the phe-
nomenon of informal networking, including both household and entre-
preneurial sectors. Drawing on both statistical and ethnographic evidence, 
they establish the motivations of businesspeople to establish and maintain 
informal networks, and also generate a rough calculation of the costs of 
maintaining these networks. While there is variation according to location, 
gender, education, and stage of business development, the cost of maintain-
ing an informal network is high, ranging from 80 to 150 Euros monthly in 
a region where the average monthly income of the survey respondents is 
250 Euros. Businesspeople report that informal networks are maintained 
out of necessity: not only for the cultivation of clients and the exchange of 
information, but also to oil the wheels of an inefficient bureaucratic and 
regulatory system. The cost of networking is lower in states where regu-
lation is more transparent and less burdensome. This evidence directly 
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contests the perception, derived from stereotype, that informal networks 
correspond to some sort of regional inclination to sociability or “mental-
ity” – most businesspeople would prefer to work with efficient and pre-
dictable state agencies rather than having to cultivate contacts in order to 
secure bureaucratic resolutions. As one of the interviewed respondents 
nicely said, – ‘But, I wish we had a state without it…’. Conversely, in states 
where recent ethnonational conflict has made ethnic and religious diver-
sity a site of contention, informal networks appear able to build and sus-
tain relationships across cultural divides more successfully than do formal 
institutions, which are all too frequently the site of preferential behaviour 
and discrimination. The principal policy implication is that legal reforms 
need to be sensitive to context, reducing informality where it is necessary 
by addressing the formal deficiencies that people resolve through informal 
networks, while integrating and formalising the positive contributions that 
are available sometimes exclusively through informality.
The contribution in Chapter 4 by Misha Popovikj, Borjan Gjuzelov, 
and Jovan Bliznakovski explicates ways in which the informal practices of 
political parties undermine the legitimacy of formal systems of democratic 
representation and accountability: through the practice of relational clien-
telism. While a good deal of attention has been paid to such „fee for service“ 
practices as vote buying, the corrosive effect of informality on political rep-
resentation looks more serious when it is viewed as an interactive process 
developing over a longer term. In a context where public institutions and 
public procurement fail to operate efficiently and transparently, both parties 
and citizens seek to form long-term mutual relationships in which help with 
solving practical problems is exchanged for loyalty. This type of relationship 
deprives political representation of its substantive content, while at the same 
time it consolidates politicians’ lack of interest in creating and maintaining 
stable and efficient institutions. What is essential in the relationship is that it is 
not only parties that offer incentives to citizens in exchange for votes – nearly 
as frequently, citizens seek out the services of parties as brokers mediating 
their needs and the institutions of the state. In states where political contes-
tation is genuinely competitive, the scale of the relationships that are forme 
din this way may be enough to alter the outcomes of elections. The authors 
propose the introduction of a parliamentary oversight mechanism to moni-
tor and control the functioning of relational clientelism. On a broader level, 
it might also be observed that the findings on this point reinforce two of the 
major outcomes of the INFORM project, that informal practices, including 
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practices that are corruptive, arise from: i) an institutional environment in 
which formal procedures fail to address the needs of citizens; and ii) the 
absence of political will to eliminate (or even the presence of direct political 
incentives to maintain) a dysfunctional institutional environment.
Informal pressures on political institutions are also the focus of Chap-
ter 5, in which Vjollca Krasniqi, Nenad Markovikj, Ilina Mangova, Enriketa 
Papa-Pandelejmoni, and Jovan Bliznakovski explore the circumvention 
of legal institutions of democratic representation and decisionmaking 
through „leaders’ meetings,“ in which the heads of political parties resolve 
contentious issues informally through meetings in settings like restaurants 
and coffee shops, sometimes with the active encouragement and interven-
tion of international diplomatic representatives. Frequently these meetings 
succeed as a tactical manouevre to overcome, at least temporarily, block-
ages in representative institutions. For this reason they may appear as an 
attractive „quick fix.“ Over the long term, however, they undermine the 
credibility of representative democracy, replacing public interest with pri-
vate interests and reducing parliaments to institutions that ratify publicly 
agreements made secretly. The authors propose that the constructive func-
tion of „leaders’ meetings“ – as a forum in which contentious disputes can 
be resolved – can be maintained, while their subversive dysfunction can be 
reduced. This could be achieved by bringing contact among party leaders 
into the parliamentary system, and encouraging this contact to be oriented 
toward preventing intractable disputes rather than toward ironing them 
out once they have developed.
Chapter 6, by Vjollca Krasniqi, Enriketa Papa-Pandelejmoni, Armanda 
Hysa, and Gentiana Kera, interrogates the space between formal rules and 
„how things get done“ in everyday life. The authors conceive of formal-
ity and informality as interactive, with informal practices emerging to 
respond to shortcomings in formal institutions, and correspondingly pro-
viding information about the successes and failures of the formal sector. 
The authors explore the frequency of use of informal practices and the 
pursuit of „connections“ and mediation, both in the everyday sphere and 
in relations with political institutions such as parties, noting that informal 
mediation is sought most in those fields where formal rules fail to function 
equitable and efficiently. The phenomenon is most pronounced in areas 
such as access to health care, education, public services, and employment. 
These observations are of value to policymakers for two principal reasons: 
i) they contest the stereotypical view of informal networks as somehow 
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responding to cultural and traditional predispositions of citizens of West-
ern Balkans states, and ii) they underscore the point that the most suc-
cessful strategy for comating (bad) informality is not through repressive 
measures, but rather by providing citizens with the means to access public 
services and benefits without the need for mediation. 
In tha last chapter, Chapter 7, Mirza Mujarić and Ismet Kumalić offer 
an overview of how EU observers have assessed reform processes in South-
east European states, as well as a comprehensive survey of how several 
post-socialist states, including ones both inside and outside the INFORM 
sample, developed strategies to confront the problem of informal employ-
ment. The scope of their review is broad and the evidence takes diverse 
forms, but it may be possible to draw out some unifying observations that 
are relevant to the development of policy. Principal among these would 
be that states have generated a consensus that informal („under the table“ 
or „cash“) employment has consequences that reverberate throughout the 
formal institutional system, undermining the rule of law while also depriv-
ing public budgets of tax income, depriving workers of protection in the 
areas of social welfare, safety and health, and increasing future burdens on 
the public in the form of unfinanced obligations for health and elder care. 
Enhanced inspection and enforcement was partly successful in addressing 
issues related to informal employment, but the most productive initiatives 
were ones that met the following criteria: i) they provided legal avenues by 
which workers could seek employment and, in the case of migrant workers, 
regulate their eligibility to participate in labour markets; ii) they made the 
process of complying with labour law faster, simpler, and less burdensome 
for employers, thereby reducing both transaction costs and the perceived 
benefit of informality; iii) they integrated campaigns to inform the public 
of the need for compliance and the means to achieve it. In general these 
insights converge around the principle that informal practices emerge as 
consequences of inefficient regulation and unmet needs, and that while 
enforcement is of course a necessity, the successful assertion of the rule 
of law also requires transparent procedures for addressing unmet needs, 
bureaucratic processes that make compliance easier rather than more dif-
ficult, and widespread knowledge and understanding among the public 
about the interests and purposes of formal regulation.
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Ivan Damjanovski and Marko Kmezić
2.  Europeanisation and Institutionalisation of EU 
Rules in the Western Balkans
This empirical analysis draws on in-depth case studies of six EU candidate countries in the 
Western Balkans. All cases display similarities in terms of potential explanations – they 
are targeted by the same policy of enlargement, premised on similar institutional settings, 
and driven by the same package of incentives. In addition, over the past decade all of the 
countries involved experienced a deep-rooted system of state capture that impeded the 
consolidation of liberal democratic society based on the rule of law. Yet, some of the coun-
tries experience additional impediments on their EU membership paths. The combined 
comparative insights from the cases makes it possible to trace patterns in explaining the 
deficiencies in EU norm promotion through enlargement to the Western Balkan candidate 
countries. The chapter addresses the implications of credibility of the accession process, 
political costs and administrative capacity on compliance with the political, economic and 
acquis criteria in the Western Balkans. It emphasizes the importance of the political dimen-
sion of the EU accession process as a key challenge for advancement in the Europeanisation 
of the Western Balkans countries.
Keywords: European Union, Western Balkans, conditionality, EU integration, Europeanisa-
tion, compliance, rule of law, media freedom, economy, acquis communautaire
Introduction
At the Thessaloniki summit in 2003, the European Council declared, “the 
future of the Balkans is within the European Union” (European Council, 
2003). This political commitment of the heads of state and prime minis-
ters of the European Union (EU) countries was understood as a strong 
incentive and a promise that the future of the region, within the EU, will 
be stable and prosperous. However, apart from Croatia that entered the 
EU in 2013, fifteen years after the Thessaloniki Summit, Albania, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia are still far 
away from full EU membership.
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While the contractual relationship between the EU and the Western 
Balkans embodied in Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) 
have now entered into force for all six countries, only Montenegro (28 
chapters opened, 3 provisionally closed) and Serbia (12 chapters opened, 2 
provisionally closed)1 continue their accession negotiations. In the mean-
time, Albania awaits the opening of its first negotiating chapters condi-
tioned by a convincing track record in implementation of judicial reform. 
Despite being the first Western Balkan country to sign the SAA with the 
EU, following the end of a deep and prolonged political crisis, Macedonia 
must implement Urgent Reform Priorities concerning the functioning of 
rule of law and the “Prespa Agreement” in order to open accession nego-
tiations. Bosnia and Herzegovina filed its accession application, but then it 
took almost two years only to submit responses to the EU accession Ques-
tionnaire. The EU and Kosovo held their first SAA Council meeting in 
November 2016, however due to prolonged internal political stalemate in 
the country EU integration had not progressed ever since.
Contrary to initial hopes that the accession of the region to the EU will 
gradually introduce a liberal democratic form of government founded on 
the rule of law in six non-EU Western Balkan countries, serious backslid-
ing in terms of democracy and the rule of law can be observed throughout 
the region over the past decade (Freedom House, 2018; BTI, 2016). Several 
countries are governed by semi-authoritarian leaders whose commitment 
to political transformation is lukewarm at best. While liberal democratic 
Western Balkan governments seem to identify with the EU, they often 
remain overshadowed by the high number of domestic formal and infor-
mal ‘gate keeper’ elites that continue to control the state in an effort to pre-
serve their private economic interests and their grip on political power. 
Moreover, the Western Balkans is suffering from a development gap. 
Despite rapid growth recorded in the early 2000s, effective economic reforms 
have often been delayed due to the fact that regional economies are incapa-
ble of withstanding the competitive pressures of the EU common market. 
Throughout much of the Western Balkans, economies have remained lag-
ging behind the EU, often relying on aid, loans and remittances, and prone 
to high levels of state intervention. With the current average growth rates, it 
will take these countries at least several decades to converge with the average 
EU GDP per capita (Sanfey and Milatović, 2018). The demographic picture 
of some countries with the “oldest” populations in Europe and low birth rates 
1 In the time of writing this chapter.
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is causing additional concerns for the future. Emigration from the region is 
persistent and is no longer driven by political, but economic conditions as 
well. 
In addition to the democratic and socio-economic setbacks in the 
region, numerous unresolved bilateral disputes and incomplete processes 
of reconciliation after the 1990s violent conflicts threaten to undermine 
fragile regional stability (Dimitrov, Djolai and Wunsch, 2015). The EU’s 
“unfinished business” in the Balkans opens the door to various political, 
economic and security alternatives as powerful geopolitical actors, particu-
larly the US, Russia, Turkey, China and countries of the Gulf are increas-
ingly competing for economic influence and for political dominance in 
the countries on the outskirts of the EU (See for example Bechev 2017; 
Bartlett et al. 2017). Frustration with the inability to progress in EU acces-
sion could easily translate the already growing Euro-skepticism into more 
openly anti-Western sentiments, which could be followed by a further rise 
of populism, nationalism and possibly even religious fundamentalism in 
some of the countries in the region. 
Finally, in its latest Enlargement Strategy entitled “The Credible 
Enlargement Perspective for the Western Balkans”, the European Com-
mission (2018) too has acknowledged the lack of progress among cur-
rent EU candidate countries. Going beyond the usual diplomatic language 
used in the EU Progress Reports, the Commission has established that “the 
[Western Balkan] countries show clear elements of state capture, including 
links with organised crime and corruption at all levels of government and 
administration” (European Commission, 2018). Furthermore, the docu-
ment added that “none of the Western Balkans can currently be considered 
a functioning market economy nor to have the capacity to cope with the 
competitive pressure and market forces in the union” (European Commis-
sion, 2018).
So why, after almost two decades of ongoing enlargement process, 
does Europeanisation of the region fail to produce more than just surface-
level reforms? This study conceptualizes and investigates the factors that 
explain the reasons for (non-) compliance with EU accession conditions 
embodied in the political, economic and administrative accession crite-
ria, focusing on both the supply and demand sides of the enlargement. 
Operationally, by taking stock of the identified gap between norm adop-
tion and implementation, we highlight the lack of accountability of the 
political ‘elites’ in charge of the enlargement process –EU actors mostly 
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coming from the Member States, and domestic elites– as well as omissions 
in the EU’s strategy for norm diffusion in order to explain the (d)evolution 
of rule transfers. 
The empirical analysis draws on in-depth case studies of the six 
remaining non-EU Western Balkan countries. All cases display critical 
similarities in terms of potential explanations – they are targeted by the 
same policy of enlargement, premised on similar institutional settings, 
and driven by the same package of incentives. In addition, over the past 
decade all of the countries involved experienced a deep-rooted system of 
state capture that impeded the consolidation of liberal democratic society 
based on the rule of law. Yet, some of the countries experience additional 
impediments to their EU membership paths, such as bilateral condition-
ality imposed by neighbouring EU member states, as in the case of Mac-
edonia due to ongoing name dispute with Greece, or non-recognition by 
five EU member states, as observed in the case of Kosovo. The combined 
comparative insights from the cases makes it possible to trace the possi-
ble patterns in explaining the deficiencies in EU norm promotion through 
enlargement to the Western Balkan candidate countries.
The results of the research presented in this chapter are based upon a 
combination of two methodological strands. First, we will employ a nor-
mative approach by means of a content analysis of the EU Progress Reports 
and legal rules and administrative regulations which were adopted and 
implemented in the candidate countries as a basis upon which to raise the 
standards in political, economic and administrative sectors tested against 
the external demands established within the EU accession process. Second, 
through a problem-oriented empirical approach, we will assess the practi-
cal aspects of enforcing political and economic transformation, analyzing 
progress, and singling out gaps between legislation and implementation 
of reforms. Particularly, we will highlight the political, administrative and 
societal context in which these dynamics are operating. 
The chapter is organized in six major parts. Following the introduc-
tion, the second part of the chapter outlines theoretical approaches to 
Europeanisation of EU candidate countries reflecting on the induction of 
compliance with the EU norms. Next three sections will draw on the exten-
sive desk and field research aiming to trace the compliance with accession 
conditionality criteria set-forth by the European Commission in fields of 
rule of law, economy and acquis communautaire, defining possible gaps 
and analysing main reasons for them. This is followed with a concluding 
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section which translates the main findings of this chapter into tangible rec-
ommendations with regard to varying level of compliance to EU condi-
tionality across different policy fields. 
Theoretical Approaches to Europeanisation  
Beyond the EU Member States
Since the 1990s the EU began to use the attractiveness of its member-
ship incentive for the post-communist countries to promote “the exter-
nal projection of internal solutions,” (Lavanex, 2004: 695) manifested in 
a broad range of political and economic membership criteria. The con-
cern of scholars of EU integration thus shifted towards evaluation of norm 
transfer from the EU to the candidate countries and the variation in its 
effectiveness. This led to the creation of the Europeanisation of candidate 
countries as a separate sub-field of the Europeanisation agenda that looks 
not only at the instruments and the degree of EU impact on domestic poli-
tics and policies, but also analyzes how this impact takes place and how 
compliance with the EU norms can be induced (Schimmelfenning 2010; 
2012; Sedelmeier, 2011; Noutcheva, 2015, etc.). Informed literature can be 
seen as arriving at two principal explanations about why candidate coun-
tries adjust to the EU norms, namely the ‘logic of consequentiality’ based 
on ‘rationalist institutionalism,’ and the ‘logic of appropriateness’ based on 
‘constructivist institutionalism’ (March and Olsen, 2004).
Rationalist institutionalism presupposes cost-benefit calculations by 
both EU institutions and domestic elites. It deals with particular questions 
such as the clarity of EU demands, which is particularly problematic in 
the field of rule of law, and the credibility of conditionality in general. It 
assumes that actors choose the behavior that maximizes their utility under 
the circumstances. The ‘logic of consequences’ goes on to claim that the 
cost-benefit calculations of the candidate country can be successfully 
manipulated by the EU through external incentives. The predominant 
mechanism for the Europeanisation of candidate countries is conditional-
ity based on the strategy of reinforcement by reward (Schimmelfenning 
and Sedelmeier, 2004).
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Constructivist institutionalism, on the other hand, deals with the 
process of ‘norm socialization,’ in which domestic elites and populations 
at large internalize EU norms which they regard as legitimate. Instead of 
directly manipulating or indirectly influencing the cost-benefit calcula-
tions of the candidate countries, constructivists suggest that rule transfer 
can only be effective if elites and populations in candidate countries iden-
tify with the EU and are thus open to behavioral change by “social learning” 
through ‘soft’ mechanisms for the EU’s domestic impact – socialization and 
persuasion (Checkel, 2005). Thus, Europeanisation in this case works when 
the domestic actors are convinced of the legitimacy and appropriateness of 
EU demands.
The mushrooming literature on the Europeanisation of EU candidate 
countries confirms that credible conditionality has indeed played a signifi-
cant role in the EU integration process, as it has successfully induced pres-
sure on candidates (See for example Elbasani, 2013; Keil, 2013; Noutch-
eva, 2015). At the same time, the overall success of conditionality remains 
dependent on the level of adoption costs for domestic authorities. Alter-
natively, other instruments for promoting EU norms, such as socialization 
of domestic elites and persuasion, do not appear to have been effective 
substitutes for political accession conditionality (Sedelmeier, 2006), even 
though they are described as unique EU strategies.
Furthermore, the literature on compliance distinguishes between 
two dominant paradigms that explain the processes of implementation of 
EU legislation: the ‘enforcement’ and ‘management’ approaches (Tallberg, 
2002). While the ‘enforcement’ approach emphasises the political will 
and the costs of implementation, both financial and administrative, as a 
prevailing factor for variation in compliance, the ‘management’ approach 
focuses on the administrative capacities and limitations as a source of 
compliance or non-compliance with EU rules (Sedelmeier, 2008). Previ-
ous research on compliance in the Central and Eeastern European Coun-
tries (CEECs) has underlined the importance of administrative capacity 
as a prevailing factor for differences in implementation outcomes. Hille 
and Knill’s (2006) comparative study points towards the bureaucratic 
strength and bureaucratic effectiveness of a country as a key factor for 
effective alignment with EU rules. In a similar vein, single case studies 
of compliance with the acquis in the pre-accession stage have linked the 
successful approximation and implementation of EU legislation with high 
administrative capacity and well-established coordination mechanisms 
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for transposition (Maniokas, 2009) and the institutionalisation of a strong 
core domestic executive (Zubek, 2005). 
Empirical findings show that although the acquis communautaire 
is at the core of Europeanisation in candidate countries, the contents of 
Europeanisation are “of a more general character” (Schimmelfenning, 
2012: 22). This particularly relates to the ‘core goals’ of Europeanisation, 
such as democratization and the rule of law. Europeanisation therefore 
has differentiated impact not only across countries, but also across various 
issues (Schimmelfenning, 2012), as our study confirms. While the enlarge-
ment has “considerably contributed” (Lavanex, 2004: 695) to the political 
transformation in Central and Eastern Europe by exporting the rule of 
law, recent trends are raising concerns about the effectiveness of the EU’s 
mechanisms to influence current EU candidates. 
This study contributes to the emerging Europeanisation theory lit-
erature by analyzing the impact of the EU norm diffusion in the Western 
Balkan candidate countries via assessment of the resonance between EU 
demands (conditions) and domestic rules (implementation). Specifically, 
we argue that besides the declared “credibility of enlargement” for the 
Western Balkans, their accession path remains all but credible as two main 
variables of credibility are missing – the first being determinacy, clarity 
and consistency of membership conditions, and the second being the cer-
tainty of the promise of full membership when these conditions are met. 
These factors are directly linked with the lack of incentives for investing in 




The principles of rule of law, human dignity, freedom, democracy, equal-
ity and human rights are defined by Article 2 TEU as a value upon which 
the Union itself is founded and which are ‘common to the Member States’. 
Most of these principles were not defined by the founders of the EU. They 
have instead become a predominant organizational model of contemporary 
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constitutional law, a dynamic “meta-principle” (Pech, 2009) providing a firm 
foundation for the functioning of the EU. Apart from standing as pillars of 
EU identity, these principles are now operationally used as an eligibility crite-
rion for EU membership (Magen, 2016).
Political membership requirements were first addressed within the 
accession context in respect to the Mediterranean enlargements of the 
1980s for the three post-authoritarian countries acceding to the EU within 
the wider framework of their respective democratic transitions. Yet, it was 
not until the prospect of Eastern Enlargement that the EU enhanced its 
political membership requirements. In regard to the CEECs, the European 
Commission (2007) defined its political criteria in Agenda 2000 as a com-
bination of free and fair elections, political pluralism, freedom of expres-
sion and freedom of religion, the need for democratic institutions, and the 
independent judicial and constitutional authorities. Even so, this approach 
was criticized for its rather “simplistic sum” (Tatham, 2009: 209) of the rule 
of law and democracy, and the lack of “actual substance” (Leino, 2002: 80).
Only with the prospect of enlargement to the South East European 
(SEE) countries did the EU become more aware of the need to provide 
content criteria, or benchmarks, by which to measure success or failure in 
fulfilling the principle of democracy and the rule of law for EU acceding 
countries (Smilov, 2006). Hence, in its April 1997 Conclusions, the General 
Affairs Council declared the political criteria SEE countries need to fulfil 
to conclude an SAA – which marks only the beginning of the contrac-
tual relationship between the EU and the candidate country. This time the 
Council made express reference to the rule of law, as it concluded that each 
SEE country must be ready to demonstrate (1) the separation of execu-
tive, legislative and judicial powers, (2) effective means of redress against 
administrative decisions, (3) access to courts and the right to a fair trial, (4) 
equality before the law, and (5) freedom from inhumane or degrading treat-
ment and arbitrary arrest. Additional clarifications aimed at each potential 
candidate country individually were voiced by the European Commission 
in its Progress (previously Regular) Reports (Kochenov, 2008). By analysis 
of these documents it can be observed that EU requires Western Balkan 
countries to demonstrate a credible track record of properly functioning 
judicial system, effective fight against corruption, and protection of funda-
mental rights.
The EU’s 2011 ‘new approach’ concerning the prioritization of the rule 
of law reforms in candidate countries was seen as an attempt to learn the 
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lessons of previous enlargements and to avoid having to initiate a Coop-
eration and Verification Mechanism after accession. The new approach 
rests on the principle that issues relating to the judiciary and fundamental 
rights and justice, freedom, and security “should be tackled early in the 
accession process and the corresponding chapters opened accordingly on 
the basis of action plans, as they require the establishment of convincing 
track records” (European Commission, 2011: 5). Furthermore, the ‘new 
approach’ envisages an interim benchmarking system that would assess 
the country’s preparedness to open and close a negotiating chapter, and 
introduces safeguard measures, most notably the overall balance clause, 
intended to stop negotiations on other chapters if progress on chapters 23 
and 24 begins to lag behind. 
More broadly, the Commission continues to use all other available 
instruments to strengthen the rule of law in candidate countries, includ-
ing through its regular monitoring via joint bodies under the SAA, expert 
assessment missions, and structured dialogues currently existing in Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. The ‘new approach’ has 
placed particular emphasis on involvement of local stakeholders, including 
civil society organizations, in dialogue and monitoring. These actions are 
paired with generous financial assistance with a major focus on rule of law 
under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) II. In addition, the 
EU supports institutional and human capacity building through its Techni-
cal Assistance and Information Exchange instrument of the European Com-
mission (TAIEX) and twinning projects which bring public administration 
officials and other experts in law enforcement from the Member States into 
direct contact with their Western Balkan counterparts. Finally, the rule of 
law is supported through other EU instruments through projects that sup-
port democracy and human rights at country-specific, regional, or global 
coverage, namely the Instrument Contributing to Peace and Stability, the 
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and thematic pro-
grams of the Development Co-operation Instrument.
Nevertheless, despite its evident prominence in the EU enlargement 
policy, there is still no uniform ‘European standard’ for institution-building 
or monitoring activities by the EU in the rule of law and democracy area. 
Hence, the EU democracy and rule of law diffusion taking part within the 
enlargement tends to measure alignment with the acquis against formal 
legal and institutional benchmarks with primary emphasis on the judiciary 
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(Carothers, 2006; Magen 2007; 2008; 2016). In the next sections, this study 
shows negative externalities of the specified approach.
The Reform of the Judiciary
In an attempt to excel at their EU integration, all of the Western Balkan 
countries produced comprehensive strategies for judicial reform between 
2004 in Macedonia and 2016 in Albania. The documents introduced 
required Constitutional amendments, established novel Judicial and Pros-
ecutors’ Councils, as well as instruments for training and capacity building 
in the judiciary across the region. Adopted legislative frameworks guar-
anteeing judicial independence became highly sophisticated, and “if fully 
observed, should generally ensure a proper functioning of the judicial 
system to a high standard,” as observed in Macedonia within the Priebe 
Report (2015: 9). However, the evident problem across the region remains 
poor implementation of adopted norms prompted by specific legal, politi-
cal, economic, cultural and historical influences, pressures, threats or 
interference. As seen in the Montenegro 2016 Progress Report (European 
Commission, 2016e), the Commission recognizes the favourable legisla-
tive framework on the judiciary that has strengthened its independence 
and professionalism, but concludes that adopted laws have not yet been 
fully implemented. 
Accumulated evidence of the relationship between the judiciary, crime 
and politics clearly indicates that the judicial apparatus in the Western 
Balkans has gradually turned into a mechanism facilitating state capture, 
and that the main problem regarding the functioning rule of law remains 
precisely the political influence over judiciary. The European Commission 
has acknowledged politically motivated threats on the judiciary in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (European Commission, 2016b), it has criticized political 
comments on ongoing investigations and cases that continue to call judi-
cial independence into question in Serbia (European Commission, 2016f), 
or has established that dominant influence of politicisation, corruption 
and weak inter-institutional cooperation hampers the Albanian judiciary 
(European Commission, 2016c). 
Secondary sources shed more light to the Commission’s findings, as 
seen particularly in the explosive leaked wiretapped materials from which 
Macedonians have learned of striking influence that the government led 
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by Nikola Gruevski had on the judiciary. A series of discussions involving 
top state officials, judges and pro-government news editors exposed party 
patronage and informality as the main impediments in judicial operations 
in the country.2 The disclosed wiretapped materials show, for example, how 
a former Minister of Justice and members of his immediate family bluntly 
interfered with court processes (Marušić, 2015). The public in Albania has 
learned of selective justice implemented towards the government’s politi-
cal opponents (Elbasani, 2017). Alternatively, the judiciary was persistently 
obstructing and ultimately closing for various procedural reasons cases of 
high-level abuse of power, which is another indicator of political influence 
over the judicial system (Kmezić, 2017). So far, none of the high level cases 
of abuse of power have been brought to closure, while a handful of judg-
ments over political corruption concerned lower ranking state secretar-
ies, heads of sectors, and local government officials (Taleski, Kmezić and 
Pollozhani, 2016). In Macedonia the Government abused the judiciary in 
an attempt to prevent unforeseen costs to the state budget by instructing 
judges not to reward compensation for damages when the state was sued 
(Taleski, Kmezić and Pollozhani, 2016). In addition, it was noted that the 
government and public administration are not implementing laws perti-
nent to the independence of the judiciary and they are not respecting court 
decisions. 
Clearly such practice echoed in the lack of popular trust in judici-
ary, whereas according to the latest Balkan Barometer region-wide sur-
vey nearly eighty percent of Western Balkan citizens considered courts as 
susceptible to political influences (Balkan Barometer, 2017: 125). Experts 
corroborate such findings, as shown in a survey involving judges and rule 
of law professionals, where the majority of respondents indicated undue 
political influence as the main impediment to the independence of the 
judiciary in Macedonia (Taleski, Kmezić and Pollozhani, 2016).
How did the Western Balkans get here and why did the judiciary become 
an enabler of widespread corruption and abuse of office? Indeed, this mani-
festation did not occur over night. A historical overview of the evolution of 
the judiciary branch in the region tells a story of fundamental cultural predis-
positions shaped by the strong legacy of communist rule in the administrative 
sphere, whereby various formal and informal institutions were traditionally 
2 For more information: “Interactive Overview of Macedonia’s Largest Wire-Tapping 
Scandal”, Al Jazeera. Available at: 4http://interactive.aljazeera.com/ajb/2015/make 
donija-bombe/eng/index.html.
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in a dominant role over justice regardless of legal guarantees of its independ-
ence (Kmezić, 2017). Embarking on a democratic transition in the late 1990s, 
the judiciary was already vulnerable and open to infiltration by party cronies 
belonging to the new political elites. In addition to the initial placing of loy-
alists without enough professional qualifications throughout the system, the 
establishment managed to keep the judicial appointments and promotions in 
control, thus creating an informal institutional network that carried out the 
party patronage line. 
The Judicial Councils – autonomous bodies established to achieve the 
independence and self-government of the judiciary, were effectively sub-
dued to the executive either via government appointment to the Judicial 
Council as seen in Macedonia, or through neglect and non-implementation 
of Council’s decisions as observed in Serbia. Furthermore, the administra-
tive evaluation of judges’ performance that may result in election, promo-
tion or removal from office, was widely performed by politically appointed 
court presidents against quantitative criteria, such as the percentage of 
repealed decisions under legal remedy and the number of resolved cases 
per year in Macedonia; or against vaguely set qualitative criteria in Serbia 
and Montenegro, thus in both cases setting fertile ground for nontranspar-
ent decision making. In addition, inadequate funding of the judiciary has 
hampered court operations as government-imposed budgetary constraints 
were used as a mechanism of control over the judiciary (US State Depart-
ment, 2014: 6). Furthermore, covert political influence was also exercised 
from within the judiciary through the role of the court’s administration, 
which manipulated the assignments of politically sensitive cases and influ-
enced the court budgets.
From the above overview it can be concluded that despite the EU’s 
long-term involvement in initiating, negotiating and financing major insti-
tutional reforms in the Western Balkans, judicial systems throughout the 
region have failed to create favourable conditions for the personal inde-
pendence of judges. The Judicial Councils were unsuccessful in building 
their integrity using the existing legislative framework, while political 
influence over judiciary – particularly seen in the content of judgments 
in high profile or politically sensitive cases – reinforced elements of state 
capture. 
Instead of focusing on the perceived negligence towards constitutional 
and legal guarantees for the judicial independence and its instrumentali-
zation for political oppression, the EU’s rule of law strengthening efforts 
Europeanisation and Institutionalisation of EU Rules in the Western Balkans 33
focused mostly on increasing technical capacities of judiciary, improve-
ment of court infrastructure, providing initial and continuous training 
of judges, reducing the backlog of cases, establishing centralized criminal 
records registries, and mediation systems. Hence, most of the EU’s inter-
ventions remained of a superficial character failing to investigate histori-
cal processes and main actors of corruption and informality behind the 
façade of judicial independence. But even here, the EU’s track record of 
reforms remains mixed as observed in negligible or non-improvement in 
the backlog of court cases across the region, except in Macedonia where 
court backlogs have not been an issue of concern for several years now. Yet, 
even in Macedonia the overall length of court proceedings from initiation 
to final judgment still remains a concern in a number of old cases (Euro-
pean Commission, 2016g).
Most importantly, this analysis has identified the lack of determination 
of EU officials to publicly name and shame corrupt individuals responsible 
for the lack of progress in rule of law reforms. Even when confronted with 
concrete evidence, as in the case of the wire-tapping scandal in Macedo-
nia, the EU has remained rather silent on democratic backsliding in the 
country. By choosing to strengthen formal institutions in unconsolidated 
democracies, the EU’s top-down institutional approach failed to fulfil its 
primary purpose – to create a system in which citizens trust the law and 
state institutions.
Media Freedom
Media freedom is frequently seen as a corollary to the general right to free-
dom of expression. This comes as no surprise, since a diverse and impar-
tial media is in fact a crucial promoter, but also protector, of freedom of 
expression (Lichtenberg, 1991). Within the context of enlargement, the 
European Commission tests candidate countries’ commitment to promot-
ing media freedom. Given the apparent lack of definition of media mar-
kets in the acquis, the Commission has produced a number of objectives 
used to test the state of media in aspiring member states. These include 
creation of an enabling legal, regulatory and policy environment for the 
exercise of rights of freedom of expression and media and media integ-
rity; increased resilience of media against external pressures; securing 
qualitative and trustworthy investigative journalism available to citizens; 
34  Ivan Damjanovski and Marko Kmezić
and, increasing capacity and representativeness of journalist professional 
organizations capable of taking responsibility of sector relevant issues in 
dialogue with authorities as well as providing services to their members 
(European Commission, 2014b). These objectives are paired with tangible 
benchmarks such as the annual assessments of existing legislation affect-
ing media, the number of rulings related to media and their consistency 
with European Court for Human Rights case law, the number of state-
ments by public officials having self-censorship effects on media, the num-
ber of physical attacks, threats and other forms of intimidation of media, 
transparency in dispatching state aid and financial assistance provided by 
state-owned companies, etc. 
In order to foster media reforms, the Commission offers a combi-
nation of political and financial support to meet the objectives. Political 
support foresees involvement of media and civil society in the accession 
process, including in the monitoring of sector strategies for EU financial 
assistance, while economic support focuses on advocacy and capacity 
building aiming primarily at decreasing media organizations’ dependency 
on international donor funding, including funding from the EU. 
However, despite all the EU’s efforts, media freedom is still in continu-
ous deterioration across the board in the Western Balkans. According to 
Freedom House’s annual Freedom Press Report, regional media is consid-
ered only partly free (2018). The Media Sustainability Index, produced by 
the IREX, reports on the “collapse of law, ethics, professionalism, and social 
norms” (IREX, 2016), which marked the previous year in the media field 
in the Western Balkans. According to both sources, regional press freedom 
has declined for seven years in a row, with setbacks registered in the legal, 
political and economic environment.
Addressing the EU objectives relating to the media sphere, Western Bal-
kan countries have all adopted ambitious Media Strategy Plans focusing on 
a new set of legal acts dealing with public media systems, media ownership 
and financing, the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media, and privatization, 
as these were regarded as the key issues concerning media diversity, freedom 
and pluralism. Although the EU has praised current candidate countries for 
putting in place legal and institutional conditions for creating an enabling 
environment for freedom of expression (see for example European Com-
mission, 2014a), the fact is that the media scene throughout the region has 
not yet improved, mostly due to political influence on media.
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By taking a broader historical perspective into account, it can be 
observed that backsliding in media freedom in the Balkans is neither a 
recent trend nor an exception, but rather the rule. Following 40 years of 
communist rule marked by the strict control of media (Jović, 2008), it was 
in the late 1980s that press freedom was curtailed by the emerging nation-
alist and authoritarian political elites. This media landscape was formally 
pluralist, but it remained heavily government-controlled. Furthermore, the 
economic vulnerability of independent journalists provided opportunity 
for economic interference in the media, including influence exercised by 
the representatives of foreign capital.
The new legislative framework has failed to break the patronage chain 
and prevent political influence on media. First, new laws have omitted to 
regulate state advertising and at the same time allowed for the co-financing 
of media projects of common interest as a permissible form of state aid. 
These categories, therefore, remain unregulated and non-transparent, and 
as such they remain potential tools for the creation of clientelistic relations 
between state bodies and the media. According to a study prepared by the 
Balkans Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN), in 2012 and 2013, Ser-
bian Government, together with its specialized agencies and public com-
panies, have spent approximately 12.5 million EUR on media. Half of this 
sum was shared between only four media outlets, while the other half was 
divided among 500 other recipients (Maksić, 2015). In addition, pressure 
on media comes from marketing agencies that are intimately connected 
to the ruling elites (Tadić and Šajkaš, 2016). For instance, after the change 
of power in Serbia following the 2012 elections, the Mediapool market-
ing agency run by Goran Veselinović, the former employer of the current 
Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, became the most influential actor in 
the advertising business despite having a relatively low profile until then 
(Georgiev and Đorđević, 2014). 
Further, media privatization was marked by numerous controversies, 
including purchasing media by party cronies, with examples of family 
members of governing Ministers privatizing local media, or privatiza-
tions implemented by a legal entity wholly or partly financed from public 
funds (Dobrašinović, 2016). Thus, political influence and control of the 
media has survived the ownership transformation only to reappear in a 
new shape.
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Particularly worrisome are political influences on public media broad-
casters. These are based on budgetary dependence of public media broad-
casters, as in the case of Montenegro and Albania (European Commission 
2016e; 2016c). However, even in cases of properly regulated public fund-
ing, the 2016 dismissal of the entire editorial team and several journalists 
at Radio Television Vojvodina (RTV), coinciding with a change in power 
in the northern Serbian province, raise serious concerns about the proper 
implementation of the Law on Pubic Service Media. In an open letter, 77 
journalists and editors in the RTV condemned the wave of dismissals and 
demanded an explanation as to whether the dismissals were politically moti-
vated (Dragojlo, 2016).
Particularly worrisome is the trend of abuse of state bodies in order 
to prevent the work of journalists. In a 2015 incident involving the Bel-
grade communal police, journalists working for two independent news 
organizations, KRIK and Istinomer, were prevented from reporting on 
the controversial Belgrade Waterfront project (Radišić, 2015). Criminal 
law remains a significant potential pressure mechanism on the media, 
in particular through using open-ended concepts such as public dis-
turbance, incitement to hatred or security-related standards. In addi-
tion, judges remain unaccustomed to key international legal documents 
relating to freedom of speech, as well as the practice developed by the 
European Court of Human Rights (Kmezić, 2015). As a result it happens 
that, as in the case of Stojan Marković, journalists are held responsi-
ble even for satirical articles about public officials (NUNS 2014), which 
fully contradicts established European Court for Human Rights case law 
(See for example Oberschlick v. Austria (No 2)). As seen in the case of 
Zrenjaninske novine in Serbia, the Government selectively uses its tax 
policies so that critical media may be shot down as a reprisal for their 
critical journalism, while loyal media, as can be observed in the case of 
TV Pink, allegedly are allowed to owe millions of euros in unpaid taxes 
(Barlovac, 2015).
Finally, government officials are involved in formal manifestations of 
media abuse observed in direct pressure on the media. Matić (2016) estab-
lishes that pressures on the editors-in-chief are more powerful than any legal 
pressure to respect the rights of others. In such cases, the editors serve as bro-
kers in the clientelistic chain. Their dependency is based on the previously 
established pattern of politically driven appointments of chief editors in the 
remnants of the state owned media, and their low paid incomes under the 
Europeanisation and Institutionalisation of EU Rules in the Western Balkans 37
private ownership. Over the past five years, government officials, including 
most prominently Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić, repeatedly engaged 
in transparent confrontations with journalists and media outlets (BIRN, 
2015a). Remnants of publicly owned media and mushrooming tabloid jour-
nals are used to back up such attacks and continue smear campaigns against 
independent news outlets and critical journalists. 
Comparing the set of newly adopted media laws with described fea-
tures of the crisis of press freedom over the past decade in the region, it 
can be concluded that despite the ongoing Europeanisation process, media 
freedom in the Western Balkans still remains deficient owing to shortfalls 
in norm implementation and political restrains imposed on journalists. 
The absence of an independent, efficient and accountable judiciary and 
police additionally aggravates the position of media in the region. Media 
freedom is guaranteed if media outlets are financially viable, free from 
intervention by owners and the state, and if journalists are guaranteed reli-
able and efficient protection. In the Western Balkans none of this is the 
case. Yet, it seems that despite its importance for the democratic func-
tioning of a country, media freedom is “not necessarily the most central 
element of establishing compliance with EU norms,” as concluded in the 
European Parliament’s study (2014: 7). In this regard, it is no surprise that 
non-compliance with this part of the Copenhagen political criteria had 
only a “negligible effect” (Vogel 2015: 10) on Serbia’s standing in Brussels. 
This is perhaps best observed in a statement made by Johannes Hahn, the 
Commissionaire for the European Neighbourhood and Enlargement, who 
claimed he needed “proof, not rumors” (BIRN, 2015b) in order to react to 
violations of media freedom in the region. 
Compliance
This chapter sets out to explore structural impediments and limitations 
to the political part of accession criteria compliance in EU candidate 
countries. Despite the evidence of limited progress in judiciary reforms 
and media freedom, this research highlights serious and persistent gaps 
between European standards in these thematic areas and the realities on 
the ground in the Western Balkans. 
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Table 2.1. Level of preparedness in fulfilling the political criteria
Criterion Montene-
gro










































Source: European Commission 2016 country reports
Pursuing the theoretical framework of Europeanisation studies, we have 
identified two sets of obstructing factors explaining the apparent gap 
between the adoption and implementation of the EU promoted politi-
cal reforms in the Western Balkans. On the supply side, i.e. on the side of 
the EU processes and strategies, these are the lack of clarity and credibility 
of EU conditionality while on the demand side, concerning the domestic 
drive for reforms, these relate to the obstructionist potential of gatekeeper 
elites and legacies of the past.
First, we have confirmed that the accession system is only loosely 
rooted in the EU Treaties, which despite the elaborated system of bench-
marks, still hinders the clarity of EU conditions. An additional predica-
ment arises from the difficulty of quantitatively verifying the achieved level 
of compliance with regard to the Copenhagen political criteria. In contrast 
to economic reform, little can be established with accuracy in the field of 
the rule of law and democracy due to the very nature of these concepts. 
Hence, during the accession process the EU mostly engages in technical 
issues related to legislative improvement and smart design of formal insti-
tutions aiming to improve the rule of law reforms in candidate countries. 
However, as this study has demonstrated, legal-institutional measures 
alone cannot engineer the firm political and societal support needed to 
succeed in the transformation process. Moreover, the credibility of con-
ditionality is closely linked with the ability of the EU to efficiently moni-
tor the fulfilment of its requirements. Although the transparency of the 
overall monitoring process has recently increased with the adoption of 
recalibrated progress reports, the observed practice of repeatedly ignoring 
evident shortcomings in rule of law implementation and failure to publicly 
‘name and shame’ politicians responsible for the obstruction of democracy 
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in candidate countries considerably impedes the credibility of EU’s acces-
sion conditionality. 
On the demand side, which concerns the drive for political reforms 
within the accession countries, we observed problems relating to the 
obstructive role of domestic ruling elites and legacies from the past. The 
main obstacles to democratic reform in the Western Balkans are not techni-
cal or financial, but rather political. The political transformation promoted 
by the EU indirectly aims at extending the accountability of individuals to 
the legislation of the state. This endeavour threatens the rent-seeking inter-
ests of domestic political elites by increasing the prospects of them losing 
their position in power, and possibly even resulting in them facing crimi-
nal indictment and imprisonment, as seen in the case of former Croatian 
former Prime Minister Ivo Sanader. Hence, despite their declarative com-
mitment to reforms, the actions of political elites are dominantly focused 
on the refusal to cede traditional impunity and vested interest manifested 
in regularized patterns of delaying key reforms that would lead to a sub-




Economic governance has been an important criterion for accession into 
the EU since the very onset of EU enlargement. Its importance continued 
to grow especially in the wake of the Mediterranean enlargements and the 
challenge to integrate the less developed economies of Greece, Spain and 
Portugal (Tatham, 2009: 224–225). As the economic competences of the 
EU and the establishment of the Common Market continued to grow, the 
appropriate economic performance and institutional adjustment of the 
candidate countries has become a necessary condition for advancement 
in all stages of the accession process. This notion has been considerably 
amplified at the beginning of the 1990s with the introduction of the pro-
visions of the Economic and Monetary Union by the Maastricht Treaty 
(Hillion, 2004) and the enormous challenge of enlarging the EU with the 
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post-communist countries from Eastern and Central Europe (CEECs). 
This necessitated a stricter and more detailed conditionality approach 
which has been initiated with the decision of the Copenhagen Council 
in 1993 to further formalize (among others) the economic criteria for 
membership. Thus, the so-called second Copenhagen criterion entailed 
“the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to 
cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union” as 
necessary conditions for accession. (European Council, 1993). The Euro-
pean Commission further developed the scope of the economic criteria in 
its communication “Agenda 2000”. The document presented a much more 
detailed explanation of the economic conditions for accession by breaking 
down the Copenhagen economic criteria into a larger number of sub cri-
teria. Thus, the first economic criterion, i.e. the existence of a functioning 
market economy was further developed with the introduction of 6 formal 
requirements (European Commission, 1997): 
– equilibrium between demand and supply is established by the free in-
terplay of market forces; prices, as well as trade, are liberalised;
– significant barriers to market entry (establishment of new firms) and 
exit (bankruptcies) are absent;
– the legal system, including the regulation of property rights, is in place; 
laws and contracts can be enforced;
– macroeconomic stability has been achieved including adequate price 
stability and sustainable public finances and external accounts;
– broad consensus exists about the essentials of economic policy;
– the financial sector is sufficiently well developed to channel savings 
towards productive investment. 
In a similar manner, the second criterion, i.e. the capacity to withstand 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union has been broken 
down into five sub criteria (European Commission, 1997):
– the existence of a functioning market economy, with a sufficient de-
gree of macroeconomic stability for economic agents to make deci-
sions in a climate of stability and predictability;
– a sufficient amount, at appropriate costs, of human and physical 
capital, including infrastructure (energy supply, telecommunication, 
transport, etc.), education and research, and future developments in 
this field;
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– the extent to which government policy and legislation influence com-
petitiveness through trade policy, competition policy, state aids, sup-
port for SMEs, etc.;
– the degree and the pace of trade integration a country achieves with 
the Union before enlargement. This applies both to the volume and 
the nature of goods already traded with Member States;
– the proportion of small firms, partly because small firms tend to ben-
efit more from improved market access, and partly because a domi-
nance of large firms could indicate a greater reluctance to adjust.
This classification of the criteria has been employed by the EU as the prin-
cipal framework for the assessment of the progress in satisfying the eco-
nomic conditions for the candidate countries from both Central and East-
ern Europe and the Western Balkans regions. 
The lessons learnt from the accession process of the CEECs prompted 
the EU to further streamline its conditionality policy towards the Western 
Balkan applicant countries. Economic conditionality constitutes a major 
part of the Stabilisation and Association Process, as its main instrument, 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreements, has been primarily economic 
in its scope (Shelton, 2015). Even more, EU’s principal enlargement policy 
framework, the new Enlargement strategy which was first introduced in 
2005 promoted rigorous conditionality as one of its fundamental pillars. 
The inaugural Strategy document encompassed a benchmarking system of 
compliance assessment, which in the economic field emphasized the fulfil-
ment of contractual obligations under the association agreement as a major 
condition for progress in the accession process (European Commission, 
2005). The formalization of economic criteria was further bolstered by the 
2013 and 2014 enlargement strategy which introduced a new ‘fundamentals 
first’ approach towards compliance with the economic requirements. With 
this, the EU has effectively put economic governance as one of the three 
key priorities of the enlargements process. The new approach introduced 
changes in the dialogue structure between the EU and the applicant states 
through increased determinacy of the assessment process and by provid-
ing further guidance for reforms. In this sense, the strategy introduced a 
new requirement for the candidates and potential candidate countries, 
which as of 2015 have to submit annual Economic Reform Programmes, 
comprised of two elements: a macroeconomic and fiscal programme, envis-
aged as an enhanced continuation of the previous Pre-Accession Economic 
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Programmes (introduced in 2001); and a structural reforms and competi-
tiveness programme (European Commission 2013; 2014c). Finally, the 2016 
enlargement strategy introduced a new refined methodology of assessment 
which encompassed a slight adjustment of the sub-criteria for the two eco-
nomic conditions which have been used as an assessment framework for 
almost 20 years. This revision of the sub-criteria puts more emphasis on 
highlighting the main economic shortcomings and a more streamlined 
analysis of the deficiencies in the functioning of the markets and weakness 
in competitiveness (European Commission, 2016a). Under this methodo-
logical framework the existence of a functioning market economy is meas-
ured through the assessment of several sub-criteria that encompass the 
applicant country’s policy commitment to economic governance, macro-
economic stability and the functioning of the product and financial mar-
kets. The capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union is measured through evaluation of the performance in the 
areas of education and innovation, the sectoral and enterprise structure and 
the level of trade and economic integration with the EU
Compliance
From an overall regional perspective, the compliance record with the eco-
nomic criteria in the Western Balkans has been a mixed bag. The initial posi-
tive developments at the beginning of the 2000s summed by strong GDP 
growth, increasing FDI’s and declining inflation (Bastian, 2008), has been 
countered by the negative implications of the global financial crisis. Hence, 
macroeconomic policies in the past decade in all Western Balkans coun-
tries have been focused on economic recovery, albeit with a varying degree 
of success. The initially good progress in 2010 and 2011 has been offset by 
recession in 2012 that has been followed by a period of modest recovery. 
On one hand, all Western Balkan countries have been praised for manag-
ing to sustain a high degree of macroeconomic stability with stable financial 
sectors. On the other hand, economic governance in the Western Balkans 
has been marred by serious structural and socio-economic deficiencies. 
According to European Commission’s assessments, none of the applicant 
countries is a functioning market economy or has the capacity to cope with 
the competitive pressure and market forces in the Union (European Com-
mission, 2018). The region has the highest average unemployment in Europe, 
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constantly exceeding 20% of the labour force. The Commission assessments 
of compliance with the economic criteria in the past several years have noted 
many recurring structural shortcomings related to the slow pace of reform 
of labour markets, lack of public sector reforms, increases in budget deficits 
and public debt, low efficiency of the public sector and the negative impact 
of rule of law weaknesses on the business environment. 
Nevertheless, despite the overall modest level of progress in meet-
ing the economic criteria in the Western Balkan region, there is a notable 
cross-country variation in compliance performance. The European Com-
mission assessment of compliance with the economic criteria puts Mac-
edonia, Serbia and Montenegro as frontrunners in regard to the level of 
preparedness in fulfilling the economic conditions, with Albania slightly 
lagging behind, while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are perceived 
as the least prepared (Table 2.2). Regarding the existence of a functioning 
market economy, Macedonia is the only country that has achieved a good 
level of preparation in developing a market economy. Serbia, Montenegro 
and Albania remain moderately prepared. Regarding the capacity to cope 
with competitive pressure within the Union, none of the candidate coun-
tries has a good level of preparedness. Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia 
are only moderately prepared, while Albania has achieved some level of 
preparation. The potential candidates, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kos-
ovo, are at an early stage of compliance in relation to both criteria. 
Table 2.2. Level of preparedness in fulfilling the economic criteria 
Criterion Montene-
gro
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Source: European Commission 2016 country reports
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The country by country analysis of the economic sub-criteria based on the 
assessments in the Commission’s progress reports presents a similar pat-
tern of uneven compliance. 
Montenegro’s stable political consensus on the market economy fun-
damentals has been offset by recent criticism on the country’s lack of 
commitment to economic reforms (European Commission, 2016e). Nev-
ertheless, macroeconomic stability has been slightly improved by recent 
economic growth as the economy’s ability for fast recovery after recession 
proves its resilience to shocks (European Commission, 2015b). However, 
the macroeconomic performance in the past five years has provoked con-
stant criticisms for the high external deficits, weak fiscal position, weak 
sustainability of the external position and a rigid labour market that gener-
ates high unemployment rates. Regarding the functioning of the product 
markets, the business environment has been improving and the number 
of new companies has been growing. However, despite placing “regula-
tory guillotine” legislation for simplification of market entry procedures, 
the project has been criticised for the slow pace of implementation. Com-
pliance with the sub-criteria on state influence on product markets and 
privatisation has been satisfactory as the privatisation process is at an 
advanced stage and state aid has been constantly decreasing in the past 
several years. Regarding the functioning of the financial market, Monte-
negro has managed to improve financial stability by stabilizing the bank-
ing system, but the small size of the non-banking sector is problematic. 
In addition, the high levels of non-performing loans and the dependency 
on external financing remain as significant challenges. In relation to its 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union, Montenegro’s has manifested varied compliance records. The big-
gest challenges relate to low levels of investment in education, research and 
innovation (especially in the private sector) and a considerate skills gap in 
the labour market. On the other hand, the country has been progressing in 
the development of physical infrastructure, especially in the transport and 
energy sectors. However, the long-lasting process of restructuring of the 
economy through a notable expansion of the service sector is marred by a 
large informal segment of the economy. 
In Serbia, the overall commitment towards creating a functioning 
market economy has been strengthened in the past several years. Since 
2014, Serbia has managed to improve its macroeconomic stability portfo-
lio after a period of recession and volatile inflation. Since then, the country 
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has stabilized its currency and reduced inflation, reduced the budget defi-
cit and improved fiscal consolidation. The previously imbalanced macro-
economic policy mix has been stabilised and the growth of exports has 
reduced the external imbalances. Nevertheless, the EU has strongly criti-
cised the structural deficiencies of the labour market and the constantly 
high unemployment rates. Compliance with the functioning of product 
markets sub-criteria has been slow and uneven. Although the set-up of a 
legislative framework for market entry and exit has gradually progressed 
in the past five years, problematic implementation and enforcement of 
laws, red tape and problems in issuing of construction permits have been 
emphasised by the Commission as major impediments for the business 
environment. At the same time, the country has not been successful in lim-
iting state influence on competitiveness as the level of state presence and 
state aid in the economy has remained substantial (European Commission 
2015c; 2016f). The privatisation process hasn’t completed although the 
restructuring and privatisation of state owned companies started to accel-
erate in the past three years. Regarding the functioning of the financial 
market, Serbia has been successful in providing financial stability through 
a well-capitalized and liquid banking system. However, the high rates of 
non-performing loans and the underdeveloped non-banking financial 
sector are perceived as a significant obstacle. Compliance with the second 
criterion has had limited success. As elsewhere in the region, the coun-
try’s educational system hasn’t been able to adequately match the human 
capital market demands. Demands for further investments in education 
and innovation need to be matched with adequate investments in physical 
infrastructure which remains underdeveloped. 
Regarding the overall economic policy of the country, in the last dec-
ade Macedonia has managed to maintain a firm commitment and a broad 
consensus on the fundamentals of a market-oriented economy. However, 
the macroeconomic policy performance has been facing significant chal-
lenges. While the country has been constantly performing well in meeting 
the criteria for macroeconomic stability through implementing stability-
oriented monetary and exchange rates policies, these achievements have 
been offset by continuous structural deficiencies of the labour market and 
the failure of the country’s labour policies to significantly reduce the high 
unemployment rates. In the last five years, the macroeconomic perfor-
mance has been hampered by weakened fiscal discipline and notable rises 
in public debts and borrowing from abroad. Regarding the functioning of 
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product markets, the country has managed to largely complete the privati-
sation and price and trade liberalisation processes, to limit state influence 
on product markets and to largely set up an adequate legal framework for 
market entry and exit. However, the Commission has criticized the size-
able shadow economy, corruption and the uneven implementation and 
enforcement of laws which have been hampering the business environ-
ment (European Commission, 2016g). The functioning of the financial 
market has benefited from a good level of capitalization and liquidity and 
a stable banking sector, however progress in this field has been marred by 
problematic access to finance and underdevelopment of the non-banking 
sectors of the financial market. Compliance with the second economic cri-
terion has been progressing at a slower pace. The EU has criticized the slow 
progress in the diversification of the economy and especially the lack of 
sustainable reforms in the education and innovation sectors. The country 
continues to suffer from weak skillsets of its human capital endowment, 
low capital stock and lack of investments in public infrastructure. Macedo-
nia has had limited success in meeting the conditions for the sectoral and 
enterprise structure, as its structure of the economy has been criticized by 
the Commission for being stagnant, markedly centred on low productivity 
businesses and hampered by a large informal sector. 
In the case of Albania, the country has been able to maintain its com-
mitment towards the development of a market economy. This has been 
matched with satisfactory results in macroeconomic stability as the coun-
try’s economic recovery has been improving, the monetary policy has been 
stabilised and the inflation has been kept low. Nevertheless, several mac-
roeconomic risks prevail, most notably the high level of public debt and 
the high rates of unemployment and informal employment. Regarding the 
functioning of product markets, the business environment has benefited 
from incremental legislative reforms for market entry procedures. How-
ever, the Commission has been constantly criticising the deficiencies in 
rule of law, contract enforcement and enforcement of property rights as 
obstructing factors for the business environment (European Commission 
2015a; 2016c). On the other hand, Albania has progressed well in meet-
ing the conditions on state influence on product markets and privatisa-
tion, as it has been able to limit state presence in the economy and reach 
an advanced stage of privatisation and market liberalisation. Concerning 
the functioning of the financial market, financial stability has been main-
tained via a stable and liquid banking system, which, however, is exposed 
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to credit risks. Growth of the non-banking sector and the lowering of non-
performing loans present significant challenges. Albania’s compliance with 
the second economic criterion is more limited. As in the other candidate 
countries, the economy is hindered by low investments in education and 
innovation. The education system has been criticized for failing to meet 
the demands from the labour market. The development of physical infra-
structure has been below par, as more emphasis needs to be put on the 
transport and energy networks. The structure of the economy has been 
criticised for lack of diversification and the presence of a large informal 
sector. Although services have a major share of the economy, the agricul-
ture sector still takes a significant portion of the economy.
As they are at an early stage of preparation to meet the economic 
criteria, both Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Kosovo are lagging in 
their compliance record in comparison to the candidate countries. Despite 
slight consolidation of its commitment towards market-oriented reforms 
in recent years, the political divisions in BiH have hindered the political 
consensus on its economic policy for most of the last decade. Despite that, 
the country managed to maintain its macroeconomic stability through low 
inflation, appropriate monetary policy and sound currency board manage-
ment. Nevertheless, the macroeconomic outlook is faced with many serious 
challenges. In spite of the declining trends in the last couple of years, public 
debt and external imbalances are still relatively high, economic growth is 
low and the rigidities of the labour market have been constantly generating 
high unemployment. BiH has also had significant difficulties in meeting 
the conditions for the functioning of product markets. The advancement 
of the business environment has been stalled by a slow consolidation of 
the legal framework for market entry and exit, while the competitiveness 
of the markets has been suffering from a large informal economy which is 
estimated to be between 30% and 50% of GDP (European Commission, 
2016b). Compared to the candidate countries, BiH is significantly lagging 
in complying with EU demands on state influence on product markets and 
privatisation. The economy is still substantially influenced by the state and 
the privatisation process is far from completion. Regarding the function-
ing of the financial market, the compliance record is somewhat better. The 
country has been successful in maintaining financial stability, which has 
been supported by a liquid banking sector. As elsewhere in the region, the 
financial sector is burdened by high levels of non-performing loans. The 
country has been limited in its capacity to cope with competitive pressure 
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within the Union. The education and innovation sectors have so far mani-
fested low levels of investment and a big skills mismatch with the labour 
market demands. The EU has been critical of the overall quality of physical 
infrastructure which is in dire need of more investments, particularly in 
the transport and energy sectors. 
Being the youngest and least experienced country in the development 
of economic policies, Kosovo is at an early stage of compliance with the eco-
nomic criteria. The country has maintained a commitment towards develop-
ment of a market economy and has been able to keep up with the regional 
trends of macroeconomic and fiscal stability, at the same time keeping the 
public debt at low levels. However, in terms of economic development there 
is a notable gap with the rest of the region (European Commission, 2016d), 
as the macroeconomic situation is hurting from high external imbalances, 
trade deficits, bad labour market conditions and high unemployment rates. 
Regarding the functioning of product markets, the compliance record has 
been poor. The business environment suffers from slow development of 
an adequate legal framework for market entry and exit, substantial rule of 
law shortcomings and a significant informal economy. At the same time, 
state influence on the product market has been constantly high, while the 
advancement of the privatisation and restructuring processes has been very 
limited. On the other hand, Kosovo’s performance in relation to the func-
tioning of the financial market has been better as the country has been able 
to preserve the stability of the financial sector. Apropos the second economic 
criterion, Kosovo has low capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union. Investments in the education and innova-
tion sector have been very limited while the large skills gap in the labour 
market is contributing towards high youth unemployment in a country that 
has the youngest population in Europe. Improvements in physical infra-
structure have been confined to investments in the road network, whilst the 
energy and water supply infrastructure remains underdeveloped. The secto-
ral and enterprise structure has been marred by a weak private sector, over-
reliance on remittances and a large share of informal economy. 
In sum, despite some progress in recovering their economies from the 
impact of the financial crises and maintaining macroeconomic stability, 
compliance with the economic criteria for the Western Balkan applicants 
is not progressing at the desired pace. Productivity is hampered by low 
investments in infrastructure, education and innovation as the labour mar-
ket suffers from high unemployment and low capacity. Compliance with 
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EU conditions imposes political costs for the ruling elites who are reluc-
tant to accelerate the liberalization of economic governance and substan-
tially reduce the levels of state interference in some sectors of the economy. 
Finally, linkage with the dynamics in compliance with the political criteria 
is evident, as the competitiveness of the economy and the enforcement of 
market liberalization reforms are obstructed by deficiencies in the legal 
systems of the applicant countries. 
Acquis Conditionality (Ability to Assume the Obligations 
of Membership)
Criteria
From an administrative and financial standpoint, the ability to assume the 
obligations of membership is by far the most demanding criterion as it (in 
principle) requires the candidate states to provide timely approximation 
and implementation of the acquis communautaire, i.e. the entire body of 
EU legislation, before they become members of the EU. The approxima-
tion of the existing EU legislation into the domestic legal systems of the 
candidate countries has been the principal requirement for membership 
since the very first wave of enlargement. However, as the scope of EC/EU 
policy making has expanded over the years so has the content and struc-
ture of the acquis. A very common illustration of this evolution is the num-
ber of pages that cover the acquis which have ranged from less than 100 
for the first enlargement in 1973 up to 80,000 for the fifth enlargement in 
2004 (Tathnam, 2009: 229) In 1992, the European Commission defined 
the acquis as “the rights and the obligations actual and potential, of the 
community system and its institutional framework”, which encompass “the 
contents, principles and political objectives of the Treaties (…), the legis-
lation adopted in implementation of the Treaties, and the jurisprudence 
of the Court; the declarations and resolutions adopted in the Community 
framework; the international agreements, and the agreements between 
Member States connected with the Community’s activities” (European 
Commission, 1992). 
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The challenge of assuming the obligation of the acquis became much 
more prominent in the wake of the accession of the CEECs and the pros-
pects of enlarging the EU with the Western Balkan countries. Having in 
mind the significant gap in the political, economic and administrative 
capacity between the post-communist candidates and the EU member 
states, the whole endeavor of adopting the acquis required a more extensive 
and stricter approach by the EU. The Copenhagen European Council in 
1993 conditioned membership with the “ability to take on the obligations 
of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union” (European Council, 1993). Through the course of the 
CEE enlargement the EU imposed a strict acquis conditionality framework 
which went beyond the simple task of transposition of EU directives and 
regulations. In its seminal White Paper, the European Commission (1995: 
23) laid the ground for assessment of future compliance by stressing that 
“the main challenge (…) lies not in the approximation of their legal texts, 
but in adapting their administrative machinery and their societies to the 
conditions necessary to make the legislation work. This is a complex pro-
cess requiring the creation or adaptation of the necessary institutions and 
structures, involving fundamental changes in the responsibilities of both 
the national administrative and judicial systems and the emerging private 
sector”. Thus, the ability to assume the obligations of membership also 
presupposes adequate administrative capacity for effective transposition, 
implementation and enforcement of EU rules. The importance of admin-
istrative capacity as a criterion to apply the acquis has been imposed by the 
Madrid European Council conclusions (1995) and by Agenda 2000. 
This framework has been further strengthened in the course of the 
Western Balkans accession process. The Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements have been the principal legal basis for approximation and 
enforcement of EU law, as they oblige the applicant states to ensure gradual 
approximation of domestic law with EU law. The new enlargement strategy 
introduced a revised framework of accession negotiations which directly 
tackles the progress of approximation and implementation of the acquis. 
Having in mind the shortcomings from the application of conditionality 
in the CEE accession, the 2006 strategy (European Commission, 2006) 
introduced opening and closing benchmarks as a new tool for assessing 
progress within each chapter of the acquis. The benchmarking system 
was further strengthened with the introduction of interim benchmarks 
whose fulfilment has been set as a prerequisite for the launch of the closing 
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benchmarks (European Commission, 2012). In addition, in order to pro-
gress in the accession negotiations, the candidate countries are required to 
show a satisfactory track record of implementation of EU rules. The acquis 
has been spread out across 35 negotiating chapters which entail the whole 
scope of EU legislation and policies including the internal market policies, 
and sectoral policies such as environment, agriculture, energy, transport, 
Justice and Home Affairs and social policy.3
Compliance
Having in mind the institutional, administrative and political limitations of 
state capacity of the Western Balkan countries, we assume a more emphasised 
role of administrative capacity, costs and low credibility of the process for the 
limited compliance outcomes of implementation of the acquis. Almost two 
decades after the launching of the Stabilisation and Association Process, the 
Western Balkans applicant countries are still progressing slowly in their abil-
ity to assume the obligations of membership. According to the Commission 
assessments, none of the applicant countries has achieved an advanced level 
of alignment with the acquis. On the contrary, the three regional leaders, 
Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia have achieved only moderate levels of 
preparation to assume the obligations of the acquis in majority of chapters. 
Albania is moderately prepared in even fewer chapters, while Bosnia and 
Kosovo are lagging as they are either in an early stage or have some level of 
preparation in most areas subject to assessment. 
These scores are obviously linked with the capacity of the adminis-
trative systems for transposition and implementation of EU legislation as 
similar patterns of compliance are on display in regard to public admin-
istration reform. None of the Western Balkan countries has a well-func-
tioning administration. Montenegro, Serbia and Macedonia are moder-
ately prepared in the area of public administration reform, while Albania, 
Kosovo and Bosnia are further behind.
3 For a comprehensive overview of the chapters and a concise explanation of the content 
of the acquis for each chapter see: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/
policy/conditions-membership/chapters-of-the-acquis_en (accessed 25 January 2018).
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Table 2.3. Level of preparedness in the ability to assume the obligations of membership
Criterion Montenegro Serbia Macedo-
nia





















































Source: European Commission 2016 country reports
Conversely, our cross-country analysis of Commission’s compliance 
assessment in selected single market and sectoral policy chapters points 
towards notable mismatches between approximation and implementation 
of EU rules instigated by high implementation costs, institutional deficien-
cies and weak human resources. 
Compliance with the chapters on the four freedoms (free move-
ment of goods, workers, services, capital) has been progressing slowly and 
mainly confined to gradual alignment with the relevant EU legislation. The 
transposition of key EU legislation, such as the General Products Safety 
Directive, the New and Global Approach acquis, the Services Directive or 
the money laundering acquis has been partial and has been progressing 
with a similar pace across the candidate countries. Compliance in all cases 
is hindered with weak implementation of standards and technical require-
ments, low market surveillance capacities and all-round weak administra-
tive capacity for enforcement of legislation.
Another example of uneven compliance is procurement policy, which 
has received special attention in Commission’s assessments as it is closely 
associated with the rule of law fundamentals. Apart from gaps in harmo-
nization with the 2014 procurement directives in the area of concessions 
in some cases, the legal framework on public procurement is largely in line 
with the EU procurement directives in both the candidate and potential 
candidate countries. The institutional infrastructure is also well aligned 
with the acquis as all Western Balkan countries have established adequate 
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public procurement agencies. However, the Commission has been critical 
on the capacity of those institutions in implementing and enforcing legis-
lation, as lack of prevention of corruption during the procurement cycle 
becomes a major challenge. 
Competition policy is a key area of the single market that ensures free 
competition through prevention of dominant positioning on the market 
and limitations of state aid. Regarding the former, all the candidate coun-
tries have maintained good levels of alignment with the relevant Treaty 
provisions and secondary EU legislation. Legislative developments have 
also been backed by adequate institutional frameworks as all candidates 
have put in place corresponding state agencies for protection of compe-
tition. However, the moderate record in enforcement has been impeded 
by human resource deficits. Thus, even in cases where the agencies are 
adequately staffed, the public officials in place lack the necessary levels of 
expertise. On the other hand, harmonisation with State aid legislation is 
less advanced in all candidate countries where the good level of alignment 
with the relevant treaty provisions has been offset by partial transposition 
of secondary EU legislation. Although all candidates have established units 
for State Aid control, they have been criticised for their insufficient capac-
ity for enforcement. Prior research in state aid enforcement in the Western 
Balkans has also emphasised the importance of the low credibility of the 
membership perspective as an undermining factor in the incentives for 
implementation of the State aid rules (Botta, 2013).
Similar structural deficiencies have been obstructing compliance with 
the sectoral policies acquis. In transport policy there is a notable varia-
tion in compliance. While BiH and Kosovo are at an early stage of adop-
tion and implementation of the acquis, the candidate countries have had 
steady progress in alignment with the acquis. Most of the candidates have 
good levels of alignment with the road transport acquis and the acquis on 
summertime arrangements. However, the adoption of legislation on Intel-
ligent transport systems is going at a slower pace. On the other hand, the 
transposition of EU rules in this sector hasn’t been matched with a good 
record in implementation. The Commission has emphasized the need for 
further efforts in implementing legislation in all applicant countries. As 
elsewhere, the mismatch is facilitated by low investments in human and 
physical resources. Hence, the need for strengthening the administrative 
capacity in all modes of transport has been a reoccurring EU demand in 
almost every applicant country.
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Compliance with the acquis in energy policy is particularly challeng-
ing due to high material and political costs of adoption. A good exam-
ple are the candidate countries who have had mixed responses to EU’s 
demands for compliance with the Energy Community Treaty and the third 
energy package. In all cases the alignment with the third energy package 
for liberalisation of the electricity and gas markets has been hindered by 
reluctance to adopt and implement secondary legislation for unbundling 
suppliers from operators. The case of Macedonia is telling, as due to fears 
of high political costs the government has been stalling compliance with 
EU demands for opening of the electricity market for operators. Similarly, 
Serbia is yet to fully unbundle and open the gas sector, while Albania has 
been criticised for lack of efforts in unbundling its state-owned transmis-
sion and distribution companies. 
Finally, environmental policy imposes probably the greatest compli-
ance challenge within the sectoral policy cluster. The priority of this sector 
for the EU has been effectuated by an ever-growing EU legislation whose 
implementation imposes significant material costs on complying govern-
ments. For example, the estimated costs for implementation of the envi-
ronmental acquis and the build-up of environmental policy institutions 
in the CEECs in the pre-accession phase ranged from 80 to 100 billion 
Euro, or an average of two to three percent of their gross domestic prod-
uct (Carmin and Vandaveer, 2007: 8). The gravity of the environmental 
acquis and its financial implications is affecting the compliance record of 
the Western Balkan countries which is amongst the lowest in compari-
son to other chapters. Thus, according to the Commission’s 2016 country 
assessments none of the Western Balkan countries is not even moderately 
prepared to assume the environmental acquis. All candidate countries have 
achieved some level of preparation in the fields of environment and cli-
mate change, while Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are at an early 
stage of preparation. All countries have been partially progressing in the 
alignment of legislation to the acquis. Across all candidate countries, only 
the alignment with the air quality and waste management acquis is at a sat-
isfactory level. The transposition of EU legislation in water quality, indus-
trial pollution, nature protection, chemicals and climate change is partial 
and varies across countries. The absence of evident progress in alignment 
with the acquis is coupled by significant implementation gaps. Lack of 
investment in administrative and institutional capacities significantly con-
strains implementation and enforcement of environmental policy. Thus, 
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all Commission assessments of environmental policy in the Western Bal-
kan countries have stressed serous weaknesses of administrative, financial 
and infrastructural capacities at both central and local levels and across all 
environmental sectors. 
In sum, our study confirms the importance of administrative capac-
ity as a factor of successful approximation and implementation of EU 
rules. In comparison to the political criteria, the determinacy of the EU 
rules in this sector is more prominent. The content of most of the acquis 
doesn’t lack clarity or precision and as such is not susceptible to politi-
cal manoeuvring and interpretation. This makes alignment with the acquis 
more of a bureaucratic process. Hence, the slow progress in meeting the 
obligations of the acquis in the Western Balkans is heavily dependent on 
the administrative capacity of the respective governments to implement 
EU legislation. Although the applicant countries have been able to main-
tain steady progress in transposition of the acquis, there are considerable 
gaps between norm adoption and implementation of EU legislation due 
to administrative ineffectiveness. Even in cases where the authorities have 
been able to set up institutional arrangements in line with EU require-
ments, their enforcement capacity and effectiveness is impeded by weak 
and insufficient human resources. Finally, the modest compliance records 
are augmented by enforcement costs. Most of the reforms that are induced 
by EU legislation are very expensive, both administratively and financially. 
Consequently, in many cases they increase political costs for domestic 
elites who are reluctant to raise or allocate funds for unpopular reforms. 
Conclusion
Despite the internal political consensus and relatively favourable public 
support for EU membership in the Western Balkan countries, the region is 
still far from achieving full convergence with EU rules and values. Even in 
the case of the two EU membership candidates that have opened accession 
negotiations, Montenegro and Serbia, the prospects of full membership 
remain uncertain. Present analysis of formal compliance with EU rules in 
the Western Balkan countries highlights the slow pace of Europeanisation 
in the region. The low credibility of the accession process coupled with 
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structural deficiencies, low administrative capacity and gate-keeping polit-
ical elites contribute to a mediocre record of compliance in the Western 
Balkans, despite observed cross-sectorial variation. On the other hand, this 
study has identified a significant discrepancy between EU demands for 
formal institutionalization of rules and existing informal social practices 
which are deeply rooted in cultural traditions and socialist legacies. The 
durability of these informal arrangements and their resistance to change 
and adapt to formal demands further constrain the processes of Europe-
anisation of the Western Balkans. 
With regard to the political aspect of EU conditionality, the EU acces-
sion process has generated unique, broad-based and long-term support 
for reforms and progress towards EU membership in the Western Balkans. 
However, while EU conditionality has an important role in prompting 
reforms, a sustainable reform process also requires additional domestic 
and EU related conditions. On one hand, the EU’s political conditionality 
in the Western Balkans lacks a strong normative justification, which affects 
the degree of compliance with the EU’s demands. Additionally, the appar-
ent lack of credibility with regard to uncertain time of accession opens 
up space for political actors to manipulate compliance and to explore the 
possibility of trade-off between full compliance and stability in the region. 
On the other hand, the EU needs to assert critical domestic conditions to 
prevail – most notably the reduction of the number of veto players and the 
elimination of institutional obstructions exhibited in informal clientelistic 
relationships among the domestic ruling elites and institutions prone to 
corruption. Finally, this study has particularly emphasised the implication 
of domestic political costs on rule of law and media policies in the Western 
Balkans. The lack of accountability of the political elites is enhancing their 
leeway to circumvent and delay the political reform processes that would 
significantly reduce their power over the institutions. The EU should apply 
a more structured pressure in publicly exposing corrupt political elites 
and their illiberal practices, accompanied with more investments in the 
empowerment of watchdog civil society actors. 
Compliance with the economic EU membership criteria is largely 
constrained by institutional deficiencies and continuing informal prac-
tices. Low investments in development of human and infrastructural 
resources appear as major obstacles for economic growth and the pur-
suit for higher competitiveness of the economies of the Western Bal-
kan countries. Compliance with the economic criteria has thus far 
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been dependent on the quality of implementing institutions, impartial 
enforcement of rules and procedural efficiency, all of which are currently 
progressing at a slow pace in the Western Balkans. Institutional weak-
ness and procedural inefficiency are increasing the economic costs in 
Western Balkan societies and are seen as major contributors towards 
broadening gaps between the outcomes of the formal institutional regu-
latory framework and the large informal sector in the economy of the 
Western Balkan region. The durability of the share of the informal econ-
omy and high unemployment levels which haven’t been reduced despite 
the membership candidates’ approximation to the EU imply that weak 
implementation and enforcement of rules continue to provide incentives 
for functioning of informal practices in the Western Balkans economies. 
In essence, modest investments in capital infrastructure projects, lack of 
effective educational and innovation policies, coupled with procedural 
and administrative burdens – all have serious implications on the eco-
nomic (under)performance in the region and the overall lack of com-
petitiveness of the Western Balkans economies with the EU average. 
Policy makers in the region should urgently address the skills mismatch 
with the labour markets by streamlining reform of the education sectors 
towards improvement of research and development skills of the work-
force. 
The development of the ability to assume the acquis in the Western 
Balkans countries follows a familiar pattern of compliance that emphasizes 
the gap between the transposition and implementation of EU legislation. 
On a ‘macro’ level, the successful adoption of EU rules is significantly con-
strained by the low administrative capacities of state agencies responsible 
for their implementation. There is no evidence of significant socializa-
tion effects of Europeanisation on the bureaucratic structures and prac-
tices in the applicant states. In contrast, well established informal codes 
of institutional behavior coupled with insufficient investment in human 
resources and infrastructure reinforce the transposition – implementation 
gap. On a ‘micro level’, in many instances, implementation of the acquis 
is confronted with informal practices based on long lasting traditional 
cultural norms which are resistant to the processes of internalization of 
the ‘new’ EU-induced rules. This results with partial implementation out-
comes due to processes of spontaneous indigenization of formal rules, 
where the implementing agencies choose to selectively apply the rules. 
This study identifies the administrative capacity gap as a crucial challenge 
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for the implementation of EU norms in the Western Balkans. The EU and 
the Western Balkan governments should therefore prioritise the processes 
of depoliticization and meritocratic recruitment of public administration 
officials. Sound retention policies based on more generous financial and 
promotion incentives could be critical for securing satisfactory compli-
ance with EU norms in the accession and post accession periods. 
It can be concluded from the above that due to higher determinacy 
and the more technical nature of the economic and acquis accession cri-
teria, norm diffusion in these sectors has progressed in a more linear pro-
gression among the six Western Balkan countries aspiring EU membership. 
However, progress in compliance with the economic criteria and the adop-
tion of the acquis is directly linked to compliance with the political criteria, 
as rule of law effectiveness is critical for enforcement of the acquis. Hence, 
our study underlines the seminal importance of the political dimension of 
the EU accession process as a key challenge for the successful outcome of 
societal transformation in the Western Balkans. 
In order to address these observed deficiencies, the interactional 
dimension reaching deeper beyond the institutional (state) structure in 
order to empower and provide the wider public with the skills necessary 
to hold the elites accountable should be further explored by the EU. The 
EU should bolster its credibility by focusing on the strict monitoring of 
aspiring members towards stable and prosperous democracies governed 
by the rule of law. Eventually, this approach would enable the social and 
cultural continuity of the transferred norms, particularly by providing 
every responsible member of society with rules for their implementation. 
Otherwise, as the democratisation in the region remains an empty shell, 
the EU integration process will stall and likely grind into standstill.
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3.  Implementation and Enforcement of EU Rules 
in South East Europe 
The problem of implementation of EU rules in new EU member states and candidate coun-
tries, including Western Balkan (WB) countries, has been increasingly recognised by re-
searchers and policy makers. Following empirical evidence, some scholars in recent years 
raised the question whether the formal transposition of EU rules also leads to their institu-
tionalization, or alternatively, whether the imported rules tend to remain “empty shells”. The 
current study focuses on the effects of the adopted EU rules on domestic production and 
consumption of food, specifically in the area of pig and sheep home slaughter (hereafter 
HS) in three WB countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia) and in two 
EU member states (Croatia and Slovenia). The practice of HS is a good example of many 
areas of everyday life, which are on the one hand subject to the newly imposed EU rules, 
and on the other, strongly connected to local traditions and ordinary people’s everyday 
economic self-subsistence.
Keywords: implementation of EU rules, Western Balkan, pig and sheep home slaughter, “gold-
plating”, institutional capacity and resources, policy implications and recommendations 
Introduction
The problem of implementation of EU rules in new EU member states and 
candidate countries, including Western Balkan (WB) countries has been 
increasingly recognised by researchers and policy makers. Following empiri-
cal evidence, some scholars in recent years raised the question whether the 
formal transposition of EU rules also leads to their institutionalization, or 
alternatively, whether the imported rules tend to remain “empty shells” (e.g. 
Dimitrova, 2010; Kmezić, 2014). Dimitrova stresses that studies dealing with 
the issue of Europeanisation through the implementation of the EU rules 
focus mostly on the formal transposition of EU rules into domestic legisla-
tion, but tend not to deal with actual effects of these rules “on the ground”, i.e., 
whether if and how these rules function (if at all) in people’s everyday life.
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The wider and crucial question in this regard is to what extent and 
under which conditions formal rule adoption leads to the institutionali-
zation of these rules, and consequently, to behavioural changes (Schim-
melfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). In a review paper, based on a wide litera-
ture review, Trieb (2006) urged that more energy needs to be devoted to 
systematic research on the phase of practical implementation of EU rules. 
Soon after, Falkner and Treib (2008) indicated that many adopted EU rules 
in the new member states indeed exist largely as “dead letters” since they do 
not get to be implemented in practice.
One of the most obvious solutions to this problem lies in stronger 
law enforcement capacities of states. Kmezić stresses that “even the best 
laws make little sense if law enforcement bodies are not objective and 
competent” (2015: 19). Similarly, Dimitrova (2010) notes that the imple-
mentation literature stresses the importance of domestic administrative 
traditions and capacities as crucial for the implementation of EU rules. 
In addition, she also observes that domestic administrations in former 
state socialist countries tend to be weak and “in flux” (e.g., lack of/low 
motivation, high staff turnover etc.). The crucial role of administrative 
power was also indicated in another study, based on analysis of the trans-
position of EU directives in 15 member states (Falkner et al., 2005: 319). 
In addition, this study concluded that the national cultures, responding 
to adaptation requirements, create different, country specific patterns of 
implementation.
Based on the described insights and also on decades of relatively slow 
and uneven process of “Europeanisation” of Western Balkans countries, 
scholars increasingly agree that the old “conditionality approach”, which 
rests on the “logic of consequentiality” might not be as successful as previ-
ously thought. It seems that this approach should be complemented with 
what is commonly called “constructivist institutionalism”, which is based 
on the “logic of appropriateness” and deals predominantly with the process 
of “norm socialization”. It involves asking questions like “to what extent, 
when and why are (sets of) EU rules regarded as legitimate”. Namely, an 
important part of a successful rule implementation (i.e., being internal-
ized by the domestic elites and populations) is that those rules have to be 
(perceived as) legitimate. Following this logic, rule transfer can be effective 
only if domestic elites and populations identify with the new rules and are 
thus open to “norm socialization” (Kmezić, 2014: 20–21).
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This chapter draws on these insights while presenting a case study 
on the effects of the adopted EU rules on domestic production and con-
sumption of food, specifically in the area of pig and sheep home slaughter 
(hereafter HS) in three WB countries (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo 
and Macedonia) and in two EU member states (Croatia and Slovenia). The 
practice of HS is chosen, being a good example of many areas of everyday 
life, which are on the one hand subjected to the newly imposed EU rules, 
and on the other, strongly connected to local traditions and ordinary peo-
ple’s everyday economic self-subsistence (such as home brandy produc-
tion, selling of homemade cheese and sour cream, or sowing of old and 
locally specific varieties of vegetables). 
Qualitative research was deemed suitable for this research project, 
following legal documents’ and related media content analysis. In addi-
tion, gathered qualitative research was further illuminated by quantitative 
research drawing from the survey data. The results are presented in accord-
ance with research procedure, providing evidence for policy implications 
and, in the end, policy recommendations.
Implementation of EU Rules in the Area of Pig and Sheep 
Home Slaughter
Many studies have been done on the consequences of EU membership on 
the performance of the agricultural sector in various countries, ranging 
from statistics that show changes in performance of the agricultural sector 
after entry into the EU, to implications of a UK exit from the EU for British 
agriculture (Van Berkum et al., 2016). A number of studies deal with pro-
ducing and processing pork meat in part-time family farms, where the pro-
prietor is a family which cannot earn their livelihood exclusively through 
farming but depends on off-farm income sources, and who keeps pigs for 
their own consumption. One of the examples is a study based on fieldwork 
carried out by national teams in 10 European countries as a part of the 
CORASON (A cognitive approach to rural sustainable development: the 
dynamics of expert and lay knowledge) work package on the dynamics of 
knowledge in the valorisation of local food) (Fonte, 2008). In many regions, 
as is shown, local lay knowledge, often exchanged and circulated through 
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informal social networks, is the dominant form of knowledge used. Span-
ish and Portuguese fieldwork, for example, showed that HS was an impor-
tant cultural, social and economic event for families and communities, a 
cultural and anthropological component of social life, involving shared 
effort and fostering solidarity in the community. The authors of the study 
thus concluded that it is clear that scientific, general and theoretical per-
spectives are not the most relevant to these experiences: the best experts 
are not scientists from universities or bureaucratic-managerial experts 
from government development agencies. Scientific knowledge may only 
be a starting point but it needs to be integrated, adapted and mediated by 
those with expertise and training in specific traditional and artisan modes 
of food production, and by those who know the “place” (ibid: 221–222).
Some of the studies were also concerned with implementing the 
rules on animal welfare. Although the traditional system of raising ani-
mals outdoors surely contributes to their welfare (Cerjak et al., 2011), it is 
often stated that in old EU member states animal welfare directives devel-
oped through a “step-by-step process”, while for the new member states 
it appeared to be a “time-lapsed process” (Wellbrock, 2008: 26). Also, for 
the new member states new rules are sometimes difficult to comply with. 
As is shown in the Polish case (Dunn, 2003), standards often create barri-
ers because they are embedded in specific geographies. On the one hand, 
many harmonized standards favour large-scale multinational capital and 
discourage local small-scale producers. On the other hand, the social lega-
cies of previous economic systems—in this case, state socialism—give 
small-scale producers “tools” (e.g. informal markets, personal social ties, 
and political organizing skills) that can be used to create barriers for large 
multinational competitors. 
However, it seems that much of local traditional practices recede. As is 
shown in the case of Hungary, HS, which was a family fiesta and a popular 
way of supplying fresh meat, bacon and sausage, is currently very rarely 
performed (Kovach, 2014). In the research done on Romanian farms and 
farmers facing the EU regulations it is shown that there was no consent 
about the attitudes towards EU regulations concerning agriculture: while 
some of them were welcomed by the population, others were strongly 
rejected. However, the most unpopular regulation, as stated by the authors, 
was exactly about HS. 
Related research was also done in Slovenia and Croatia, predomi-
nantly addressing disease prevention and production yields. However, in 
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2009 results from an extensive fieldwork with 42 farm households dur-
ing the two-year period and comprised of detailed interviews with farm-
ers and other local and national stakeholders, participant observation and 
documentary analysis, were published. Results indicated that much of the 
agricultural production in these households was primarily oriented toward 
subsistence use, while part of it was used for exchange, or sold informally. 
In addition, the study indicated that biosecurity, as part of a broader shift 
in agri-food governance stemming from Slovenia’s entry to the European 
Union, has dramatically reshaped the playing field for semi-subsistence 
producers, driving agricultural restructuring and diminishing farmers’ 
strategies of subsistence HS and informal marketing (Frelih Larsen, 2009). 
As for Croatia, in 2008 a master’s thesis entitled “Pig welfare in Croatia: 
A critical reflection on the EU pig welfare directives” was defended at the 
Wageningen University in Netherlands, a university that focusses spe-
cifically on the theme of healthy food and living environment. Efforts to 
terminate or intensify family farms, the author concluded, could lead to 
welfare impairment – both for pigs and for humans – instead of welfare 
improvement. For example, the author stated, neglect of part-time family 
farms could increase informal market activities (Wellbrock, 2008).
Thus, it is not surprising that during the EU accession process, the WB 
countries met the news about what is to be changed in respect to HS prac-
tices, with varying responses. While some of them raised no public debate 
on the issue, and welcomed the changes, in some countries, like Croatia, 
and to some extent Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, concerns 
were raised about survival of traditional practices of production and pro-
cessing of food and beverages, but also about consequences for small fam-
ily, especially peasant economies. Specifically, in Croatia, where these prac-
tices were represented as endangered by new legislation, reactions in public 
space were set between existential threat and Euroscepticism. It could be 
argued that the varieties of these public discourses may be partly due to the 
differences in openness of the accession processes. In Croatia, for exam-
ple, the accession process was almost completely closed to the public (cf. 
Grubiša, 2012; Ivanović, 2011; Jović, 2012b). Still, in spite of such observed 
varieties, responses and corresponding discourse confirm what was identi-
fied by the past research. Namely, research done on how people perceive 
EU rules that regulate, or would regulate HS practices point at encroaching 
a complex field of the so-called ordinary everydayness, including culturally 
rooted and socially functioning practices (e.g. Grandin and Regenstein, 
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1994; Fonte, 2008; Roseman, 2010; Zoethout, 2013; Bergeaud-Blackler et. 
al., 2015; Dorondel, 2016). This makes the question a ready-made weapon 
in hands of those who have publicly been advocating their disapproval of 
common European policy. A deliberate suppression of food production is 
in question, as is often stated, so people would be dependent on “imported 
agricultural products that often look and taste suspicious” (Zobel, 2011). 
At the other side of this apparently political spectrum, evidence was raised 
in defence of the changes, oftentimes by lessening the negative effects that 
EU regulations (would) produce in actual and local-specific surroundings. 
All in all, due to its deeply-rooted traditional aspects, HS seems more than 
an appropriate research area that enables a more nuanced perspective on 
perceived differences in meeting the new regulations in the WB area.
Data and Methodology
In order to study partial implementation of EU rules effectively, the 
research team, as indicated, decided to choose one specific field of prac-
tices where partial enforcement can be expected and which could be stud-
ied in a comparative manner. After considering different options, the team 
opted for legislation and practices regarding HS as widely present practice 
in the Western Balkans region societies.
The sample of countries for our investigation involved five countries 
of the former Yugoslavia with significant differences in their level of inte-
gration with the EU. Two of them are member states of the EU; Slovenia 
since 2004 and Croatia since 2013. Macedonia is considered as an official 
candidate, while BiH has submitted a membership application in 2016 and 
is currently considered a potential candidate for the membership in the 
EU. Kosovo is another step further from the EU since it has not yet submit-
ted a membership application. 
The methodological approach was grounded in the model of Europe-
anisation, whereby initial research questions were structured according to 
the basic stages of the process (EU rules  Adoption of EU rules  Imple-
mentation/enforcement of EU rules  Behavioural change). 
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Our initial research questions were:
i. What is basic content of the EU regulations?
ii. Which EU rules were adopted and what were related public discourses?
iii. What kind of attitudes toward the legislation and the EU prevail in 
countries observed? 
iv. To what extent are the most important regulations enforced in coun-
tries observed?
v. What are reasons and motives for partial enforcement?
vi. What was the impact of adopted EU rules on practices on the ground?
vii. What formal and informal constraints were most important in regu-
lating practices?
We first studied the existing literature dealing with the enforcement of 
EU rules in the area of agriculture in several European countries. Within 
the empirical work, we analysed related legal documents and media texts, 
conducted interviews with relevant public servants and HS meat produc-
ers and consumers and, finally, supplemented our results with INFORM’s 
targeted survey data.
In applying the method of legal documents analysis, we first searched 
texts of EU directives and regulations which are relevant to HS. In the next 
step we analysed these legal contents in view of the theoretically and legally 
most relevant issues (e.g. regulations on selling/donating meat, or regula-
tions on stunning animals before slaughter) and derived basic legal frames 
that were used for further analyses. In the third step, we analysed relevant 
legal documents at the national level and compared national regulations 
with EU directives and regulations.
Analysis of related media content available online was used as supple-
mentary tool in order to assess national public discourses in relation to the 
adoption of the EU rules. Researchers searched the internet in their local 
languages searching for possible media content on this issue. 
We conducted 17 interviews with relevant public servants, thus being 
able to collect valuable data in relation to practically all research questions. 
In BiH we conducted four expert interviews. Two of them were with vet-
erinarians (one from the Veterinary Office of BiH and one from Inspec-
tions), one with a Muslim religious authority, one with a certified butcher 
and one with a controller of halal slaughter. In Croatia we interviewed the 
Head of the Veterinary Inspection Service, an employee of the Institute 
for Judicial and Administrative Veterinary Medicine and an employee at 
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one of the local veterinary stations. In Kosovo interviews were conducted 
with one veterinarian, one expert on EU law harmonization working in 
public administration, and a director of unit at the Food and Veterinary 
Agency. In Macedonia four interviews with experts/public servants from 
the Agency for Food and Veterinary were conducted: one interview was 
conducted with the head of the inspection unit, one with the head of the 
sector for legal affairs and two more were conducted with other civil serv-
ants within the Agency. In Slovenia, we interviewed three public servants, 
all employed at the Administration of Republic of Slovenia for food safety, 
veterinary and plant protection: one senior official from headquarters in 
Ljubljana, one specialized official for disposal of SRMs from headquarters 
in Ljubljana, and a higher official from a local branch of this institution.
In order to effectively identify practices on the ground and identify 
gaps between formal institutions and practices we conducted 33 inter-
views with farmers and 25 interviews with consumers of meat originating 
from HS. We set a minimum of six interviews per country for both catego-
ries of respondents together. The number of interviews varied from six in 
Kosovo to twenty-two in Slovenia. All interviews were conducted between 
November 2016 and February 2017.
INFORM’s survey of perceptions and experiences of informality was 
conducted in three countries analysed in this report (BiH, Kosovo, and 
Macedonia) and also in Serbia, Montenegro and Albania. The entire sam-
ple consisted of 6.040 respondents aged 18 years or more among which 
1.246 were from BiH, 930 from Kosovo, and 1.015 from Macedonia. The 
relevant variables from the acquired dataset were statistically analysed in 
accordance with the research goals.
Most Relevant Results of Empirical Investigations
The results of the applied methods can be summarised in points, presented 
below.
Firstly, with some variation, the Western Balkan countries included in 
our research have a good track record in alignment of their domestic legisla-
tion with the relevant EU rules. Our research indicates quite strongly that 
the countries observed have fully complied with the EU standards in terms 
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of adopting appropriate formal laws and rules. The only slight exception we 
identify for Kosovo, where the stunning obligations provisioned by Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1099/2009 on the protection of animals at the time of 
killing have been adopted with the Law on Food. However, their application 
is limited only to licensed slaughter houses and it does not apply to produc-
tion of meat for private home consumption, meaning that HS without stun-
ning can be practiced without legal restrictions.
Secondly, with a notable exception of Croatia, the public media dis-
course did not draw much attention to EU regulation of HS. In Croatia some 
of the related media articles are characterized with sensationalist titles such 
as “The EU prohibits pig home slaughtering”, or “We should save pig home 
slaughtering” (Ivanuš, 2003). In Croatia, and to a much lesser extent also in 
BiH and Macedonia, broader concerns were also raised about the survival 
of traditional practices of production and processing of food and bever-
ages, but also about consequences for (mostly rural) families. It should be 
noted that the varieties of these public discourses may be partly due to the 
differences in openness of the accession processes. In Croatia, for example, 
the accession process was almost completely closed to the public (Grubiša, 
2012; Ivanović, 2011; Jović, 2012b).
Thirdly, meat from HS plays an important role in traditionally rooted 
exchange in community and is generally perceived as of substantially 
higher quality as compared to meat that is offered by retailers in the for-
mal market. Our respondents expressed positive attitudes towards HS 
and highlighted quality of meat from home grown animals. Thus, the EU 
inspired rules in this case interfered with deeply entrenched traditional 
practices of not only consuming meat and meat products (bacon, sausages, 
pork cracklings etc.) within the household, but also of sharing them with 
relatives, friends and neighbours or even selling them on the black market.
Fourthly, although EU directives limit the use of meat from HS to pri-
vate consumption, the definition of private consumption is open to differ-
ent interpretations. The EU legislation does not provide clear guidelines as 
to what private consumption entails or who exactly is allowed to be given 
meat from HS. Our investigation suggests, however, that several official 
state agencies in EU member states limit private consumption to the mem-
bers of the “immediate family”, whereby they interpret the term immedi-
ate family as the members of the family who reside in the household, i.e. 
the people that live permanently in the property (Food Standard Agency, 
2013). We found that such an interpretation is also officially adopted in 
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Croatia and Macedonia, where therefore any transfer of HS meat outside 
the household, even gifts to immediate family members who do not reside 
at the owner’s household, can be considered as illegal. It is thus not surpris-
ing that some governments in the region have chosen to make the rules 
more stringent than they need to be. In Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia, 
private consumption is restricted only to the household members of the 
owner of animals. In Slovenia, however, private consumption is defined as 
‘consumption of family members living in the household, including rela-
tives and hired workforce’. The addition of ‘relatives and hired workforce’ 
significantly broadens the range of eligible parties. Importantly, accord-
ing to a representative of Slovenian authorities who was directly involved 
in the transposition of the respective legal act, there was practically no 
pressure from the EU to make the definition of private consumption any 
more restrictive. Thus, our findings suggest that national political elites 
in Croatia, Kosovo and Macedonia, perhaps together with the EU, could 
do much more in terms of adjusting the related rules. In other words, the 
described situation in these countries resembles what is commonly called 
‘gold-plating’. The European Commission defines ‘gold-plating’ as the “…
transposition of EU legislation, which goes beyond what is required by that 
legislation, while staying within legality” (Cited in Boci, De Vet and Pauer, 
2014: 27).
Next, findings indicated that the relative restrictiveness of the adopted 
EU rules is in some cases incompatible with the extent of national public 
discourses. As indicated, there was a strong public debate in relation to the 
adoption of EU rules regarding HS in Croatia, while there was virtually 
no such debate in Slovenia. Nevertheless, Croatia accepted a much more 
restrictive definition of private consumption than Slovenia. Thus, the wide 
public discontent in Croatia did not result in less restrictive regulations, as 
one would expect.
Further, large shares of population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo 
and Macedonia express concerns regarding gold-plating practices. Results 
from INFORM’s survey data suggest that in Macedonia around 54 % of 
adults agree with the statement ‘Our bureaucracy often introduces even 
stricter rules than the EU expects’. In Kosovo, this share amounts to 41 % 
and in BiH to 39 % (Slovenia and Croatia were not included in the survey). 
Thus, general public is relatively aware of the ‘gold-plating problem’ and 
would probably support stronger role of the EU in terms of preventing 
such practices by domestic elites.
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Our survey data also suggest that around half of the citizens of WB 
countries perceive the EU rules as potentially harmful for their tradition and 
good practices. We find that the highest share of agreement with this state-
ment was found in Serbia (63%), Montenegro (54%), Macedonia (52 %), 
followed by BiH (48 %) and Kosovo (45 %; see Figure 3.1).












IMPACT OF THE ADOPTED
EU RULES ON OUR SOCIETY
IS PREDOMINANTELY
POSITIVE
COMPLIANCE WITH THE EU
RULES IS THE BEST OPTION
FOR OUR COUNTRY
MANY EU RULES ARE NOT
BENEFICIAL FOR THE
WELFARE OF THE CITIZENS
OF OUR COUNTRY.
MANY EU RULES CREATE
MORE CONFUSION THAN
ORDER IN OUR COUNTRY.
MANY EU RULES HARM
OUR TRADITION AND GOOD
PRACTICES
Serbia BIH Macedonia Montenegro Kosovo Albania
Note: Percentages of those who fully or predominantly agree with individual statement are 
presented.
Interestingly, agreement with this statement is very strongly (r = 0,408, 
p < 0,01) correlated to agreement with the statement on gold-plating. This 
means that people who perceive EU rules as threatening to local traditional 
practices tend to see at least part of the responsibility for this situation in 
their national governments and state institutions. This means that people 
who perceive EU rules as threatening to local traditional practices tend 
to see at least part of the responsibility for this situation in their national 
governments and state institutions.
According to our next finding, some adopted formal rules seem to 
remain “empty shells”. Based on our data, this is especially true for Croatia, 
Kosovo and Macedonia. Our interviews with public servants, farmers and 
consumers of HS meat suggest that these actors do not take the limitation 
of HS meat distribution seriously. Transfer of HS meat within informal 
social networks (relatives, neighbours and acquaintances) is taking place 
on a regular basis and tends to be considered, even by state authorities, as 
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something acceptable. According to our respondents, including competent 
public servants, these practices pose a negligible threat in terms of public 
health and we found no reported serious sanitary problems related to reg-
ular traffic of HS meat through social networks or to HS practices in gen-
eral. Furthermore, the transfer of HS meat within informal social networks 
is often seen as having important positive effects in terms of solidarity and 
social integration at the local level. 
Our data also suggest that the most frequently expressed reason for the 
weak implementation of rules relating to HS was the lack of capacity of the 
state. State authorities in most cases complained that the limited number 
of veterinarians and inspectors prevents them from implementing rules 
effectively. However, this finding needs to be understood in the context 
of what has been said about the attitudes of public servants towards such 
rules (and their enforcement). Namely, at least in case of sharing HS meat 
outside the animal owner’s household, such enforcement is generally not 
seen as necessary or functional for the society.
We further found that the available resources of farmers are often prob-
lematic in relation to the rule on obligatory stunning. Farmers are, apart 
from religion-related sheep slaughter in BiH, in favour of proper stunning 
of animals if not for anything else than because of the fact that this makes 
slaughter much easier. However, our data suggest that in many cases, espe-
cially in Kosovo and Macedonia, pig home slaughterers find it hard to 
afford the proper equipment and for this reason choose to apply traditional 
practices of stunning and slaughter.
The problem of capacity (i.e., the problem of weak institutions) and 
resources was also something that was raised during INFORM meetings 
with national and European officials responsible for enlargement process 
(in respectful countries and at the EU level). While all officials, national 
and European (DGNEAR) indicated that state/public administration is 
often too weak to effectively implement and/or negotiate the adoption 
of EU rules (also in terms of accommodating them to domestic values 
and norms), their emphasis was different. Specifically, while national offi-
cials stressed the problem of high rate of staff turnover, low awareness, 
low motivation and especially low resources, the EU officials (DGNEAR 
representatives) highlighted the importance of negative selection in pub-
lic administration employment procedures, lack of planning (i.e., time is 
needed to address laws properly, but due to time constraints, often put by 
the countries themselves, this time is not available) and lack of “service 
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mentality” (i.e., public officials are not serving their “clients”/public but 
their political “godfathers”, controlling/monitoring mechanisms are not 
implemented, which then causes problems in establishing responsibility). 
In addition, DGNEAR representatives also indicated that the problem of 
institutional weaknesses is further exacerbated by the fact that EU del-
egations in the area are often significantly overstretched. However, both 
expressed strong sentiment that state officials need support from research 
which should be operationalized in concrete policy recommendations.
Within our analyses, also a socially dysfunctional potential overlap 
between interests of national governments and interests of their imple-
menting agencies has been identified. While national governments may 
benefit from adopting relatively more restrictive legislation because they 
can present it as an achievement on the path of ‘Europeanisation’, imple-
menting agencies may attempt at seeking rent from a situation where vir-
tually ‘everyone is guilty’. In such a situation, the law can be turned against 
an individual small farmer at almost any time and it is ‘the good will of the 
inspector’ that keeps the small farmer functioning without a penalty. Such 
a situation creates perfect grounds for administrative corruption.
Finally, based on some of the above findings it can be concluded that, 
at least in the case of HS, the partial implementation of EU rules can be 
best understood as spontaneous indigenization of formal rules. Spontaneous 
indigenization of formal rules is a process where actors of implementation 
of rules apply such rules in an indigenized manner. This process probably 
occurs mainly because these actors are members of local societies them-
selves and therefore predominantly spontaneously and well-intentionally 
adjust the implementation of rules to local informal institutions and prac-
tices. Our data confirm this notion through the main reasons that were 
stated by the public servants for the weak/partial implementation of the 
observed formal rule limiting HS meat to private consumption. First, pub-
lic servants took into consideration the economic implications for the 
farmers engaged in HS. Second, the HS was not considered problematic 
due to its very limited spread (quantity) and regulators were said to be 
focused primarily on the control of registered facilities. And third, tradi-
tional values and ways of life which are still functional were also consid-
ered as something that should be preserved.
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
The results of this study suggest that, at least in cases of deeply entrenched 
traditional practices such as pig and sheep home slaughter, implementa-
tion of the EU rules is often indigenised, i.e. adopted to local cultural con-
text. This is largely due to a considerable gap between formal rules and tra-
ditionally entrenched informal practices. This gap, however, does not ensue 
only from the lack of flexibility of the EU rules. According to our results, 
some governments in the region have chosen to make the rules more 
stringent than they need to be. Such ‘gold-plating’ practices have also been 
noticed by the general public and are one of the crucial reasons why some 
adopted formal rules seem to remain “empty shells”. Such excessively strin-
gent rules are not being implemented largely due to the lack of resources, 
both on the side of the state administration being unable to monitor the 
situation in the country and on the side of farmers being economically 
not able to meet all the prescribed requirements. Such a situation is very 
likely to lead to spontaneous indigenization of the imported formal rules. 
The problem of capacity, including the problem of weak institutions only 
further exacerbates here identified gaps. 
Based on these findings, we developed four policy recommendations 
than can hopefully address some of the issues related to the problem of 
slow and partial implementation of EU rules in Western Balkan countries. 
Firstly, the governments in the Western Balkans and representatives of 
the EU should actively participate in the process of adjusting formal rules to 
local cultural values, norms and practices. Almost half of the population of 
WB countries see EU rules as threatening to their traditional practices. Such 
perceptions undoubtedly substantially harm the process of rapprochement 
with the EU. Furthermore, insufficient “indigenization” of the EU rules tends 
to result in partial enforcement of these rules, which can have detrimental 
social effects (e.g. lower effectiveness of public institutions, higher frequency 
of corruptive practices, widespread pessimism, etc). Actors involved in the 
enlargement process should therefore more actively support indigenization 
of the imported rules, both administratively and financially. Such EU-sup-
ported indigenization, which should take into account both existing formal 
and informal institutions, should provide a relatively efficient tool for find-
ing and implementing sufficient functional adjustment of EU regulations to 
domestic values, norms and practices. Probably, the most straightforward 
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way of seeking for appropriate patterns of indigenization is through identi-
fication of actually followed rules. In cases of partial implementation, these 
rules are often just modifications of formal rules.
Secondly, the governments in the Western Balkans and representa-
tives of the EU should identify and minimize practices that resemble “gold-
plating”. Adopting excessively restrictive rules demonstrably has harmful 
consequences for both, implementation of EU rules and Europeanisation 
of Western Balkans in general. “Gold-plating” usually leads to partial (or 
even absence of) implementation of the adopted rules, which, among other 
things, erodes the principles of rule of law as laws are applied selectively. 
Excessively restrictive laws also tend to turn public against the EU as such 
regulations can be perceived as an attack on local identity and common 
traditions. Therefore, there is a need of proactive role of the EU in shaping 
the national and local public discourses on issues related to transposition 
of EU rules. For instance, EU should address the potential public fears over 
“loss of national identity and traditions” that may endanger the process 
of Europeanisation by taking more active role in terms of following local 
public/media discourses and intervening in cases when needed. In the case 
of the distribution of meat from HS, it would be quite easy to show that the 
pressure from the EU is substantially lower than often publicly presented. 
Consequently, the problem of poor implementation public is also related 
to a rather poor image of EU rules. Education/raising awareness in this 
regard is very important, together with efforts to shape the formal rules 
in line with the one and only legitimate political goal – to provide citizens 
with physical, economic, social and legal security.
Thirdly, the EU should actively participate in the process of adjusting 
formal rules to local cultural values, norms and practices. The EU should 
also take a more active role in making sure that countries transposing cer-
tain EU legislation have the capacities to implement them in practice in 
a reasonable time. In our study, it has been shown that some countries 
simply lack administrative power to effectively implement certain rules. 
If the transposed rules do not take such issues into consideration this will 
inevitably lead to them being only partially implemented. Public servants 
dealing with law implementation in a particular field may be a good source 
of information about reasons for such modifications. Based on such infor-
mation it should be possible to find effective ways for implementation of 
(accordingly adjusted) formal rules.
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Finally, the EU should follow and influence public discourse dictated by 
local elites and veto groups. The EU should make more efforts to ensure that 
national publics get a realistic picture about the introduced legal framework 
and the rationale behind it. Our literature review and media content anal-
yses revealed that, at least in Croatia, harmonization of rules on domestic 
production including pig slaughter led to a controversial public discourse 
of Europeanisation as a process endangering some deeply rooted traditional 
practices. Keeping in mind that Croatia is also one of the countries which 
adopted unnecessarily stringent rules regarding the distribution of meat 
from HS, it becomes clear that national political elites can play a kind of a 
double game. They, or parts of them, can by their own will introduce dispro-
portionally strict rules and at the same time publicly present the EU as the 
one pushing for such rules and thus endangering local traditions. Obviously, 
such a situation can cause huge damage to the process of rapprochement 
and Europeanisation in general. Much of such damage can be prevented if 
the EU takes a more active role in terms of following local public/media dis-
courses and intervening in cases when needed. In the case of the distribution 
of meat from HS, it would be quite easy to show that the pressure from the 
EU is substantially lower than often publicly presented.
Although here presented chapters focus on policy recommendations 
for the EU, it should be added that local actors such as political elites, 
governments and NGOs, of course should play central role in improving 
the implementation of EU rules, especially in regard to efforts that would 
strengthen institutional framework (of, for example, implementation and 
enforcement). It is crucial that these actors engage actively in the processes 
of transposition and adoption of EU rules.
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Adnan Efendic and Alena Ledeneva
4.  The Cost of Informal Networking in the 
Western Balkans Region Matters!
This chapter explores the prominence of informal networking of individuals in the Western 
Balkans (WB) and their associated costs. We find that informal networking, or use of personal 
contacts for getting things done, is frequent and that the informal costs of networking amount 
to 100 Euros per month, which is substantial, given that the average income reported by re-
spondents is around 250 Euros. In the structure of networking costs, the estimated costs of 
invested time, a proxy for sociability, dominate. We find that incurred costs are systematically 
higher for males, educated individuals and for entrepreneurs. As our key policy relevant find-
ing, we establish that individuals in the WB region who invest into informal networking do so 
at a high cost, which implies that the culturally determined sociability of informal networking 
has an instrumental purpose. The evidence highlighting the power of economic factors points 
to the ambivalence – both sociability and instrumentality – of informal networking. 
Keywords: informal networking, cost of time, cost of money, informal networking costs, 
Western Balkans, sociability, instrumentality, informal exchange, use of contacts 
Introduction
One of our respondents, an entrepreneur, has explained to us the importance 
of socialising and networking in the Western Balkan countries as follows:
‘I was educated in the USA, and when I came back here I tried to do everything by the 
book, so I did not fully understand (informal networking) and did not accept this “Bal-
kan mentality”, let’s call it in that way. This was the case until several years ago when I 
realized how our system is functioning, and that it was better for me to start socializing 
and networking more to find my ‘own people’. I could not progress without them. So, 
Yes. Some informal networks are built. …. But not in the state institutions. No. I have 
that possibility, but my priority is business…. Informal networking is primarily used to 
create new business opportunities, to target new clients together….’ (CRO_2) 1.
1 Acronyms used to code the interviews include: ALB for Albania, BiH for Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, KSV for Kosovo, MKD for FYR Macedonia and SRB for Serbia. The 
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The interplay between formal and informal institutions is associ-
ated with both formal and informal institutional costs, which inevita-
bly translate to economic resources related monetary expenses, which 
should not be ignored. While we do have research on the costs of formal 
institutional environments (e.g. Wallis and North, 1987), its informal 
dimension is rather neglected in the existing literature. Why? A short 
answer to this question is simple: it is much more difficult to measure 
costs associated with informal institutions than those that are formal. 
A longer one involves complexity: although informal costs are linked 
to activities which are not formally visible, still every social interaction, 
including invisible ones, contains some costs (Marmaros and Sacerdote, 
2006). Thus, in our study we analyse costs related to informal practices 
operating on the ground, as the first such research attempt, by asking the 
following questions:
How widespread is informal networking in the Western Balkan region? 
What is the approximate cost of informal networking in the Western 
Balkan region? 
To provide approximation for the costs of informal practices, we ana-
lyse the costs of informal networking in two sectors of the economy, the 
household sector (general public) and the business sector (entrepreneurs) 
in Western Balkans (WB) countries. Informal networking is a phenome-
non which serves as a supporting intermediary mechanism for majority of 
informal practices in the formal economies of WB countries in focus. Infor-
mal transactions, exchange of information, experience and ideas as well 
as (self)enforcement are implemented through informal networks (sup-
porting informal mechanism), which makes the phenomenon of informal 
networking sufficiently representative of informal practices in WB region. 
Therefore, our estimate of the direct and indirect (time) costs of informal 
networking is a good proxy for the costs of informal practices. Our inten-
tion is not to provide a precise calculation of these costs, but to suggest a 
way of approximation and useful numerical representation of these costs 
(time and money). Although the investigation provides regional analysis 
(Western Balkans), it has wider implications for the socio-economic litera-
ture on networks and informality.
number after the abbreviation is the ordinal number of interview (e.g. BiH_1, means 
interview number one in Bosnia and Herzegovina). All interviews are anonymised 
and archived following ethical guides from the INFORM project. 
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The underpinning analysis is based on quantitative and qualitative 
data; namely, a regional survey from the INFORM project is supplemented 
with qualitative interviews with entrepreneurs in the region. We find that 
individuals bear the high costs of informal networking not only for social 
and culturally determined reasons, but also with an instrumental purpose. 
Our evidence suggests that both sociability and instrumentality drive 
informal networking, in particular in the business sector. The network size 
and the associated costs are systematically higher for entrepreneurs, and it 
is business interest that motivates entrepreneurs to engage in informal net-
working, more than some traditional, cultural or other influences. On aver-
age, individuals and entrepreneurs spend around 100–160 Euros on infor-
mal networking per month respectively, with some differences between the 
countries in focus. There is a strong indication that the (opportunity) costs 
of (invested) time are larger than the real costs paid for informal network-
ing. 
This chapter is structured as follows. First, we provide a literature 
review covering informal networking and associated costs, which is fol-
lowed by the section that explains the data and methodology. The main 
findings are presented in the penultimate section. The chapter ends with 
conclusions and relevant policy implications.
Informal Networking 
The functioning of informality is impossible without supporting chan-
nels associated with informal networking. Informal transactions, favours, 
information, experience and ideas as well as their (self)enforcement are 
implemented through informal networks. Although informal networks 
seem to be a biographical by product, they are costly to establish, maintain 
and expand – it takes a lifetime of individual effort, time, and resources. 
The importance of informal networking varies across different sectors of 
the economy. The business sector is thought to be particularly associated 
with informal networking, thus informal institutions (Williams & Vorley, 
2015). Informal institutions affect entrepreneurial activity and shape the 
behaviours of entrepreneurs (North, 1990; Valdez & Richardson, 2013; 
Williams & Vorley, 2015). Not only does the informal economy rely on 
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informal networking, but also, intriguingly, many formal businesses are in 
part informal (De Soto, 1989). The general business orientation of entre-
preneurs is influenced by informal networks (Field et al., 2015), in particu-
lar in transition countries (Ledeneva, 1998; 2006), while more extensive 
business dynamics are identified among individuals who have entrepre-
neurs within their social networks (Klyver, Hindle, & Meyer 2008). While 
measuring costs of informality is a very demanding research task, measur-
ing costs of informality in the formal sector is even more challenging (De 
Soto, 1989). 
Informal institutions are used to complement or substitute formal 
institutions (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; Furubotn & Richter, 2005; Brous-
seau & Glachant, 2008; Andersson, 2008; Efendic, Pugh & Adnett, 2011). 
However, the presence and costs of informality are caused primarily by the 
absence of good formal institutions, legal framework and good governance 
(De Soto, 1989). As the core channels of the informal institutions, infor-
mal networks serve a variety of purposes, from exchange of information, 
experience and ideas between agents to provision of goods, services, and 
favours that are not freely exchanged on the market (Jackson & Wolinsky, 
1996). Establishing, maintaining and expanding of such networks incurs a 
considerable cost, but also brings significant benefits. The costs of informal 
networking depend upon network size, which is limited, given the finite 
nature of individual time and monetary resources. The available literature 
reports that density of networks has a significant influence on costs; higher 
density of informal networks lowers transaction costs (Henning, Henning-
sen & Henningsen, 2012). Moreover, the structure of networks might influ-
ence informal costs differently – network diversity based on race or ethnic-
ity, for example, or networks based on family and friends, or acquaintances 
(Marmaros & Sacerdote, 2006; Silk, 2003) all might have different effects 
on costs. 
Although any informal networking can be costly, the costs of maintain-
ing informal networks in the business sector vary depending on the phase of 
business development (Greve and Salaff, 2003). At the initial stage of business 
development, entrepreneurs must identify their opportunities, find relevant 
resources, employees, and institutional support; informal networks and their 
diversity have a significant influence on addressing these challenges. Thus, 
informal networking is particularly important for entrepreneurs in the early 
stage of business development and in situations when formal institutions are 
underdeveloped (Chakraborty, Mukherjee, & Saha, 2015). 
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Great attention in the business literature on network structure has 
been devoted to whether strong or weak networks or ties bring more bene-
fits (Granovetter, 1973; Greve & Salaff, 2003; Wang & Altinay, 2012). While 
strong ties (especially family-based) may provide the entrepreneur with 
emotional and motivational support, weak ties (acquaintances and more 
distant members) may better help to secure access to new knowledge and 
information (Efendic, Mickiewicz, & Rebmann, 2015). Accordingly, differ-
ent combinations of strong and weak ties have a direct impact on discover-
ing new opportunities and gaining legitimacy for entrepreneurs as well as 
on the informal costs of networking (Elfring & Hulsink, 2003). 
The literature to some extent suggests that forming and maintaining 
informal networks leads to variety of costs, including in particular: cost of 
time and costs of money (Marmaros & Sacerdote, 2006; Brueckner, 2006; 
Silk, 2003; Pesämaa & Franklin Hair, 2007), which needs to be materialized 
and comparable. At the same time, informal networks seem to be beneficial 
for entrepreneurship growth when formal institutions are not sufficiently 
developed, which is the case with the countries that we investigate in our 
sample. Being inspired with the literature and evidence form the WB 
region, we provide the first study of informal networking costs, with the 
data coming from both household and business sectors of these societies.
Measuring Informal Networking – Survey Data and 
Interviews
To construct indicators on informal networking and their costs we rely on 
qualitative and quantitative data gathered in WB region. We use quantita-
tive data collected through a targeted INFORM survey implemented in six 
WB countries (Albania, BiH, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia) 
over the period March – June 2017. To collect this data, a multi-stage ran-
dom (probability) sampling methodology was used to ensure representa-
tive samples. In every household, the ‘closest birthday’ rule was applied 
to select respondents, while every subsequent address was determined 
by the standard “random route” procedure. The dataset comprises 6,040 
respondents from these countries, including 302 entrepreneurs, enabling 
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us an investigation that includes the general public as well as a subsample 
of entrepreneurs. The survey covers a variety of topics related to formal 
institutions and informal practices in the countries of WB. The relevant 
questions related to informal networking, including the size, structure and 
associated costs of networks, are included, which are used to construct 
variables relevant for our investigation. 
We also conduct semi-structured interviews implemented in the WB 
region (namely, in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, 
and Serbia) and two EU countries involved in the INFORM project (Croa-
tia and Slovenia). The interviews were implemented among entrepreneurs 
who run or manage micro, small, and medium businesses. The interviews 
were conducted over the period November 2016 – February 2017. The 
majority of interviews were recorded with the approval of interviewees, 
coded to ensure the anonymity of respondents, organized in transcripts, 
and used for qualitative analysis. The effective sample includes 70 inter-
views: five in Albania, sixteen in BiH, five in Kosovo, ten in Macedonia, 
nine in Serbia and 25 in the EU (Croatia and Slovenia). Through these 
interviews, we also collected essential data about the interviewed entrepre-
neurs and their companies, including the costs of informal networking2.
Informal Networking in the Western Balkans
The literature review provides indications that the size of informal net-
works might be linked with the total informal networking costs. Thus, our 
first step is to investigate the size of the informal networks reported by our 
respondents in the INFORM survey (Table 4.1). The obtained data sug-
gests that the average network size in the WB region is 13 members, being 
the largest in Montenegro and Macedonia (19 and 16 members respec-
tively) and lowest in Albania and Kosovo (8 and 9 respectively), while the 
other WB countries are closer to the average. 
2 This chapter provides a summary of the key findings based on the both quantitative 
and qualitative data, and for the both sectors, household and business sector, while for 
a more detailed presentation of the data and empirical methodologies applied in this 
investigation can be found at Efendic and Ledeneva (2018) and at INFORM publica-
tions available at: http://www.formal-informal.eu/home.html .
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Table 4.1. Estimated size of informal networking by different categories of individuals
Business status Gender Level of education
Citizens Entre-
preneurs
Males Females Primary Secondary University Postgrad-
uate
13 17 15 12 10 14 16 13
Source: INFORM, 2017 survey data and calculations of the authors. The numbers are rounded. 
If we look at the individual characteristics that might be associated with 
the informal networks size, we find that male respondents report slightly 
bigger networks and respondents with higher education, although this 
effect does not show a clear pattern. However, the highest effect in the sam-
ple has entrepreneurial status, where entrepreneurs report some 30% big-
ger networks. Our qualitative investigation of this pattern identifies that 
entrepreneurs are often explicit in saying that they are trying to expand 
their networks even further, because they see this as an important strategy 
for their further success, and some of them have built rather huge informal 
networks. 
‘If we look as far as to the lowest levels, then (my informal network) includes more than 
100 people. Because, success can be measured by the size of your network. The larger it 
is, the more successful you are. It is better if you have someone you know at any (formal 
state) institution or it is you know someone who knows someone else. This is because 
everything is so complicated here. It is almost impossible to go to an institution and 
finish everything you need (without knowing someone there).… The more people you 
know the more progress you make in your business. And, I prefer to know more and 
more people on an informal basis (…) which means to know more people whom you 
are more or less ready to help tomorrow, and also, they are willing to do the same for you 
without going to lunch, without gifting and those kind of things’ (BiH_4) 
Most of the WB countries seem to have a similar performance when it 
comes to informal networking, the motives behind it and especially the 
ways in which informal networks are used. For example, in every observed 
WB country, entrepreneurs recognize the importance of having informal 
networks for establishing, developing and maintaining their businesses. It 
is business interest that motivates them to do the informal networking, 
more than some traditional, cultural or other influences. 
 ‘It is very hard to impose yourself today. In our society, there is still a system where 
you cannot make progress without some sort of informal connections. But, I wish we 
had a state without it…’ (BiH_1) 
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 ‘There are segments in our society where, to put it simply, you just have to have in-
formal connections even when you are meeting all other criteria; that is having the 
money, having a contract and other documentation – you just have to have the ear (in 
formal institutions) that listens to you in order to get what you need without damag-
ing anybody.’ (BiH_10)
We identify that informal networks are used for different purposes, such as: 
to exchange ideas, information, knowledge, ensure access to the market, to 
compensate for the lack of rule of law, as a protective shell against political 
influence, but most frequently to avoid formal institutional rigidities and 
time-wasting procedures, unnecessary formal institutional costs, while in 
this diverse spectrum we identify even examples of informal networking 
providing personal psychological benefits. Still, a majority of entrepre-
neurs insist that informal networks are used primarily to substitute for the 
failures of formal institutional outcomes and to offset political influences 
in their business. 
‘We utilize informal networks for getting information, speeding up procedures, get-
ting new business deals. It is not just one thing.’ (MKD_3)
‘If we do not create informal networks in our business segment, we cannot function. 
You cannot rely only on professional relations. So, an informal network of contacts 
simply has to exist. If there was a regulated market in the country, these contacts 
would have been unnecessary. These contacts enable you to “swim in muddy waters.” 
If there was a more functioning rule of law in the country, one would not need these 
kinds of contacts.’ (MKD_3)
We recognize that where formal institutions relevant for business devel-
opment are more efficient, informal networking is less present and used 
for different purposes. These two processes seem to be simultaneous – the 
more intensive informal networking goes hand in hand with the less cred-
ible formal institutions. Interestingly, we arrive to the same conclusion in 
our empirical investigation conducted with individual survey data (i.e. 
household sector). Conversely, the entrepreneurs and citizens operating in 
more efficient institutional environments use these informal networks to a 
lesser extent. In the first example, where informal networking is intensive, 
it is also used widely and for various purposes – from exchange of informa-
tion and ideas to avoiding formal institutional complexities. When formal 
institutions are more efficient and credible, however, informal networking 
is less intensive, it is primarily used to complement formal institutions, 
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for exchange of ideas, and sometimes as a protective shell against political 
influence. 
The entrepreneurs report ‘aversion’ towards informality and perceive it 
as a burdensome but necessary strategy to cope with the poor formal insti-
tutional environment. Although informal networking is frequently used 
in WB economies and is firmly integrated into the business cultures, it is 
not generally perceived as something positive, even if used, but rather as a 
necessary strategy ‘to get things done’. …But, I wish we had a state without 
it…’ (BiH_1). Once the formal institutional environment for business is 
improved, for which the best example is Macedonia as a non-EU, post-
conflict and transition economy, informality is less used and the aversion 
towards it decreases. 
Entrepreneurs prefer to do their business relying on weak-tie network 
members, and sometimes strive to separate business from private relation-
ships, if strong-tie network members cannot be avoided. This is consistent 
with the conventional business literature. 
‘To be honest I have heard this from various people but it is not my case. I keep sepa-
rated my family, kin and friendship ties from my business. I prefer to do things by 
myself. The less one relies on such ties, the less troubles one has, this is my principle. 
So, I resolve my problems all by myself.’ (ALB_4)
The main intention of our study is to provide an estimate of the cost of 
informal networking. We focus on two main types of informal networking 
cost – the costs of money (resources) and costs of time (lost opportunities). 
Our dataset contains information on both types of costs – estimates of 
time and money spent on informal networking by our respondents in WB 
region. To reach an estimate of money invested into informal networking 
over a typical week, we asked the respondents to assess their expenses on a 
nine category scale: 1) 0 Euro; 2) 1–10 Euro; 3) 11–20 Euro; …; 9) over 100 
Euro. We use the mean value of the scale to calculate the average amount 
of money invested by every individual. For the last category, which is open 
(over 100 Euro), we use 150 Euro as the mean value. The calculation of the 
time spent on informal networking is also based on a weekly scale: 1) 1-2 
hours; 2) 3-5 hours; 3) 6-10 hours; 4) 11-20 hours; 5) over 20 hours. For the 
last category, which is open (over 20 hours), we use 30 hours as the mean 
value. Following the same procedure, we use the mean value of the scale to 
calculate the average time spent in networking over a typical week by every 
individual. In the next stage, we monetize the costs of time by calculating 
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the average value of a working hour (Euros) for every individual based 
on the information on their net monthly earning based on the following 
question: What is your monthly income, including all sources: income_1: 
up to 100 Euro; income_2: 101–200 Euro; income_3: 201–300 … to the 
highest income category, income_9: over 1,500 Euro. The advantage of this 
approach is that it produces more accurate estimates, since we also have 
a question on their total income, from both formal and informal sources. 
After this transformation, we summarize the estimated costs of money and 
time expressed in Euros. In the final step, we use purchasing power parity 
(PPP) indices to equalize the monetary costs between different countries 
in the WB region and aggregate them to monthly totals. The estimated 
(aggregated) costs per month across the WB region (costppp_inm) are 
reported in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1. The total costs of informal networking in WB, in Euros, PPP adjusted 
Our survey data suggests that, on average, individuals in the WB region 
spend around 10 hours of their time on informal networking and around 
11 Euros per week for gifts, coffee, meals, parties and other related costs. 
The total informal networking cost, the costs of time and money stand-
ardized by the PPP index, is around 23 Euros per week, on average, and 
if aggregated at the monthly level, around 100 Euros (red line on Figure 
4.1). In the structure of these costs, there is around 10 Euros reported to 
be spent in terms of money, while the remaining 13 Euros, on average per 
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week, is the opportunity costs of time (which is calculated based on the 
individual earnings of every respondents in the database). This means that 
the estimated (opportunity) costs of time are greater than the reported 
monetary costs. Comparing the total cost among countries, the high-
est monthly informal cost is reported for Kosovo (150 Euros, average net 
earnings reported in our dataset for Kosovo is 270 Euros), the lowest one 
in Serbia and Macedonia (80 and 85 Euro, average net earnings reported 
for these two countries are 240 and 250 Euros respectively), while the other 
countries fall closer to the average. The average net income in our dataset 
is 250 Euros.
Interestingly, once asked about costs of informal networking in our 
in-depth interviews, our interviewees recognize these costs well; they pro-
vide quantitative estimates, including both costs they spend in terms of 
money and the time they invest in establishing, sustaining and expanding 
informal networking. In addition, throughout our interviews we identify 
a substituting relation between money and time – more time is invested 
in informal networking in the early stage of business development, while 
more money is invested in the later stage of company’s development, which 
is a consistent finding with business literature (e.g. Greve and Salaff, 2003). 
The entrepreneurs are rather explicit in trying to prevent any unnecessary 
time loss, even for informal networking, and apparently, they are buying 
their time with more money invested, which is the case when a business is 
more developed and financially stronger. The estimated costs of informal 
networking in our sample are larger for entrepreneurs by 60%. 
Table 4.2. Estimated costs of informal networking by different categories,  
in Euros, PPP adjusted
Business status Gender Level of education
Citizens Entre-
preneurs
Males Females Primary Secondary University Postgraduate
95€ 160€ 120€ 80€ 50€ 100€ 150€ 210€
Source: INFORM, 2017 survey data and calculations of the authors. The numbers are rounded. 
The entrepreneurs are not the only category which reports much higher 
costs of informal networking. The level of costs is also gendered, where 
the male respondents report some 50% higher informal networking costs 
comparing to the female respondents. It also interesting to note that level 
of education provides a very clear pattern in the behaviour of these costs. 
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As the level of education of our respondents is getting higher, the average 
costs are also increasing. For example, the respondents with incomplete 
primary or primary education spend some 50 Euros on informal network-
ing per month, while on the other end of the scale, the respondents with 
master or doctoral degrees spend over 200 Euros on informal networking 
per month. The effects of these individual characteristics might overlap 
(e.g. entrepreneurs might be more often male respondents who are more 
educated); hence, these influences might operate cumulatively, but at this 
stage we cannot say more on these effects.
Most entrepreneurs explicitly point to the blindness of informal net-
works to ethnicity and religion, which is a persistent problem for some of 
these formal institutional environments (e.g., BiH and Macedonia). This 
is a positive example, sending a message that informality (networks) deals 
better with ethnic and religious diversity than do formal institutions; the 
motives driving formal (political interest) and informal (in this case busi-
ness interest) institutions are obviously different, and they produce differ-
ent attitudes related to the role of ethnic heterogeneity in these societies. 
‘[…]my situation is that I don’t really know the ethnic and religious belonging of peo-
ple to whom I am connected, unless in cases when they say where are they from or to 
which religious group they belong. This happens because to me and my acquaintances 
this is not an issue at all.’ (ALB_1)
‘In my network, there are various people, people from different spheres of life. In busi-
ness relationships the ethnic background is irrelevant, because everyone is striving 
towards the same goal that is the mutual satisfaction coming from the job done. Eve-
ryday activities establish business connections and ties, thus creating a circle of people 
where everyone knows what to expect from others.’ (BiH_2)
‘The people I work with come from different social and ethnic groups. Depending 
on one’s needs (interest) business does not discriminate on the above stated criteria.’ 
(MKD_2)
It seems that formal institutions in the region can learn and try to integrate 
positive messages sent by informality, which one of our respondents from 
the EU (Croatia) commented on.
‘In my opinion, all formal institutions have employees who are politically selected – 
in BiH, Croatia, Kosovo – they have the same problem. Those people are not in their 
positions because of their knowledge, experience, results – there is no criteria there. 
That is why they need a problem, to pull the brake. Mainly these are stories with ethnic 
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background, politically motivated – is someone left or right?, was someone a partisan 
or not?, was someone in the secret service (UDBA) or not?. They are telling us stories 
and poisoning us with these silly ideas. Actually, my conclusion is that political insti-
tutions, these formal ones, are mainly politicized, hence, biased in their structure. In 
contrast, informal institutions are built naturally, from the ground’. (CRO_4) 
Finally, assuming that informal networking is not free, an increase in the 
number of members in a network could be associated with a higher total 
cost of networking. We investigate this possibility by looking at the simple 
correlations between these influences. The pairwise correlation between 
the two variables – the cost and size of the networks – is indeed positive 
(0.09) and statistically significant (p-value=0.000). Accordingly, we have 
indications that a larger network size is associated with a higher informal 
networking cost, although this needs to be checked in a model with causal 
relationships to get more meaningful explanation. 
Policy Implications
This chapter provides empirical evidence that informal networking is 
widely used in the WB region. It plays an equally important part in the 
everyday life of people and in the daily business activities of entrepre-
neurs. Survey participants report to have around 13 active members in 
their informal networks and they spend around 100 Euros per month in 
terms of the money and time they invest. We find evidence that the costs of 
invested time are a bit higher than what average individuals pay in terms 
of money. This applies to the both randomly selected citizens and entre-
preneurs, although entrepreneurs report having larger informal networks 
(by some 30%) and bigger informal networking costs (by some 60%). We 
also find evidence that informal networking is rather gendered as male 
respondents report having bigger networks and larger costs than females. 
While the purpose of networking is diverse, our in-depth interviews 
with entrepreneurs find that informal networking is primarily used to 
support their business activities – from providing comfort, support, and 
advice through established networks to making new business deals within 
existing and expanding networks. What the majority of entrepreneurs 
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underline is that informal networking eases cumbersome and demanding 
formal institutions and their procedures. 
The conducted investigation implies that policy makers should not 
look at informal networking and informal practices built in the household 
and business sector as an exclusively negative phenomenon associated 
with cultural and traditional backwardness or ethnic and religious roots, 
representative of the Western Balkans’ mentality. Rather, informal institu-
tions, channelled and supported by informal networks and practices on 
the ground send a valuable signal, serve as indicators of the functioning of 
formal institutions that need attention, and have the potential to be inte-
grated into policy thinking. As our key policy relevant finding, we establish 
that individuals in the WB region who invest into informal networking do 
so at a high cost, which implies that the culturally determined sociability 
of informal networking has an instrumental purpose. 
Policy makers know that informality in the WB business sector, 
although built and inherited from the past, do respond to the imposed 
positive changes of formal institutions over a quite short period of time. 
However, waiting for a complete turnover in the workings of formal insti-
tutions without simultaneous engagement with the informal sector is not 
an option. On the one hand, introducing relevant policies to increase the 
efficiency of formal institutions and regulations is likely to reduce infor-
mality without an additional effort to change culture, traditions, or mental-
ity of people. On the other hand, the champions of change tend to use all 
available avenues in policy-thinking (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). 
Exploring the potential of context-sensitive policies and engaging 
informal practices for policy implementation, and articulating the signifi-
cant costs of informal networking for people in the WB region can help 
facilitate change and create shortcuts in post-conflict societies. Thus, for 
example, through their informal networking entrepreneurs deal success-
fully with the ethnic and religious issues that present multiple challenges 
for heterogeneous societies, and much more effectively than the formal 
institutions. While formal institutions are generally prioritized in policy 
thinking over informal ones, they are only one part of the solution. The 
other part will remain to depend on the integration of the well-established 
informal practices of social inclusion of ethnic and religious differences 
into formal institutional settings (ALB_1; BiH_2, MAK_2), which brings 
economic benefits (Efendic and Pugh, 2018). While formal institutions tend 
to go ‘formal’ (by issuing legal requirements and constraints) in engaging 
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with diverse and complex environments in the region and thus send wrong 
signals to the international and local community, informal networking and 
unofficial channels provide a back-up and prove to operate effectively on 
the ground. 
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5.  How to Sustainably Decrease Clientelism 
and Ensure Fair Political Competition in the 
WB? The Case for Introducing Standing 
Parliamentary Committees
Political clientelism is widely present in the Western Balkan countries (WB) and has 
a substantial effect on electoral, political and policy outcomes. It involves an array of 
redistributive practices, facilitated through informal channels, which appear, in vari-
ous forms and to varying degrees, throughout the WB countries (Albania, Bosnia and 
Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia). Incumbent political parties 
take advantage of weak institutions to obstruct the enforcement of rules designed to 
prevent clientelist practices. This paper aims to identify sustainable political solutions 
to the problem of clientelism and the uneven playing field. Since clientelist practices ex-
tend beyond election periods, they need to be tackled continuously within institutional 
and political processes.
Keywords: clientelism, patronage, informality, political parties, Western Balkan, policy
Introduction
Political clientelism is widely present in the Western Balkan countries (WB) 
and has a substantial effect on electoral, political and policy outcomes. It 
involves an array of redistributive practices, facilitated through informal 
channels, which appear, in various forms and to varying degrees, throughout 
the WB countries (Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina [BiH], Kosovo, Mac-
edonia, Montenegro, and Serbia). Incumbent political parties take advantage 
of weak institutions to obstruct the enforcement of rules designed to prevent 
clientelist practices. The lack of enforcement of such rules spurs the arbitrary 
allocation of public resources for clientelist goals and contributes to the par-
tisation and deterioration of the public administration, thus strengthening 
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the incumbents and preventing credible democratic outcomes. Finally, cli-
entelism may help incumbents take over institutions, which may ultimately 
lead to state capture (Grzymala-Busse, 2008).
Recent academic studies of clientelism have proposed a distinction 
between electoral and relational clientelism (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and 
Nichter, 2014; Nichter, 2010), both of which are present in the Western Bal-
kans region. Electoral clientelism represents ad hoc, short-lived relation-
ships, typically involving transactions established and implemented during 
election campaigns and, in particular, on the election day. A very com-
mon example of electoral clientelist relationships is vote buying (a one-off 
exchange of money or goods for votes). Relational clientelism by contrast 
is based on long-term relationships, where the inducements that are dis-
tributed for the wellbeing of clients are much more substantial. Moreover, 
under relational clientelism, there is a wider ‘catalogue’ of inducements, 
ranging from party patronage in employment to long-term or permanent 
benefits, typically at the expense of public resources.
This distinction is key to understanding the varying degrees of 
enforcement of rules against clientelism: rules for preventing electoral cli-
entelism, valid only before and during election cycles, are enforced to a 
greater extent than those that sanction practices between two elections. 
Rules to prevent electoral clientelism include the ‘freezing’ of the distribu-
tion of subsidies, procurement and employment in the public sector, as well 
as sanctions for biased media reporting. In addition, international election 
observation missions and media monitoring remain focused on manifes-
tations of electoral clientelism. The monitoring findings filter through to 
EU country reports, with the result that EU conditionality focuses on only 
one part of the overall problem, since practices of electoral clientelism are 
in fact only a fraction of the full range of clientelist practices that harm 
political competition.
The lack of implementation of rules combating clientelism has exac-
erbated various political crises which threaten the political process in 
the WB. Ruling parties tend to abuse resources and capture the institu-
tions that should ensure the rule of law and prevent clientelism, while 
opposition parties, unable to win elections in conditions of unfair com-
petition, tend to use non-institutional measures such as boycotting of 
parliaments and organised protests. Such patterns of crisis have recently 
taken place in Macedonia (2012–2013; 2015–2016), Montenegro (2016) 
and Albania (2017). In all these cases, opposition parties have boycotted 
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the formal institutions and demanded international (EU) mediation 
as a route to resolve the situation. Such mediation has been conducted 
mainly through informal leadership meetings. One of the outcomes of 
these meetings has been the establishment of interim governments that 
supposedly increase the enforcement of rules against clientelism and 
corruption during elections. 
However, such solutions have a temporary and unsustainable char-
acter: they only partially solve the problem of clientelism and the uneven 
political playing field. Clientelism prevention mechanisms, such as ban-
ning public sector employment contracts and procurement before elec-
tions, occur only during the limited pre-election periods, despite the fact 
that clientelism occurs continuously. Moreover, since such solutions are 
the product of internationally sponsored informal political agreements, 
they unintentionally undermine the role of national parliaments as insti-
tutions where political conflict should be addressed. International media-
tion, while relatively effective for resolving conflicts, is of an informal char-
acter and does not offer sustainable solutions mediated through formal 
institutional channels. 
This chapter aims to identify sustainable political solutions to the 
problem of clientelism and the uneven playing field. It begins with a review 
of literature focused on the variations of clientelist linkages. Then it goes 
on to analyse the different types of clientelism in the WB by examining the 
findings from the research within the project ‘Closing the Gap between 
Formal and Informal Institutions in the Balkans’ (INFORM). Lastly, the 
chapter proposes an institutional solution for ensuring continuous tackle 
of clientelism through incentivising political will. Throughout the chapter 
we use survey data from the project INFORM, gathered during May-June 
2017 (6040 face-to-face interviews with respondents from the WB coun-
tries). Empirically, we also rely on our conducted fieldwork (ethnography 
and semi-structured interviews with citizens and policy makers), but also 
on data produced by international and domestic election observation mis-
sions and media reports depicting clientelist practices in the region. 
Since clientelist practices extend beyond election periods, they need 
to be tackled continuously within institutional and political processes. 
Therefore, we propose a standing committee within parliaments, which 
should be tasked with overseeing the measures taken by other state bod-
ies against clientelism. This standing committee should be established in 
cooperation with civil society organisations. As the national parliament is 
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a forum where governing and opposition parties meet, incentivising over-
sight is an appropriate tool for overcoming the political conflicts created 
by clientelism or corruption. The success of such a body should be set as a 
condition for the further EU progress of the WB countries. This will enable 
a positive structure of incentives for constructive political dialogue, which 
should generate the much sought-after political will that is essential to 
facilitating the effective work of existing institutions tasked with tackling 
political clientelism.
Variations of Clientelist Linkages in the Literature
The policy recommendation of this chapter, which aims at sustainable solu-
tions to the continuous appearance of clientelism (both within and outside 
election cycles), is based on the understanding that there are various mani-
festations of political clientelism. These variations should be considered 
when designing policies for suppressing and preventing clientelism. While 
there is a recognition within the social science literature that the various 
manifestations of clientelism require different policy treatments, this is not 
the case in the sphere of policy making. Across the WB societies, policies 
are drafted and implemented with a view to the immediate period around 
elections, thus ignoring the manifestations of clientelism between election 
cycles. Our data suggests that clientelist linkages are forged continuously, 
not only just before or after elections. This section will briefly present the 
scientific literature on the variation of clientelist linkages, so as to elabo-
rate a theoretical framework for our recommendation to establish standing 
parliamentary committees.
Political clientelism is defined in the literature as a non-programmatic 
political relationship between citizens (clients) and political parties or 
office-seekers (patrons), which is personalised, instrumental, reciprocal 
and asymmetric in terms of distribution of power and resources (Kitschelt 
and Wilkinson, 2007; Piattoni, 2001: 12–13; Scott, 1972: 92; Stokes et al., 
2013). Within this broad category of relationships, which can be clearly dif-
ferentiated from programmatic political linkages (classed as ‘standard’ in 
highly developed democracies), we find an underlying diversity in the key 
constitutive elements of the clientelist relationship. Indeed, the American 
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political scientist and anthropologist James C. Scott, one of the pioneers of 
the study of clientelism, maintains that “one could potentially make almost 
limitless distinctions among patron-client relationships” (Scott, 1972: 97). 
Scott stresses that the resource bases of patrons and clients, which are cru-
cial determinants of the establishment and persistence of clientelist rela-
tionships, are one source of variation. Variations may also be found in the 
balance between affective and instrumental ties and between voluntarism 
and coercion; in the durability of the relationship over time; in the homo-
geneity/heterogeneity of the clientelist following; and in field (contextual) 
variables (Scott, 1972: 97–101). In another typology (which includes not 
only political clientelism but also its pre-mass politics manifestations), 
Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984: 221) differentiate between different types of 
clientelism on the basis of: the organisational patterns of clientelism; the 
modes of patron and client role taking; the styles of instalment into the 
relationship (tacit agreements vs. ceremonially or contractually sanctioned 
agreements); the types of clientelistic exchanges; and the degree of continu-
ity and instability in the relationships. In developing the policy recommen-
dation presented in this paper, we differentiated between clientelist rela-
tionships according to the types and contents of exchanges, which we found 
to be a suitable dimension for understanding the variety of clientelism in 
the WB. The types of exchanges within clientelist relationships, in turn, are 
strongly affected by the resource bases of both patrons and clients.
Once the resource base of patrons and clients has been taken into 
account, a further instructive distinction becomes relevant: the distinction 
between electoral and relational clientelism (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca and 
Nichter, 2014; Nichter, 2010). This distinction can effectively capture the 
variations that are at stake when devising policies to combat clientelism. 
Short-lived clientelist relationships, involving transactions established and 
implemented during election campaigns, especially on the election day, are 
classed as manifestations of electoral clientelism. Relational clientelism, by 
contrast, is based on long-term relationships, in which the inducements 
that are distributed for the wellbeing of clients are much more substantial. 
The following analysis will show that the electoral vs. relational cli-
entelism distinction can help understand political clientelism in the 
WB. Moreover, it should explain why substantial and long-term political 
engagement of key actors is needed (via parliamentary committees) to cre-
ate effective conditions for combatting clientelism.
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Different Types of Clientelist Linkages in the WB and the 
Scope of Clientelism
Although political parties do not publicly announce their redistribution 
strategies in their clientelist dealings, the widespread pursuit of such strat-
egies represents a ‘public secret’ (a form of informally institutionalised 
behaviour) in all WB countries. Some of the more obvious clientelist prac-
tices include vote buying, spoils-based employment in public administra-
tions, favours ensuring preferential treatment in dealing with state institu-
tions, and particularistic redistribution of state subsidies (Table 5.1). 
Table 5.1. Inducements and enforcement mechanisms that patrons employ across the WB 
Inducements:
- Handouts for vote buying (money, goods)
- Party employment in public administration
- Selective distribution of subsidies for farmers
- Selective distribution of social benefits and similar favours
- Public procurement contracts 
Enforcement mechanisms:
- Carousel voting
- Photographing the ballot
- List of ‘secured voters’
- Trading of influence, donations, protection from investigations
The variety of goods that are exchanged (and the presence of different 
enforcement mechanisms) in return for votes point to the existence of both 
electoral and relational clientelism in the WB. At present, this ‘dynamics’ of 
the field is not tackled effectively with relevant policy responses. 
The need for continuous action against political clientelism is dem-
onstrated by the reach and efficiency of clientelist practices in the WB6 
countries. According to the INFORM survey, significant portions of the 
population have been offered money or favours in exchange for their vote. 
Notably, one in five respondents in Montenegro (23%) and Albania (21%) 
reported receiving an offer of money or favours in exchange for a vote, 
while the corresponding figures in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and 
Kosovo were 15% and 13% respectively. The clientelist pressure on voters 
is lowest in Serbia (8%) and Macedonia (7%) (Figure 5.1).
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Figure 5.1. Have you ever been offered money or a favour in exchange for your vote in elec-
tions? (%)
Moreover, institutional dysfunctionality in the WB countries leaves signifi-
cant space for the development of parallel informal ways of dealing with 
state institutions. Political parties in power have thus become the ‘middle-
men’ between formal institutions (e.g. healthcare, employment, education) 
and citizens. People have become familiar with the ‘rules of the game’ and 
adapted to the situation by seeking access to services through political par-
ties rather than the institutions.
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HAVE YOU TURNED TO A PARTY OFFICIAL FOR HELP?
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When respondents were asked whether they had ever approached a party 
official or activist for help, the highest proportions of affirmative responses 
were in Macedonia (14%) and Montenegro (13%), while the lowest was in 
Albania (4.5%) (Figure 5.2). The figures for the other countries lie in the 
middle: 10% of BiH respondents, 8% of Kosovars and 7% of Serbs reported 
asking help from political parties. This demonstrates the extent of ties that 
are less likely to have occurred only before elections, i.e. relational clientelism.
To gain a more practical understanding of the effect of clientelism on 
election days across the WB, we projected the figures onto the number of 
voters in the last general elections before our survey (Table 5.2). We com-
pared this with the data about electoral performance in the same elections 
of the winning party/coalition and the party/coalition entering parlia-
ment with fewest votes. In each of the countries of interest, the number 
of respondents who have ever experienced a clientelist offer represents a 
substantial proportion of the voters, which is thus able to affect election 
outcomes. For example, this number makes up more than two-thirds of the 
votes for the election winners in Albania and Montenegro, while it exceeds 
the number of votes for the winners in BiH and Kosovo. Of course, our 
projections should not be taken as a precise indicator of the effects of cli-
entelism on election outcomes. Nevertheless, they do provide a very rough 
illustration of the extent of its influence, suggesting that political parties in 
the WB devote significant energies to establishing clientelist linkages for 
the sake of political support. In short, our findings suggest that the scale of 
clientelism is enough to swing election results.
Table 5.2. Projection of survey responses onto the number of registered voters in the WB6 
countries
 ALB 2013 BiH 2014 KOS 2014 MKD 2016 MNE 2016 SRB 2016
Registered voters* 3,271,885 3,278,908 1,799,023 1,784,416 528,817 6,739,441
% of reported 
pressured voters**
20.6 15.4 12.5 7.4 22.5 8.4
Projection of 
pressured voters































Sources: *National electoral commissions and **INFORM 2017 survey.
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Furthermore, the analysis reveals that when citizens seek benefits, the 
chances of political parties seeking their loyalty is substantially higher: 
citizens seeking benefits have six times higher odds to experience clien-
telist pressure than those who do not do so. This effect is most marked in 
Kosovo, where benefit-seekers have 11 times the odds to participate in a 
clientelist transaction than non-benefit-seekers. In Albania, they have nine 
times the odds, in BiH seven times, in Macedonia six times, in Serbia four 
times and in Montenegro three times.
In addition to reported experiences of clientelism, our survey data on 
citizen perceptions of clientelist practices reveal the existence of shared 
expectations about informal rules. According to our data, for instance, citi-
zens have shared expectations that employment is gained predominantly 
through informal channels such as party membership or connections. Cit-
izens’ perceptions thus act as informal, bottom-up incentives that encour-
age political parties to engage in clientelism, forming a sort of vicious cycle. 
Taken together, then, our data point to the simultaneous existence of two 
interconnected phenomena: a top-down process whereby political par-
ties are actively engaged in practices of clientelist employment, which are 
reflected in respondents’ perceptions; and a bottom-up process whereby 
the idea of party-sponsored employment is deeply embedded in citizens’ 
perceptions, to the extent that clientelist employment is seen as a normal 
‘rule of the game’.
Designing an Incentive Structure for Continuous Fight 
Against Clientelism 
Since long-term practices of relational clientelism ensure advantages for 
incumbents well before elections, they need to be tracked and prevented 
continuously. The data above demonstrate two main findings: that clien-
telism is widespread in the WB, and that it can be efficient in swinging 
elections by creating an uneven field for political competition. Public 
institutions are mainly inefficient at tackling this situation, which eventu-
ally creates political conflicts that are settled outside the political process. 
While analysts and policy-makers in general focus on the inefficiency of 
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state bodies, less attention has been paid to the interests of political parties 
in sustaining clientelism. We claim that a solution should be sought in the 
political sphere, by structuring continuous political dialogue about the 
presence and effects of clientelism and employing parliaments as agents 
of oversight. This does not mean abandoning the reform of the preven-
tive and suppressive institutions tasked with tackling corruption and cli-
entelism; rather, it entails fostering these institutions through generating 
much needed political will within parliaments.
To combat clientelism in the long run, we propose the establishment 
of a permanent oversight mechanism in the legislature that can monitor 
the institutions of the executive branch and their redistribution of public 
funds, public service employment and decision-making of relevance for 
clientelist practices. This body should also aim to prevent potential overlap 
between the state and the ruling parties and ensure a more level playing 
field between political actors from the government and the opposition. The 
main task of this oversight mechanism would be to ensure that existing 
institutions tasked with prevention, monitoring, oversight and suppression 
of abuse of power function properly and coordinate in order to achieve 
tangible results. This may be achieved by demanding reports and achieve-
ments from existing institutions and by compiling an annual assessment 
report.
In order to be successful, this oversight mechanism should have politi-
cal weight and expert capacity from supporting staff, and should be sup-
ported by the EU as an important segment of the conditionality mechanism 
for the WB countries. The committee should call upon existing institutions 
with the authority to prevent, monitor and curb abuse in these sectors, 
including ministries, agencies and bureaus, as well as independent and 
regulatory bodies. The members should have the right to demand reports 
from these bodies throughout the year and should inquire into how they 
are tackling current issues.
Once a year, the committee should draft a report on the risks of 
abuses of public office for party gains. Such reports should evaluate the 
current state of affairs and assess any improvements or backsliding in 
the functioning of the relevant state institutions (e.g. the National Audit 
Office, anti-corruption bodies) in monitoring and preventing potential 
abuses for party gains (clientelist practices). These reports should be 
produced by the standing committee and then discussed and adopted 
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in a plenary parliament session. The European Commission should also 
make use of these reports as a valuable input in its overall assessment of 
the country’s rule of law and democratic competition. 
The committee should oversee areas where there is a high risk of abuses 
that may lead to an uneven playing field, overlap between the state and the 
party, corruption and clientelism. These areas include in particular:
– Public procurement and public finance management
– Allocation of social benefit transfers
– Agricultural subsidies
– Employment and promotion in the public sector
– Prevention and suppression of corruption
– Media oversight.
This mechanism should be based on a parliamentary oversight committee, 
where the opposition holds the majority of seats and the chair is selected 
through a consensus. 
The oversight committee should make full use of the independent civil 
society, expert and media sectors in the WB countries. In order to structure 
such cooperation, we propose creating a registry of organizations and indi-
viduals that could participate in the body’s public discussions. Independ-
ent experts, civil society activists and journalists should be able to raise 
discussions and participate in setting the agenda as associate members 
without voting rights. Granting such figures formal agenda-setting rights 
should make the committee’s work much more dynamic and effective than 
if it remained closed to the public.
Overall, the political character of the body should serve to ensure 
that its decisions are not purely administrative but also carry political 
weight. Political will should therefore be the main driver of oversight 
and any proposed measures and reforms. In this way, the committee will 
complement institutional reforms of other state bodies and will secure 
the development of institutions within a system structured by the politi-
cal will for improvement.
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Conclusion
Political clientelism is widespread across the countries of the WB region. 
We have suggested that the distinction between electoral and relational 
clientelism, currently more frequently used in the academic literature than 
in policy making, is helpful when designing policies for suppressing and 
preventing clientelism. This suggestion is reinforced by the fact that some 
of the WB countries (Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro) that have 
launched stricter policies against clientelism have addressed the immedi-
ate periods around elections, leaving the fight against clientelism between 
elections weak and ineffective. In other words, the countries from the WB 
tend to be focused on combating short-term electoral clientelism, while 
disregarding its relational manifestations. Despite these policies, the extent 
of clientelism remains relatively substantial across the WB – at least sub-
stantial enough, as our survey findings show, to affect electoral outcomes.
The policy recommendation proposed in this article aims to create 
a specific type of incentive structure at the political level, which should 
naturally guide political actors towards suppressing clientelism, particu-
larly those practices pursued by incumbents which tend to generate the 
relational form of clientelism. In order to facilitate the emergence of such 
an incentive structure, the permanent parliamentary committees that we 
envisage, tasked with overseeing the work of institutions combating clien-
telism, should be made up of a majority of members from opposition par-
ties. In addition, the work of the committees should be closely monitored 
by the European Commission and their performance should be evaluated 
within the EU’s conditionality mechanisms for the WB countries. 
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6.  Leaders’ Meetings: Facilitating or Replacing 
the Formal Political Processes in the Western 
Balkan Countries?
Leaders’ meetings, an informal practice for resolving political conflicts, have become a 
common feature of the political systems in the Western Balkan (WB) countries: Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo and Macedonia. Formal parliamentary political 
institutions and processes in the WB are often incapacitated by boycotts, blockades or rejec-
tions from political actors, which turn political deliberation into political conflict. In turn, 
political conflicts have created and/or intensified political crises, rendering formal institu-
tions dysfunctional, and opening the space for interventions by external actors. Indeed, 
the deadlocks in political decision-making and the fragility of formal political institutions 
have led to a reliance on leaders’ meetings as an informal political mechanism. These in-
clude both meetings of leaders themselves and leadership meetings, which are attended by 
delegated representatives, and in many cases, external actors are also involved. This chapter 
explores the nature and the effects of the leaders’ meetings in political decision-making. It 
asks whether the leaders’ meetings facilitate or replace the formal political processes in the 
WB countries.
Keywords: informality, formal politics, leadership, actors, Western Balkans
Introduction 
Leaders’ meetings, an informal practice for resolving political conflicts, 
have become a common feature of the political systems in the WB coun-
tries: Albania, BiH, Kosovo and Macedonia. Formal parliamentary political 
institutions and processes in the WB are often incapacitated by boycotts, 
blockades or rejections from political actors, which turn political delibera-
tion into political conflict. Indeed, the deadlocks in political decision-mak-
ing and the fragility of formal political institutions have led to a reliance 
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on leaders’ meetings as an informal political mechanism. Leaders’ meet-
ings include both meetings of leaders themselves and leadership meetings, 
which are attended by delegated representatives, and in many cases, exter-
nal actors are also involved. Leaders’ meetings are negotiations among the 
major political party leaders that seek a consensual resolution on conten-
tious issues and that occur outside formal institutions, in public places, 
commercial, as well as in diplomatic premises. The purpose of this infor-
mal practice is to deal with political disputes, which, having gone outside 
formal institutions, cannot be contained by them, so are resolved in private 
meetings, mainly between party leaders. As the political actors involved 
have little faith that what they agree will be respected and implemented, it 
is necessary for an external actor to facilitate, mediate and guarantee the 
leadership negotiation process to ensure that what is agreed in the meet-
ings will be honoured. Most commonly, this role has been performed by 
the president of the country or representatives of the European Union 
(EU) and the United States (US). 
Hence, against this backdrop, the book chapter, explores the nature 
and the effects of the leaders’ meetings in political decision-making. It asks 
whether the leaders’ meetings facilitate or replace the formal political pro-
cesses in the WB countries. The chapter is divided into three parts. The 
methodology section lays out the methods used, theoretical framework 
and the concept of leaders’ meetings. The second part offers four coun-
try specific case illustrations on contentious issues and where political 
actors resorted to informality in politics through leaders’ meetings fol-
lowed with an analysis of the outcomes and impact on formal politics. The 
third part presents concluding remarks. Finally, the chapter discusses the 
policy implications and it also proposes a set of recommendations to be 
addressed by domestic political actors and the ‘international community’ 
alike to address informality in political decision-making in WB countries. 
The chapter shows that leaders’/leadership meetings serve some sort of 
‘substitutive’ function as the domestic political actors and ‘the international 
community’ aim at reaching a political decision in the context of dysfunc-
tional formal institutions. It recommends ways to strengthen political dia-
logue, foster consensus-building on major political issues and strengthen 
democratic institutions. 
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Formal and Informal Political Institutions  
and Decision-Making 
The chapter is based on a qualitative methodology, namely process tracing, 
interviews with actors involved in the leaders’ in all four case studies, and 
archival research: media reports and press releases as well as legislation. 
Informality constitutes an integral part of the functioning of societies in 
WB, as is the case in all former communist countries. As Giordano and 
Hayoz observe, ‘no organization or democratic state can avoid informal 
practices, which make sense only with regard to a formal rule’ (Giordano 
and Hayoz, 2013: 12). Informal practices, and informality as a phenomenon 
exist in Western societies as well, but differences in its scope, frequency and 
functioning are considerable compared to the former communist socie-
ties (Sampson, 1985: 44–66). To be sure, informality is embedded in the 
past experiences of post-communist countries, where formal institutions 
were often insufficient in solving everyday problems of citizens. As such 
informal practices developed as responses to the constraints of formal 
institutions. They were a form of reaction and ‘tactical’ means of survival 
in a highly insecure societal atmosphere. In post-communist societies, the 
state is still perceived more as a generator of crisis rather than an effective 
means of social organization, which is directly connected to past experi-
ences during communist times. As Giordano observes:
Informality as an adequate principle of social organization (along with its social prac-
tices, mentioned above) is strictly linked to the dreadful experiences that members 
of a given society have continuously had with the state both in a recent and distant 
past. (…) these negatives spaces of experience, which have a marked influence on the 
actors and the formation of their horizons of expectation, do not reproduce them-
selves automatically by tradition (…) These spaces of experience must be constantly 
confirmed in the present. (…). In accordance with the members’ perception of these 
experiences, the corresponding systems of representations and behavioural models 
will be strengthened, modified, or discarded (Giordano, 2013:42).
The legacy of socialism has shaped the process of democratic transition 
of post-communist countries, with informality being perpetuated as a 
practice in the new democratized settings. This has led to continuation of 
old and emergence of new informal practices. Looking at informality in 
politics, the chapter has taken North’s definition of institutions as ‘humanly 
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devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interac-
tion consisting of ‘informal constraints (…) and formal rules…’ (North, 
1991: 97). Similarly, Helmke and Levitsky define institutions as ‘rules and 
procedures (both formal and informal) that structure social interaction by 
constraining and enabling actors’ behavior’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 
727). Along these theoretical lines, informality could be perceived as ‘a set 
of one-on-one behaviours – highly personalized – which can be regarded 
as the most simple, basic and universal of human relationships’ (Giordano, 
2013: 30) which does not exclude the possibility of informality taking place 
between groups, with informality brokers on both sides, notwithstanding 
that both domestic and foreign political elites could play the role of infor-
mality promoters. 
However, an important definition on informality in this inquiry is the 
one that interprets informal institutions as ‘socially shared rules, usually 
unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of offi-
cially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 727). As such this 
definition differentiates informal institutions from the formal ones, but is 
also points to informality being an integral part of the formal rules. Moreo-
ver, looking at the motives of informal institutions, Helmke and Levitsky 
offer three motives for emergence of informal rules and institutions. They 
have included the following:
– Actors create informal rules because formal institutions are incom-
plete;
– Informal institutions may be a ‘second best’ strategy for actors who 
prefer, but cannot achieve a formal institutional solution;
– Actors create informal institutions when they deem it less costly than 
creating formal institutions to their liking (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 
730). 
Moreover, as Hans-Joachim Lauth argues, there are three types of insti-
tutions, defined by the interplay of the informal and formal institutions. 
They are 1) the complementary type, in which they co-exist side by side 
and mutually reinforce and support each other; 2) the substitutive type, 
in which either formal or informal institutions are effective in the sense 
of being functionally equivalent to each other; and 3) the conflicting type, 
when the two systems of rules are incompatible (Lauth, 2000: 25). 
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Yet, to understand how (in)formal political decision-making through 
leader’s meetings works, it is important to engage in explaining two cru-
cial aspects that relate to EU’s conditionality policy and the role of the 
‘the international community’ in the state politics in the WB countries. EU 
integration processes is often broadly referred in political discourse via the 
concept of ‘Europeanisation.’ Indeed, this concept has become widely used 
to describe the process of (a) construction, (b) diffusion and (c) implemen-
tation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, 
‘ways of doing things’, as well as shared beliefs and norms, which are first 
defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics 
(Radaelli, 2004: 3). However, the more generic term institutionalization 
often time used also in the context of approximation of aspiring states for 
EU membership points to ‘the process by which the actions and interac-
tions of social actors come to be normatively patterned’ (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier, 2002: 503). This ‘includes the transposition of EU legisla-
tion into domestic law, the restructuring of domestic institutions accord-
ing to EU rules, or the change of domestic political practices according to 
EU standards’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 503). Indeed, both 
concepts refer to the same outcome of adjusting societal structures and 
behaviour to patterns given by external actors, being that such structures 
need not be necessarily formal. Looking at the institutional change as a 
result of EU conditionality, Antoaneta Dimitrova has pointed out that 
institutional change conceptualized as the interplay between formal and informal 
rules can be seen in a different light when analysing EU enlargement (…) a process 
where new institutions arise as a result of changes in informal rules that are later fol-
lowed by changes in formal institutional rules, enlargement brings changes in formal 
rules which may later be followed by changes in informal rules (Dimitrova, 2010: 
139).
Hence, EU’s conditionality politics arises as a mechanism of ‘political 
give and take’, where political elites of aspiring countries for EU member-
ship can effectively recognize the reward of institutional adaptations and 
embark on harmonization of the EU rules. Mutual political manoeuvring 
requires constant adaptation of strategy on both sides, given that the actors 
on the side of candidate countries can often have diverse and heteroge-
neous interests, especially during political crises occurring in the coun-
tries that aspire EU membership. Ambitious political goals set by the EU 
to aspiring states are implemented through conditionality which basically 
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denotes ‘a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the 
EU provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its 
conditions’ (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2002: 670). The mechanism 
of conditionality entails that 
[…] it is simple and based on granting rewards for the fulfilment of given conditions 
and, conversely, withholding rewards for failure to meet the conditions. Very rarely 
has the EU opted for direct negative sanctions in cases when the EU’s conditions were 
not met. In most cases, failure to comply with the conditions resulted in ineligibility 
to transition to the next phase of integration or withholding of EU funds earmarked 
for the potential candidate state in question (Blagovcanin, 2017: 16).
The logic of conditionality implies that it ‘rewards those countries that 
have successfully mastered the quantifiable and urgent challenges of politi-
cal and economic reform rather than the less tangible long-term objectives 
of regional cooperation’ (Meurs and Yannis, 2002: 3). In order to satisfy 
conditionality requirements, aspiring countries —the four analysed here— 
have to frequently overcome political turmoil that occurs when socially 
divisive questions arise. Even more so, if one has in mind that the base 
of conditionality is democratic conditionality driven from the Copenha-
gen criteria which encompass ‘the fundamental political principles of the 
EU, the norms of human rights and liberal democracy’ (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier, 2002: 677) where the ‘main external incentive in this con-
text is, first, the establishment of institutional ties, such as association, and 
subsequently, the opening of accession negotiations (Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier, 2002: 677).
The ‘International Community’ and Politics in Western 
Balkan Countries 
State-building in post-communist and post-conflict societies in WB coun-
tries, occurs based on interaction between domestic and international actors 
through on an interplay of imposing values by ‘the international community’, 
reflexive feedback by domestic political elites and gradual internalization of 
these values in domestic political systems, or the lack thereof. This does not 
imply a deficit of authentic internalized political values; however, it implies a 
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frequent impossibility to resolve political crises and to align with the exter-
nal demands as the EU’s acquis communitaire or more fundamentally the 
Copenhagen criteria. Fragile and often defunct institutions, informal pres-
sure groups, corruption and political interests of domestic veto players often 
stand in the way of a more effective state-building process that is both suffer-
ing from excessive particularism (Mungiu Pippidi, 2005: 49–68) and visible 
social, ethnic and political cleavages.
In Albania, BiH, Kosovo and Macedonia, ‘the international commu-
nity’ has played a great role in post-socialist and post-conflict democrati-
sation in the region. Yet, the involvement of ‘the international community’ 
is short of decisive when it comes to political processes and internaliza-
tion of democratic values. The transformational efforts of ‘the international 
community’ have focused not only at the institutional level, but also social 
level, trying to create common and shared values and norms with a focus 
on interactions between institutions and individuals’ (Pilavdzija, 2013). Yet, 
shared norms in post-communist and post-conflict societies have proven 
challenging due to deep social and political divisions. Such institutional 
approaches may assist the functioning of the political institutions, but they 
fail to satisfy the citizens expectations and needs, as political elites often 
compromise on values they represent, and by deepening the divisions that 
influence political processes from within. 
Leader’s Meetings: An Informal Practice in Politics 
The political systems in Albania, BiH, Kosovo, and Macedonia, have pro-
duced an informal practice in political decision-making termed as the 
‘leaders’ meetings’. Formal parliamentary political institutions and pro-
cesses have faced with s stalemates in the political decision-making. This 
has signalled the fragility of formal political institutions and it has led way 
to the informality through leaders’ meetings, in which substantive political 
disputes are resolved in private meetings between party leaders circum-
venting legislative and other decision-making institutions. 
The leaders’ meetings constitute a practice of negotiation among the 
leaders of the major political parties taking place outside the framework 
of formal institutions reaching an agreement on a politically contentious 
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issue. Unlike in formal institutions, where a policy is adopted by the deci-
sion of a majority, in this setting leaders reach a solution consensually. The 
leaders’ meetings represent a mid-point from when the formal processes 
fail to resolve the problem at stake and the informal ones fill the void in an 
attempt to reach a resolution. Often the leaders themselves are not directly 
involved in negotiating the various aspects of the issue at stake, which are 
being discussed by negotiators, similarly in form to a working group. The 
negotiators act as ‘informality brokers,’ although they operate without full 
authorisation to decide on the issues and must consult with the leaders 
throughout the negotiation process. However, through their ‘delegates,’ the 
leaders monitor all the lower level meetings throughout the process. They 
are defined as the leadership meetings. 
Leaders’/leadership meetings have entailed negotiations among the 
major political party leaders and their delegated representatives occurring 
outside formal institutions seeking a consensual resolution on contentious 
issues. Distrust by the political actors that what they agree will be respected 
and implemented opens up a space for an external actor to mediate/facili-
tate and guarantee the leadership negotiation process and ensure that what 
is agreed in the meetings will be honoured. Most commonly, the represent-
atives of the EU and USA, and/or the president of the country has assumed 
this role. The ability of the outside actor to facilitate and guarantee the 
negotiation process depends on her/his political power and the ability to 
provide positive and negative incentives as stimuli to nudge the political 
actors to accept or concede the proposed position. Negotiations on level 
of political elites (as in the case of leadership meetings) reflect a practical 
modus operandi for reaching political compromises rather than reflection 
of political demand, which in these societies can often lack democratic 
substance. This practice is not only used in WB region. The scope of this 
use is larger in WB, but this practice has accompanied political decision-
making in other contexts as well. To illustrate informal political decision-
making the following is a sketch of four country case illustrations.
Case #1 Albania: The 2016 Judicial Reform 
The dispute/conflict: Albania’s judicial reform, intended to remove corrupt 
judges and suppress organised crime, was a top priority for the country to 
embark on the path to EU accession. However, the Socialist Party (SP) and 
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the opposition Democratic Party (DP) could not agree on how the reform 
should be carried out. It took the two parties 18 months of negotiations, 
disputes and mutual accusations, as well as a meeting between the SP and 
the DP and constant intervention from EU and USA, to reach an agree-
ment. Eventually, at midnight on 21 July 2016, the Albanian Parliament 
unanimously passed a constitutional package substantially amending the 
judicial system of the country.
Internal actors: The three largest political parties: SP, DP were primary 
actors, and the Socialist Movement for Integration (LSI) was a secondary 
actor.
Leaders in negotiations: chair of the SP; leader of the DP.
External actors: The European Commission (EC), through the European 
Commissioner for Enlargement, MEPs; the EU ambassador to Albania, US 
ambassador to Albania.
Resolution: Adoption of judicial reform by changing the Constitution of 
Albania with the mutual agreement of the majority and opposition. This 
gave a green light for the adoption of vetting procedures for the judiciary 
and more efficient measures against corruption and organised crime.
Case #2 BiH: Adoption of the EU Coordination Mechanism, 2016
The dispute/conflict: BiH’s fraught history of policy decision-making and 
implementation is the result of its complex institutional structures, which 
entail overlapping authorities, and mistrust between the three constitutive 
ethnic communities, which are fuelled by the actors of the ethnicity-based 
political system. The Coordination Mechanism (CM) on EU matters is 
thus a response to BiH’s fragmented and multi-layered formal institutional 
structure, as it establishes procedures for the effective coordination and 
implementation of EU-driven policies, and structures the interaction of 
the country as a whole with the EU. Despite being a key EU requirement 
for BiH, the adoption of the CM was hindered by the Republika Srpska 
(RS) leadership’s view that it was a threat to the entity’s position within 
the country. When a deal on the CM was established between the leader 
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the Bosniak and Serbian leaders, an objection was raised by their Croa-
tian counterpart, who regarded the CM as a threat to the position of BiH’s 
cantons. Eventually, the CM was finalised and formally adopted, with the 
package being brokered through a series of leadership meetings held in the 
period 2015–2016, in which the EU ambassador also participated.
Internal actors: The three largest political parties: Party of Democratic 
Action (SDA), Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and the 
Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH).
Leaders in negotiations: leader of the SDA and Chairman of BiH Presi-
dency, leader of the SNSD, President of RS; and leader of the HDZ BiH, 
member of BiH Presidency.
External actors: EU, Head of Delegation to BiH.
Resolution: The final text of the ‘Decision on the system of coordination of 
the process of BiH’s European integration’ was drafted in terms that were 
acceptable to all sides and formally adopted by the Council of Ministers in 
August 2016, contributing to BiH’s EU prospects. 
Case #3 Kosovo: The 2014 Parliamentary Elections 
The dispute/conflict: The 2014 Kosovar parliamentary elections were 
evaluated overall as transparent and well-organised, but there was no clear 
winner and a government could not be formed for six months. The Demo-
cratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) coalition, despite coming first in the elec-
tions, faced a challenge to form a government when the opposition parties 
– the Vetëvendosje Movement, the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), 
the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) and the Initiative for Kos-
ovo (NISMA) – joined forces to form the so-called VLAN coalition, thus 
becoming the majority political force in the Assembly. The VLAN coali-
tion claimed the right to form a government as they had the majority of 
seats. However, the PDK coalition persisted, arguing that they had won the 
plurality of votes in the elections and thus had the right to form the gov-
ernment. Eventually, a Constitutional Court of Kosovo ruling granted the 
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PDK coalition the power to form the government, rather than the VLAN 
post-election coalition. 
Internal actors: Political parties who won seats in the Assembly of Kosovo 
in the 2014 national elections: PDK, LDK, AAK, NISMA, Vetëvendosje.
Leaders in negotiations: leader of the LDK; leader of Vetëvendosje; chair of 
the AAK; chair of NISMA; leader of the PDK.
External actors: The  German ambassador, the German Ministry of For-
eign Affairs representative for Southeast Europe; the UK ambassador; the 
US ambassador.
Resolution: The rupture between the leaders of the LDK and the AAK over 
the Prime Minister’s post led to the disintegration of the VLAN coalition. 
The LDK then joined the PDK and the deadlock was broken.
Case # 4 Macedonia: The 2014 Parliamentary Elections  
and 2014–2016 Political Crisis 
The dispute/conflict: The credibility of the 2014 parliamentary elections 
was rejected by the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM)-led 
opposition, which abandoned formal political processes and boycotted 
Parliament, claiming that state institutions had been captured by the much 
more powerful VMRO-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity 
(VMRO-DPMNE). After a period of stagnation, SDSM’s release of wire-
tapped conversations of political elites in February 2015 triggered a pro-
cess of leaders’ and leadership meetings for resolving the political conflict, 
facilitated by the EU and the US. Political party leaders and their repre-
sentatives were in continuous negotiations until August 2016. Ultimately, 
they reached an agreement to implement measures in the electoral, judicial 
and media systems that guaranteed the trust of all parties in these institu-
tions before new parliamentary elections were held.
Internal actors: The four largest political parties: VMRO-DPMNE and 
SDSM were primary actors, and the Democratic Union for Integration 
(DUI) and Democratic Party of Albanians secondary actors. 
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Leaders in negotiations: leader of VMRO-DPMNE; leader of the SDSM; 
leader of the Democratic Union for Integration; and leader of the Demo-
cratic Party of Albanians.
External actors: EC, through the European Commissioner for Enlarge-
ment; the USA, through the US ambassador, MEPs. 
Resolution: The Przino Political Agreement, which introduced: a special 
public prosecutor; electoral reform measures; media reform measures; an 
interim technical government; an end to the release of wiretapped conversa-
tions; and parliamentary elections, which took place on 11 December 2016.
The Outcomes of the Leaders’ Meetings and Impact on 
Formal Politics 
The country case illustrations evidenced that important decisions were 
made in informal meetings among politicians of biggest political par-
ties and the EU and US officials and diplomats. In Albania, the ‘leaders’ 
meetings’ became a rule rather than exception on the justice reform. The 
political processes in BiH, after the country’s stalemate in the EU acces-
sion process. Yet it led way to an informal approach resolving political 
dead-ends. The issue of the EU coordination mechanism was moved out-
side the formal decision-making. The ‘soft’ pressure of ‘the international 
community’ was less publicly visible in the Kosovo case. In the period 
from July to December 2014 several leaders’ meetings among the coali-
tion parties took place in Kosovo. The meetings were neither facilitated 
nor organised/or called by the US or EU member states ambassadors, as 
in the case of Albania, BiH and Macedonia. Yet the media attributed the 
breaking of the deadlock to the Ambassador of the German Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs for Southeast Europe. In Macedonia, numerous leaders’ 
meetings were often called and led by the international actors, and with 
the EU Commissioner himself and four MEPs of the European Parlia-
ment, as facilitators in the process. 
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The leaders’ meetings have served as a quick fix to larger political 
issues and crises of the political arena. Indeed, the leaders’ meetings have 
been successful in bringing to an end of disputed political issues and clo-
sure to political crises. Yet the connecting thread between the cases and 
their outcomes is that they stand in relation to the larger theme of EU 
membership. The success of the leaders’ meetings rests on the instrumen-
tality of EU conditionality as Albania, BiH, Kosovo and Macedonia all 
aspire an EU membership. To be sure, EU has used its active leverage in 
all four cases, where the solution to the specific crisis has been posted as a 
conditio sine qua non for furthering the EU accession process. In Albania, 
BiH and Kosovo active EU conditionality has been followed by more direct 
diplomatic pressure by US representatives, as an additional tool in the ‘car-
rot and stick politics’. In other cases, as Macedonia, the EU has taken the 
leading role in the process, through involving MEPs in the developments, 
predominantly as mediators but also informality brokers, which signals a 
larger level of involvement and an attempt of the EU to have a leading role 
and manage specific political crisis at hand. 
However, the leader’s meetings have altered formal politics, positing 
informality as a substitutive modality of political decision-making. All 
cases show that the constitutional/political design does not safeguard for-
mal decision-making and that ‘informal institutions may also limit presi-
dential power’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 726). Informal leaders’ meet-
ings have a lasting impact on the legitimacy of polity and democracy. Just 
as any other form of informality, the leaders’ meetings erode democracy. 
The leaders’ meetings may have been efficient but not transparent, contrary 
to formal institutions that are projected to be transparent, but often are not 
efficient. They suffer from an embedded transparency deficit as they took 
place behind closed doors, far away from the public eye, and with no con-
sideration of citizens’ voices. The leader’s meetings have shifted the politi-
cal decision-making from formal channels into informal ones. They also 
have constituted and served as a modality through which ‘the international 
community’ is both ‘invited’ and legitimized as a partner in the political 
processes and decision-making in WB countries. 
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
The analysis of the practice of leaders’ meetings in Albania, BiH, Kosovo 
and Macedonia has led us to conclude that political elites in the WB region 
are sometimes unable to address political disputes through regular political 
processes and within the formal political institutions, which exacerbates 
political conflicts and crises. When such situations arise, leaders’ meetings 
become a medium of an informal process for overcoming political con-
flicts and crises. Due to the inability of political elites in the region to reach 
agreements within formal political settings, leaders’ meetings circumvent 
the institutions of the political system, seeking more neutral ground and 
causing a ‘spill-over’ effect in the political process. As a result of leaders’ 
meetings, political decision-making becomes more centralised, less inclu-
sive and non-transparent. Besides the bypassing of institutional arrange-
ments, crucial information is often withheld from the public.
The decisions made during the leaders’/leadership meetings are for-
malised through their adoption and implementation by formal political 
institutions. Leaders’ meetings serve some sort of ‘substitutive’ function as 
the domestic political actors and ‘the international community’ have the 
same goal – reaching a political decision in a political context of dysfunc-
tional formal institutions. Leaders’ meetings never perform a pre-emptive 
function; that is, they do not aim to forestall political crises. This means that 
they rarely take place unless a crucial political issue has already reached a 
dead-end such as the examples presented here on judicial reform, coordi-
nation mechanism, elections or political negotiations related to a general 
political crisis. In all cases, EU and USA representatives deployed a similar 
diplomatic strategy of conditionality politics. 
Leaders’ meetings may be an effective way of overcoming political 
crisis in the countries of the WB. Utilising this format is undeniable when 
it comes to efficient decision-making in times of turbulent crises. How-
ever, in the long run, leaders’ meetings create political side-effects that 
undermine democratic principles and institutions. Moreover, they create 
a long-term dependency on the actors of ‘the international community’, 
meaning that domestic political players prefer relying on external help 
for resolving polarising political issues to seeking a solution within the 
institutional setup. Furthermore, frequent utilisation of leaders’ meetings 
decreases confidence in domestic political institutions, meaning that 
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they are seen merely as implementing agents of the decisions being made 
in leaders’ meetings in a centralised, non-inclusive and non-transparent 
manner. 
Based on this analysis, we have come to several recommendations. 
Leaders’ meetings should be used as a pre-emptive mechanism. Their 
purpose should thus be altered, instead of using the format as a damage 
control mechanism, they should serve to strengthen political dialogue, 
foster consensus-building on major political issues and prevent political 
crisis. 
The countries of the WB, in cooperation with ‘international commu-
nity’ actors, should develop early warning mechanisms to predict possible 
shortcomings of the political processes that might generate political crises. 
Early prediction of political crises can lead to more effective management 
of political challenges and, in the long run, can result in increased trust in 
the institutions and the political system in general.
A consensus-seeking parliamentary committee for key strategic mat-
ters should be established within the formal institutional framework of the 
WB countries, so that political dialogue can be sustained inside institu-
tions and addressed through formal channels. Such a body could be part of 
the solution to prevent similar political conflicts in the future. 
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7.  Informality and Everyday Life: How ‘Things 
Get Done’ in Contemporary Western Balkan 
Societies
This chapter provides an overview of informal practices in everyday life in six countries of 
the Western Balkans (WB): Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Serbia. It presents the literature review on informality and its multifaceted 
expressions in everyday life. Using survey and ethnographic data, the chapter discusses citi-
zens’ perceptions and practices towards informality, highlighting the domains where infor-
mality permeates everyday life. The chapter shows that citizens across WB, while agreeing 
to formal rules, often subscribe to informal ones to ‘get things done,’ as informality ensures 
security of the procedures to make things happen due to the shortcomings of public institu-
tions. In addition, the chapter discusses specific policy measures to address informality at 
the levels of state, civil society and the European Union (EU).
Keywords: informality, everyday life, perceptions, informal practices, Western Balkans
Introduction
Informality is a pattern of social life; it is multifaceted, socially embedded, 
and connected to formal institutions. As a diverse phenomenon ‘covering 
wide range of economic, social and political practices’ (Polese et al., 2016: 
184)—stretching across space and time—informality is challenging to 
identify, measure and compare as not only the actors’ motivations vary, but 
the institutional frame also shifts. Formal rules and informal practices are 
organically linked in everyday life. Informal rules are resilient and endur-
ing, and often remain in the private domain of family and kinship relations 
to ‘get things done.’
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Grounded in survey findings and ethnographic observations, this 
book chapter outlines how informality pervades everyday life in socie-
ties of the WB, more specifically Albania, BiH Kosovo, Macedonia, Mon-
tenegro, and Serbia. The approach taken here places an emphasis on the 
nature of informality in everyday life, aiming to highlight informal prac-
tices and also to understand how citizens in the WB navigate through 
formal rules and informal practices. The everyday life here concerns the 
attitudes and practices that are familiar, ordinary and routine, often taken 
for granted. 
The chapter is organised into three main sections. The first one pre-
sents methodology and a literature review on informality in relation to 
everyday life. Second, using survey and ethnographic data, the chapter 
discusses citizens’ perceptions towards informality and practices, high-
lighting the domains where informality permeates everyday life. The 
chapter shows that citizens across the WB societies, while agreeing to 
formal rules, often subscribe to informal ones to ‘get things done’ as 
informality ensures security of the procedures to make things happen 
due to the shortcomings of public institutions. Finally, the chapter dis-
cusses specific policy measures to address informality at the state level, 
civil society and the EU.
The evidence that we rely on is based on quantitative and qualitative 
methodology. The quantitative data stem from a representative survey 
within the framework of the INFORM project, conducted in 2017 through 
face-to-face interviews with around 6,000 respondents: 900 in Albania; 
1,200 in BiH; 1,000 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; 900 
in Kosovo; 800 in Montenegro; and 1,100 in Serbia (hereafter referred as 
the INFORM Survey 2017). The questionnaire included demographic, 
economic, political and social capital questions in relation to formal and 
informal institutions and practices. Aiming at ‘bottom up’ knowledge pro-
duction on informality in everyday life, this research has taken advantage 
of ethnography as a research method. Thus, to understand informality and 
the micro-politics of everyday life, the chapter reflects on the qualitative 
data stemming from the ethnographic observations through day-to-day 
field research and conversations with ordinary citizens in their given social 
settings.
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Informality in Everyday Life: Theoretical Grounding
The way individuals and social groups act in everyday life is contingent 
on an array of social conventions, rules, and norms. Indeed, conventions, 
norms and rules set the standards of behaviour among the members of a 
community and the society at large. They constitute an important source 
for the transmission of social knowledge from one generation to the next. 
Yet as Jack Knight has pointed out, ‘informal conventions form the base on 
which a vast range of formal institutions organise and influence economic 
and political life’ (Knight, 1992: 1). True, institutions – as a set of rules – 
structure social interaction in particular ways. However, not all rules con-
stitute an institution. For Knight, a set of rules become an institution when 
the knowledge of rules is shared by the members of the given community 
or society (Knight, 1992: 2). Moreover, Knight contends that ‘institutions 
are constraints that help individuals avoid the negative ‘emerging effects’ of 
collective action; institutions enable social actors to work together towards 
beneficial social goals; and institutions reconcile rationality at the indi-
vidual level with rationality at the collective level’ (Knight, 1992: 10). As 
such, institutions are indispensable as they are able to resolve problems in 
society. 
When embarking on the research on informality in everyday life one 
has to keep in mind that in human relationships, as Max Weber argued 
long ago, the relationship between informal behaviour and formal rules 
is complex and reciprocal (Weber, 1921). Within legal theory, as Friedrich 
Hayek emphasised, ‘informal law or moral rules have evolved over a long 
period before some of them eventually did transform into legislation, and 
that beneficial informal rules were principally subject to a kind of selec-
tion through ‘cultural evolution’ that was neither natural nor artificial’ 
(Hayek, 1973; 1988 cited in Chavance, 2008: 58). As Bernard Chavance 
argues ‘followers of this line of thought consequently give great weight to 
informal, evolved rules, and view formal, deliberate ones as beneficial only 
when they correspond closely to the former. […] formal rules may reflect 
a constructivist attempt to build an extended order following the pattern 
of a teleological organization, in which case they will endanger society and 
economy’ (Chavance, 2008: 59). Thus, formal institutions are perceived to 
be rational and purposeful and as such beneficial to society, in contrast to 
informal institutions that are believed to be deviations from the rational 
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ways of organising (Herzfeld, 2005). Yet, in this inquiry, informal prac-
tices, rules and constraints, are not considered as constituting institutions. 
Attention is paid to instances when an informal practice enters the formal 
realm and how it becomes ‘institutionalised’.
Douglass North (1990; 1993) in his theory of institutional development 
and change, has emphasised the distinction between formal and informal 
constraints, with the latter both underlying and supplementing the former. 
Noticeable, North points out, ‘is the persistence of so many aspects of a 
society in spite of a total change in the [formal] rules’ (North, 1991: 36). 
Thus, defining institutions as constraints, he maintains that ‘informal con-
straints that are culturally derived will not change immediately in reaction 
to changes in the formal rules’ (North, 1991: 45). For North, institutions 
are ‘the humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and 
social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints: sanctions, 
taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct, and formal rules: con-
stitutions, laws, property rights’ (North, 1991: 97). 
North’s distinction between formal and informal institutions has been 
adopted by several scholars in the study of post-socialist transformation, in 
the economic field, in particular (Chavance, 2008: 60–61). Pejovich (1999) 
built on the ‘interaction thesis,’ distinguishing different relations between 
formality and informality. According to Pejovich, this relationship is four-
fold, including the following: ‘(i) formal institutions suppress, but fail to 
change informal institutions; (ii) formal rules directly conflict with infor-
mal rules; (iii) formal rules are either ignored or rendered neutral; and 
(iv) formal and informal rules cooperate — as in cases where the state 
institutionalizes informal rules that had evolved spontaneously’ (Pejovich, 
quoted in Chavance, 2008: 60). 
In the sociological vein, for Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, 
‘informal structures shape the performance of formal institutions in impor-
tant and often unexpected ways. Informal institutions also shape formal 
institutional outcomes, yet in a less visible way: by creating or strengthening 
incentives to comply with formal rules. In other words, they can be ena-
bling and constraining to formal institutions and informal rules’ (Helmke 
and Levitsky, 2004: 726). Thus, they define informal institutions ‘as socially 
shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and 
enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 
2004: 727). For Helmke and Levitsky, ‘informal rules which are endogenous 
to formal institutional structures have diverse origins; informal structures 
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are created by actors because formal rules are incomplete; informality may 
be a ‘second best’ strategy for actors who prefer, but cannot, achieve a formal 
institutional solution. One motivation for creating informal rules may be 
the pursuit of goals not considered to be publicly acceptable. Some have a 
cultural and long-standing nature, but many have a limited time span and 
a remote or weak relationship with cultural values and rules’ (Helmke and 
Levitsky, 2004: 727). Helmke’s and Levitsky’s theory is taken critically and a 
reason for that is anthropological. Institutions have rules such as laws that 
are designed to be resistant to change, whereas the responsive character of 
informal rules entails that they can modify relatively quickly in response to 
changes in the environment. 
On the other hand, studies in anthropology and interpretative soci-
ology— characterized by micro-perspectives and a bottom-up outlook 
on social life — make different theoretical and methodological choices 
with regard to informality. Given this specific approach, data collection 
in anthropology and interpretative sociology, not surprisingly, is based on 
techniques specific to qualitative research, such as participant observation, 
interviews and life histories. In terms of the analysis of the various forms 
of informality and their relation to formal structures, anthropology and 
interpretative sociology tend to build knowledge focusing on the mean-
ings that actors give to informality (Giordano and Hayoz, 2013: 14). There-
fore, in this current of thought informality tends not to be fully understood 
on negative terms but rather as ambiguous, neither good nor bad, neither 
positive nor negative, and neither functional nor dysfunctional, but sensi-
ble and rational, contingent on a given socio-cultural context. 
Informality is an expression of state-society relations (Polese et al., 
2016: 182). There is no organization or democratic state that is free of 
informal practices. Indeed, ‘informality is, in fact a globally enduring and 
resilient phenomenon, not transitory and only characteristic of modern-
izing/transitioning societies’ (Polese et al., 2016: 184). Informality can be 
understood only in relation to formal rules as it can only exist in the pres-
ence of formal rules. Yet, the nature of the interaction between the formal 
and informal rules and practices is contextual and temporal. Looking at 
social and political change after socialism, Chavance drives home the point 
that ‘post-socialist transformation has not taken place in a uniform way in 
informal institutions: enduring legacies have co-existed with the rapid col-
lapse of unwritten rules and with the swift emergence of new non-codified 
rules’ (Chavance, 2008: 65). Informality underpins the democratic system 
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across East European countries. It has shaped governance via personalized 
networks that undermine democracy and the rule of law. This mode of 
governance cannot maintain itself without informal institutions. Hence, 
as Giordano and Hayoz have argued, ‘understanding how democracy is 
reworked we need to pay attention to how informal arrangements, rules or 
institutions have become indispensable’ (Giordano and Hayoz, 2013: 11) 
and how they shape social, political and economic life. 
The everyday life, commonly referred to as ‘the informal’ is no less 
important than the formal bureaucratic institutions. The notion of ‘infor-
mality’ in everyday life and impact on lived experience often went unrec-
ognized by many theoretical models (Steenberg, 2016: 294). As Rune 
Steenberg has pointed out, studying informality one needs to recognize 
the analytical limitations of the concept itself. Indeed, Steenberg sees util-
ity in the concept of informality, yet argues that the usefulness of the term 
itself ‘depends not only on our recognition of its limits and its strong ideo-
logical embeddedness, but also in its communicative potential’ (Steenberg, 
2016:303). Thus, in the vein of Steenberg’s line of thought, it would be erro-
neous to insist on the negative effects of informal practices and to project 
bad informality as a trait of WB societies, or more generally, societies of 
the global south. Moreover, it would be also misleading to put the ‘negative’ 
conception of informality, usually associated with corruption and clien-
telism, in the field of political science studies on democracy, and leave the 
‘good’ informality in the field of anthropology and micro-sociology. 
This inquiry on informality in everyday life takes advantage of the the-
oretical model of the INFORM project to analyse how informal relations 
and practices interact with formal institutions in the domain of everyday 
life. This model builds on Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levtisky’s defi-
nition of formal institutions as constitutional and legal norms, as well as 
contracts and mechanisms of implementation (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004: 
727), considering them as determining ‘formal constrains’ of social behav-
iour. Thus, informal constraints consist of unwritten rules derived from 
traditions, customs, beliefs, former formal rules or practices in response 
to new formal rules in the ‘emerging game.’ Here, formal constraints are 
treated as by-products of new formal rules, which in our case relate to 
the set of EU provisions known as acquis communautaire. Examples of 
laws passed in compliance with the EU law but not put into practice in 
WB societies have indicated that rules, whether formal or informal, do not 
automatically become constraints. In order to become effective in practice 
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they must pass through what has been termed as an ‘enforcement belt’– 
the process of interpretation, designing mechanisms of implementation, 
and of positive and negative sanctions that would enable their effectiveness 
(Hysa, Kera, Pandelejmoni, 2018: 8). The following is the discussion of key 
findings stemming from the survey and ethnographic data showing how 
informality pervades realms of everyday life in WB societies. 
Informality is Omnipresent in WB societies
Citizens in WB societies perceive informality to be omnipresent. The 2017 
INFORM survey shows that more than 70% of those surveyed in these 
societies think that having connections and to ‘have people in places’ is 
crucial in order to ‘get things done.’ However, perceptions of informal-
ity vary in the fields surveyed by the research and across countries. For 
instance, giving money, having contacts or giving gifts to doctors is per-
ceived as most most widespread in BiH and Serbia, followed by Monte-
negro. This perception is less marked in Macedonia, Albania and Kosovo. 
In terms of institutions, the survey data indicate that informality is more 
pervasive in the health sector. In kindergartens, schools and university 
education, informality is viewed as most prevalent in BiH (47.4%) and 
least in Albania (13.6%). Offering gifts to police officers in order to dis-
miss or avoid paying a fine is perceived as a widespread practice in BiH 
(47.4%) and Serbia (43.8%). This is seen to be to less common in Kosovo 
(10%) and Macedonia (26%).
Moreover, the research affirms strong bonds of family and kinship. 
Citizens across these societies express that they can rely on their parents, 
cousins or friends to help them with childcare or care for the elderly and ill 
(70%). A further 50% to 60% of the respondents consider that, in cases of 
great life misfortunes (death, illness, permanent loss of employment), they 
can count on the help of their families, cousins, friends, and neighbours. 
However, trust in people is rather low across the region, scoring from 2.9 
in Macedonia and 3.8 in Albania (1.0 min to 5.0 max). The level of trust in 
state institutions is higher than trust in people. It is the highest in Monte-
negro (mean score reaching 4.9), followed by Albania, Serbia and Kosovo. 
In contrast, BiH and Macedonia show less trust in state institutions (mean 
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scores 3.5 and 3.7). The family is the most trusted institution while politi-
cal parties are the least trusted. Relatives and friends enjoy high levels of 
trust, while colleagues, neighbours, people of the same national and reli-
gious backgrounds are somewhat trusted. Thus, we are able to conclude 
that eroded trust in state institutions is conducive to informality.
Encountering Informality on an Individual Level 
When looking at personal experiences of respondents and the people they 
know about informal practices, such as gift giving, providing services, 
money, and connections to ‘get things done’ in healthcare, courts, the edu-
cation system, and gaining employment in the public sector, the INFORM 
survey identifies sites where informality emerges. Informal practices in 
healthcare are a fact of life throughout the region. The survey data show 
that half of the respondents from all the countries, except Kosovo, know 
someone personally who has had to bring a gift, provide a service, pay 
money, or find a connection in order to obtain better health care. Moreo-
ver, most respondents in Albania and Kosovo paid to get treatment in pub-
lic healthcare (Albania 68%, Kosovo 54%); in Macedonia and Montenegro 
40% of respondents sought and found a connection. Gift giving is the most 
frequent practice in Serbia (45%); in BiH almost the same percentage of 
respondents give gifts and as give money (39%).
With regard to informality in the courts, a smaller number of respond-
ents report resorting to informal practices to influence court decisions. This 
is not to say that the level of informality is lower in the courts compared 
to other institutions. One should bear in mind that interaction of citizens 
with the courts is less frequent compared to other institutions. However, 
the most common practice of informality in the courts consists of ‘giving 
gifts’ with around 47% in BiH, Serbia 44%, Montenegro 35%, Macedonia 
26%, Albania 14%, and Kosovo 10%, reporting that they have offered gifts 
in order to obtain service from the courts. However, informal practices 
favour/s, giving money and connections are in place also.
Enrolling children in kindergarten, school or university is less con-
nected to informal practices in comparison to other domains of everyday 
life. The percentage of those who know someone who has used connections 
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to get a place for their child in the kindergarten and/or enrol in school and/
or university ranges from around 18% in Kosovo to 30% in Macedonia. The 
informal practice that was least frequently reported is having to seek con-
nections to get a place for a child in a kindergarten and/or enrol in a school 
or university (Macedonia 6% and Kosovo 2%). 
The research data also indicate that informality encompasses employ-
ment. Of those surveyed who have reported to personally know someone 
who had to provide a gift, service, pay money or find a connection to get 
employment, it is Macedonia and Serbia that score the highest (40%), fol-
lowed by Kosovo (16.7%) and Montenegro (9.3%). It is in BiH that these 
practices that are the least prevalent (2.7%). 
The Informality Mediators: Family and Friends 
The mediators in the informal exchanges across all countries are interwo-
ven between family and friends. Informality through family members and 
relatives is most often prevalent in Kosovo and Albania. While friends are 
everywhere, they are most common in Montenegro (44.83%) and Macedonia 
(44.35%). In BiH (25.40%) and Serbia (36.13%) friends are the main media-
tors to ‘get things done.’ In dealing with the courts, the main mediators are 
friends and relatives, followed by political parties. In employment, the media-
tors are friends. In BiH (47.98%) there are fewer intermediaries and respond-
ents report less help from friends, while in Albania friends (30.92%) and rela-
tives (35.20%) are the main mediators. In Kosovo (33.33%), relatives seem to 
be of paramount importance to gain employment in the public sector. 
The research data indicate that many citizens are in pursuit of connec-
tions to ‘get things done’. Indeed, connections, as Čarna Brković has argued, 
‘intertwine with public administration and how veze and stele enable flex-
ibility to approach the ‘right people’’ (Brković, 2017: 106–107). In order to 
get what they need, many citizens approach friends and family with ‘con-
nections.’ The interlocutors count on connections, as can be seen from the 
following quotes: 
In order to get the job that I applied for I had to contact someone, as I knew I 
wouldn’t have a chance to get the job without connections. Besides me another per-
son applied for the same job, who did not have a CV like me, but had two years of 
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work experience more than I did. And the commission first gave the job to that 
person, because of those two years. Thus, I had to intervene through somebody and 
finally I got the job. (A teacher, Tirana)3
Not all people can have ‘connections,’ yet they proactively search for them. 
A single mother, unemployed from the countryside near Tirana, with three 
daughters, one of whom is a university graduate, when asked what about 
how to find a job for the daughter, replies that:
It’s not easy to get a job; it requires ‘mik’ (friend/acquaintances) and ‘lek’ (money). We 
don’t have money, we have to look for friends. (unemployed woman in Tirana)
A teacher from eastern Albania confirmed that family and kinship ties are 
important in finding a job.
I have relatives and kin, who are employed in Tirana. I have an aunt’s son who has 
employed many of my kin… he offered ‘punë me mik’ (a job through connections). 
(teacher from Eastern Albania)
These experiences are exemplary of how informality reworks the power 
relations shifting the ‘state’ and the ‘public’ towards ‘personal relations’ and 
‘private arenas’ (Brković, 2015: 279), having a profound impact on the 
distribution of rights in the society. Thus, connections and personal rela-
tionships not only show how ‘things get done’, but also how certain actors 
improve their livelihoods (Brković, 2017: 107).
Political Parties as Mediators of Informality 
The ethnographic fieldwork on the case of the 2017 elections in Albania 
indicates that people get involved in clientelist relationships and practices, 
especially during elections. When individuals were asked whether resolv-
ing issues of everyday life had influenced their decision to vote, the research 
identified two types of problem-solving through favours. The first has to do 
3 To protect the privacy and confidentiality of participants in the research, personally 
identifiable information such as name, age, residence and affiliation were altered from 
the interview transcripts to ensure that the informants and the data participants in the 
research remain anonymous.
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with long term problems, where a vote might attract help in solving them. 
The second is related to problems which might not show up during the elec-
tions, but once they emerge, people have to find contacts in a party that influ-
ences the institution involved. From the ethnographic fieldwork in Albania it 
seems that employment and other issues which are important for economic 
and social security and wellbeing lead to the creation of long-lasting cli-
entelist relationships between individuals/families and political parties, in 
which resolutions are offered in exchange for votes (Hysa, Kera and Pandele-
jmoni, 2018: 55). Such practices are shared by citizens of Montenegro as well 
who think that ‘in state institutions in particular, more people than necessary 
are employed and that their employment stems from their loyalty to the rul-
ing party’ (Sedlenieks, Puzo and Dubrovska, 2018: 25–26).
Concluding Remarks and Policy Implications 
Informality in the WB can be understood through the interconnections 
between formal institutions and informal practices. The most common 
practice is ‘gift giving’ followed by rendering services, giving money, and 
favours achieved through clientelist relations. Our data implies that infor-
mality is most prevalent in the public health system and the least so in 
childcare and education. The research confirms that informality does not 
exist independently of everyday life experiences, but it is part of it, and that 
it can only be defined in the context of formality. 
In Albania, BiH, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, infor-
mality permeates everyday life through various practices that are often 
based on family/kinship relations, but also in response to formal con-
straints on upward social mobility. Informality is not the preferred course 
of action, but a reaction to unresponsive state institutions. The research 
findings indicate that informality is not free from ambivalence and ambi-
guity. Practices of informality can be understood only in relation to the 
interplay between the accepted norms and rules on the one hand, and for-
mal structures and processes on the other. In everyday life informality is 
embedded in social norms, solidarity and reliance on kinship and social 
networks. Overall the research finds that citizens across WB countries, 
while agreeing to formal rules, often subscribe to informality to ‘get things 
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done’ as informality ensures the security of the procedures that make 
things happen.
The states, civil society and the EU each have a stake in overcoming 
challenges that informality poses in everyday life. Governments should 
work towards an integrated policy framework to address informality in 
everyday life and demonstrate accountability in governance through the 
rule of law. The states in WB region should promote equality and anti-dis-
crimination policies, as well as increase transparency mechanisms to guar-
antee equality and fairness in healthcare, employment, education, social 
services, judiciary and security. Moreover, the governments in WB region 
should extend social and health protection; improve the public health sys-
tem by increasing public expenditure on health and welfare protection. In 
addition, the governments in most of the WB countries should enact legis-
lation to combat corruption, clientelism, and nepotism in employment in 
the public sector and ensure that recruitment is merit-based. 
Not only should government be active, but the civil society should 
continue to promote equality, solidarity and reciprocity and counteract 
negative informality. Civil society organisations should work to restore 
public trust through citizens’ participation in decision-making at com-
munity and state levels. The EU policy should prioritise socio-economic 
development as integral to EU integration strategy of the countries of WB. 
Finally, EU policy should ensure that the national governments take 
steps to enhance the trustworthiness of formal institutions and uphold the 
rule of law. In addition, the EU’s support to WB countries should address 
informality in the public sector, especially in health, public administration 
and courts as the growth of informal practices is a consequence of insuf-
ficiency of formal institutions. 
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Mirza Mujarić and Ismet Kumalić
8.  Formal and Informal Institutions in  
Policy – Evidence from South East Europe 
This chapter provides a systematic review of the literature and policy measures in 13 post-
socialist countries, now EU member states. The chapter starts by reviewing academic litera-
ture on institutionalization of EU rules with particular focus on the resulting gap between 
formal and informal institutions. Then, the treatment of various forms of informality in this 
sample of countries by EU staff working documents (SWDs) is discussed. In its appendix, 
the chapter offers a discussion of specific policy measures implemented in each of these 
countries to tackle informality, which helps us to recognize some of the policy implications 
for the current aspirants to EU membership.
Keywords: informality, informal institutions in South East Europe, informal economy, in-
formal employment, policy measures on informal employment
Introduction
The process of transposition of the EU rules and directives which makes 
the acquis communautaire and enlargement acquis by the candidate coun-
tries is not easy. There are many factors to be considered when adopting 
and sometimes imposing new rules in a country. The results are often not 
achieved as envisaged, and usually carry some side effects as well—par-
ticularly when combined with lack of engagement to implement the new 
rules. There are also many cases of backsliding from the adopted rules in 
favour of more short-term interests. Therefore, the main focus of transpo-
sition of the EU rules in the literature is put on their institutionalization, 
that is building institutions that take ownership of those rules and invest 
effort in their implementation. Dimitrova (2010) recognizes three results 
of this process: a successful one which implies that the EU rules are insti-
tutionalized in the accessing country, a failing one in which the rules are 
eventually reversed, and a hybrid one, which the author calls “empty shells,” 
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implying that the rules are transferred to the accessing country but are not 
implemented or respected.
The main focus of this chapter is on the “empty shells,” or rules that are 
adopted but poorly implemented in the 13 post-socialist countries, now 
EU member states. Deficient implementation brings into existence a gap 
between the rules and everyday practices—gaps that are usually filled with 
informal practices. In this chapter we review the EU staff working docu-
ments (SWD) in order to find how informal practices are discussed, and 
more importantly, what recommendations are given to restrain informal 
phenomena that filled these gaps between rules and practices. 
A general finding of this chapter is that the EU reports pay little 
attention to the informal sector. However, we identify two broad informal 
phenomena that are most frequently considered: corruption on the one 
hand, and informal economy and informal employment on the other hand. 
Other informal practices remain mostly uncovered. 
Our analysis consists of reviewing the SWDs for the countries in focus, 
both before and after these countries became EU member states. The time 
frame we encompassed varies from country to country and is conditioned 
by the availability of those documents, but in general, we sought to cover at 
least five years before and five years after each state’s accession to EU mem-
bership. In some cases, this chapter managed to go beyond this time frame. 
We also provide an overview of all case studies on policies implemented in 
the focus countries to curb the informal economy, which are made avail-
able by Eurofound (European Foundation for the Improvement of Living 
and Working Conditions).
The chapter begins by reviewing relevant literature on transposition 
and institutionalization of EU rules in accessing countries, and links the 
available literature to the INFORM theoretical framework. There follows 
a discussion of informal institutions evidenced in EU staff working docu-
ments. The final section offers concluding remarks and some general pol-
icy indications for future actions. A review of policy measures on tackling 
informal economy is given in the appendix to the chapter.
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Transposition and Institutionalization of EU Rules – a 
Literature Review
One of the essential steps in the process of the EU enlargement is the 
transposition of the EU rules and directives by the candidate countries. 
There are 35 chapters (EU Info Centar, 2015) covering diverse fields. Align-
ing domestic legislation with the requirements of the EU acquis commu-
nautaire can involve an impressive volume of legislation, rules and norms. 
Along with the acquis, EU also promotes the less defined enlargement 
acquis which is designed to address conditions in post-socialist countries, 
the adoption of which is envisaged to facilitate democratic consolidation 
and relevant market reforms. The candidate country has to adopt the rules 
and norms that operate well in the atmosphere of established EU member 
states, but may meet challenges in environments with different cultures 
and traditions, where people may have developed, for various reasons, 
different ways of doing things in everyday life. Therefore, the process of 
transposition of the EU rules is complicated by the problem of adjusting 
formal rules to the conditions that predominate in candidate countries, 
even though some space for modifications is left to the accessing coun-
tries. Overall, however, accession to the EU is conditional on adoption of 
a number of rules, which sometimes pushes candidate countries to rush 
with the transposition of EU rules, with the consequence of deepening 
tensions between formal rules and material conditions, or of proclaiming 
rules that may be reversed or never enforced. 
There are many cases of actual backsliding from EU rules once 
adopted. For example, In an article from 20061, The Economist points to 
several cases in Poland and Czech Republic, where laws were either passed 
or postponed in order to give politicians more influence in the process of 
appointing civil servants. These are clear instances of laws being passed in 
the EU pre-accession process and then not implemented or delayed post-
accession. However, the revocation of rules does not need to happen to call 
the adoption of the rules a failure—simply, if behaviour does not follow 
the adopted formal rules then the rules themselves have not achieved their 
intended impact. Or to put it simply, adopting all 35 chapters of the acquis 
1 The Economist (2006). The European Union’s new members: Through the looking 
glass. 30 November 2006, printed edition.
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by a new member state does not mean that the accession process is com-
plete in the way it was initially envisaged.
When it comes to the transfer of EU rules to candidate countries, 
the main focus of theoretical debate concerns the institutionalization of 
rules—i.e., building institutions based on the transposed rules. North 
(1990) defines institutions as setting “the rules of the game”. However, even 
though conditionality has motivated domestic institutions to adopt the EU 
“rules of the game”, the rules adopted were formal rules (Dimitrova, 2007), 
and were frequently in conflict with the “rules-in-use”—a focus of institu-
tionalization, as suggested by Ostrom (1999). 
The theoretical framework of INFORM project explains that institu-
tions are defined in a way meant to account for both formal and informal 
rules and mechanisms of enforcement. First, the rules continuum encom-
passes both formal and informal rules—both rules coming from the EU 
acquis communautaire and informal rules entrenched in social values and 
norms. Then the rules pass through the enforcement belt, which repre-
sents the processes of recognition and implementation that rules need to 
acquire in order to become obligatory, followed and respected in everyday 
behaviour—that is, to become constraints. This implies that the rules will 
be interpreted and implemented by their users, and that mechanisms to 
sanction misinterpretation and mis-implementation will be established. 
Finally, formal and informal constraints shape behaviour and influence 
practices on the ground. When combined together, rules, enforcement belt 
and constraints constitute institutions. However, it is important to notice 
that behaviours (practices on the ground) are not seen only as rule-guided, 
but are also dependent on the resources available to individuals, organisa-
tions, companies and other bodies; as well as the social fields where the 
practices are happening (political, economic, legal, etc.). 
In the short run, it can be said that behaviours are influenced and 
shaped mainly by formal and informal constraints. It follows that for-
mal and informal constraints can only steer behaviour in the same direc-
tion if they are aligned with one another. Several conventionally shared 
beliefs are at work here, and these are visible in the literature: the first is 
the contention that formal rules tend to develop out of informal norms 
and social values (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004), and the second is the con-
tention that through social learning some rules get followed by broader 
groups of society, and these are the ones most likely to be formalized 
(Sedelmeier, 2006). The principal postulate involved here is an organic 
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metaphor where there exists a logical path from informal to formal ways 
of doing things, which is absent due to EU conditionality. Dimitrova 
(2007) points out that the transposition of EU rules, which are created 
in different contexts and states and for a different set of preferences, in 
the accession process raises issues of deficits in influencing and shaping 
behaviours in accession countries. She also stresses (2002) that an impor-
tant distinction is to be made between transfer of policy rules, on the one 
hand and rules that form a part of the broader institutional building, on 
the other. In the first case, the governments would only implement EU 
policies and not necessarily adopt the values behind the policies, whereas 
in the second case the focus is on institutionalization of rules which 
implies building institutions that would take ownership of the values and 
rules and ensure implementation of policies.
The process of transposing rules and building institutions faces unique 
complexities in post-socialist countries. The transformation from planned 
to market-oriented countries was believed to be hindered only by their 
authoritarian rulers who, once overthrown, will leave countries that will 
welcome democracy and free markets. But, overthrowing their rule proved 
to be only the start of a long process of state building, which uncovered 
many state weaknesses (Migdal, 1988). Weak states and their institutions 
opened up a space for many interest groups to take over particular areas, 
often under the cloaks of reforms, institution building and EU integra-
tion. However, Hellman (1998) and Ganev (2001) argue that the early win-
ners of reform and institution building processes sometimes redirected the 
process of public policy reform to private interest. Ganev (2001) points 
out that the early winners first join forces with state agencies but obstruct 
progress once state agencies try to reassert control over public assets. After 
the fall of communism, the post-socialist countries were left with various 
stakeholders who profited from the initial waves of democratization and 
institution building due to an innovative and flexible policy style (Dim-
itrova, 2007) which won international support. However, once their power 
increased during the process to give them the hybrid right (formal and 
informal mix) of playing veto they acquired the ability to block institu-
tional reform. 
Hille and Knill (2006) find that the implementation of the acquis in 
accession countries has been constrained by bureaucratic capacity and 
institutional ability to comply. This is further deepened by the countries’ 
inability to prevent their leading experts from attaining more lucrative 
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opportunities abroad. This lack of resources is also a focus of other pre-
accession institutionalization studies (e.g., Seidentopf and Ziller, 1988; Ver-
heijen, 2000). They primarily suggest that scarce financial resources and 
poor administrative capacity will have an impact on institution building 
based on the adopted EU rules.
On the other hand, Falkner et al. (2006) reject administrative capacity 
as a factor in compliance, and stress that a national culture of comply-
ing to requirements plays the pivotal role. A cultural inclination to comply 
ensures stability and longevity of adopted rules and norms. Furthermore, 
Sedelmeier (2006) and Epstein (2005) argue that the pre-accession period 
is crucial in the institutionalization process, as it allows for a period of 
social learning to take place. Rules that are adopted through social learn-
ing become part of the informal social values and norms, and are harder 
to reverse despite political actors acting as veto players and bottlenecks. It 
is also important to notice that country specific factors have influence on 
institutionalization of imported rules (Dimitrova, 2007). Dimitrova (2010) 
sees that the results of EU conditionality and rule transposition can be 
threefold:
• Reversal
• Institutionalization (alignment of formal and informal rules)
• “Empty shells” (actors ignore the new rules, parallel informal rules 
used) (Dimitrova, 2010: 17)
Reversal of adopted rules implies abandoning those rules and enforcing 
different ones instead. This is the most probable outcome when the rules 
adopted are not part of the EU acquis—most likely implemented in the 
first place to send a message that the accession process is progressing—and 
when the veto players find that it is in their interest to oppose those rules. 
Institutionalization, on the other hand, happens when the adopted formal 
rules are part of the EU acquis and when they conform to existing informal 
rules. Also, if veto players’ preferences are for the new set of formal rules, 
the rules have higher chances of institutionalization. And finally, ‘empty 
shells’ are result of formal rules being adopted as part of the EU acquis 
which conflict with existing informal rules, and opposing veto players’ 
preferences for maintaining the status quo.
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Informal Institutions in Post-socialist Countries –  
Evidence from EU Reports
This section analyses the representation of the informal sector in EU 
reports; thus, it based on an overview of the European Commission Staff 
Working Documents (SWD) for 13 post-socialist countries. This includes 
countries that have become full members of the EU or are in the process 
of joining the EU. Additionally, the reports for Cyprus and Malta, located 
in the south of the Western Balkans (WB), were analysed. All of the above 
data was taken from the listed Country Reports2. 
Our general finding and impression is that the Reports pay little 
attention to the informal sector. However, they discuss the impact of some 
forms of informal practices such as: corruption, inefficiency of (formal) 
state institutions, and tax evasion. From these Reports we can conclude 
that all countries have made progress and that new institutions in line with 
the EU integration process have been established in the most countries. 
Despite these efforts, several Western Balkan countries (WB) continue to 
show the symptoms of a captured society. “Enterprises, institutions or pow-
erful individuals that with their illegal activities affect policies, design the 
policies as well as the legislative environment and economy, and all that 
according to their own interests”3. The Reports cite unjustified political 
interference in the work of public administration, public media services 
and non-transparent public financing of social needs. 
The Reports reveal that the continuing weakness of the rule of law 
negatively affects the overall climate for investment and development. A 
weak and inefficient judicial system, frequent changes in legislation, unfair 
2 European Commission: Country Report – Communication on EU Enlargement Policy, 
Brussels SWD (2016) for countries: B&H; Montenegro; Serbia; Macedonia; Albania 
and Kosovo. Available on: https://ec.europa.eu/ neighbour hood-enlargement/coun 
tries/detailed-country-information; European Commission: Country Report – As-
sessment of progress on structural reforms, prevention and correction of macroeconom-
ic imbalances, and results of in-depth reviews under Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011, 
Brussels, SWD (2017) for countries: Slovenia; Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary; Slovakia; 
The Czech Republic; Poland; Estonia; Latvia; Lithuania; Croatia; Cyprus and Malta. 
Available on: https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/2017-european-semester-coun 
try-reports_en
3 European Commission: EU Enlargement Policy Statement for 2016: 4. Available on: 
http://dei.gov.ba/dei
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competition, poor management of public finance, administrative restric-
tions, and an unaccountable informal sector diminish investors’ interest in 
direct foreign and domestic investment.
On the other hand, weak tax policies, public expenditures, non-
enforcement of laws, including the fight against corruption and organized 
crime, diminish the tax base and the effectiveness of economic policies. The 
extent and presence of these factors indicate a high presence of informal 
practices in WB countries. The impacts of informality differ from country 
to country. The Reports show that the economic role of the informal sector 
ranges between 30% and 50% in Bosnia and Herzegovina, between 20% 
and 40% in Macedonia, between 20% and 30% in Serbia, above 33% in 
Albania, and is 24.5% of GDP in Montenegro (SWD 365, 2016; SWD 362, 
2016; SWD 361, 2016; SWD 364, 2016; SWD 360, 2016). 
Post-socialist countries that have successfully implemented reforms 
required by the acquis communautaire are now full members of the EU. 
However, they have not resolved all of the challenges related to informality 
and are below the EU average with regard to tax evasion, corruption, and 
employment. The share of the informal sector in Latvia is 21% of GDP 
(SWD 79, 2017) and the share in Estonia is between 15% and 26% (SWD 
72, 2017).
Although the EU reports do not provide much quantitative data for 
all countries regarding the informal sector, the analysis of corruption, 
unemployment, tax evasion, the independence of the judiciary and public 
administration indirectly indicates the presence and influence of informal 
practices. Below is a brief overview of the findings on the countries studied 
listed in the Reports. 
Corruption is widespread in all studied countries. Although almost 
all countries have made progress in fighting corruption in recent years, 
some have recorded an increase in corruption, such as Cyprus. Across 
the countries studied, corruption is present in almost all public institu-
tions and sectors, though the prevalence and impact of corruption var-
ies. Poor institutional capacity for law enforcement combined with the 
widespread corruption has a negative impact on the business environ-
ment and the development of the private sector, particularly in Bulgaria, 
Kosovo, Montenegro, and Macedonia. According to the Reports, public 
procurement is the segment most susceptible to corruption. “Corruption 
in public procurement takes several forms. The most common forms of cor-
ruption include collusive bidding, tailor-made specifications for particular 
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companies, conflict of interests in the evaluation of bids, involvement of 
bidders in the design of specifications, abuse of negotiated procedures or 
abuse of emergency grounds to justify the use of non-competitive or fast-
track procedures, and amendments to the contract terms after concluding 
the contract” (SWD 89, 2017: 45). 
Slovenia has the least pronounced perception of corruption, but even 
there 37% of companies declared that they could not win tenders due to 
corruption. In Lithuania, the percentage is somewhat higher, around 39%, 
while perception of corruption remains higher in the following countries: 
The Czech Republic 41%, Romania 52%, Slovakia 54%, and Bulgaria 60%. 
Over 40% of public procurement contracts are awarded on the basis of 
only one tender in Slovenia. Likewise, the largest number of competitive 
bidders are excluded from the offer. After political instability, corruption is 
reported as the second most problematic factor for business in Hungary. 
In the Czech Republic, after ineffective government bureaucracy and tax 
regulations, corruption is regarded as the third most troublesome factor 
for doing business. The studies carried out in Cyprus underline the percep-
tion that patronage, bribery, and abuse of power are significant problems in 
public administration, and 87% of entrepreneurs confirmed that corrup-
tion hinders competition. In Romania, corruption is generally considered 
as a major problem. In Serbia, as in Albania, corruption is widespread and 
represents a serious problem, despite efforts to prevent and fight against 
corruption. Progress has been made in Bosnia and Herzegovina following 
the adoption of action plans at different levels of government, but the frag-
mentation of the country diminishes the effectiveness of implementation. 
In Kosovo, which is at the initial stage of preparation for fighting corrup-
tion, there is no political will to solve the problem in a comprehensive way 
(SWD 89, 2017; SWD 80, 2017; SWD 69, 2017; SWD 88, 2017; SWD 90, 
2017; SWD 68, 2017; SWD 72, 2017; SWD 78, 2017).
As stated in the Reports, in some countries, the practice of “pocket pay-
ment” has developed. “Pocket payment” is most widespread in the health sec-
tor. In Cyprus, this form of payment in the health sector reached 50% (EU 
average is 15%), in Latvia it is 39%. Informal payments “under the table” in 
Slovakia are up to 23% and potentially hinder equal access to services (SWD 
78, 2017; SWD 79, 2017). In the case of Hungary, the share of that payment 
method, which includes the estimated amount of informal payments, is 27% 
compared to 17.6% in the EU. Patients use informal payments to avoid long 
waiting lists or to seek access to preferential treatment (SWD 82, 2017). 
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All studied countries have made steps forward in institution building 
and the adoption of anti-corruption strategies and policies. Issues of the 
efficiency of institutions and governance in the public sector are the main 
challenges facing the fight against corruption at all levels. The low level 
of processed corruption cases, especially for high-level individuals, creates 
the perception that corruption is an acceptable behaviour. The high level of 
corruption in the studied countries confirms the significant role of infor-
mality in creating a business environment. 
The Reports find tax evasion in all studied countries. Tax evasion is a 
consequence of the weakness of tax policy and the high participation in the 
informal sector. “Poor tax authorities, high levels of tax evasion and unde-
clared work and, consequently, relatively low tax revenues provide lim-
ited fiscal space” (SWD 68, 2017: 21). Tax debts, tax evasion, and the grey 
economy are the main challenges for establishing tax discipline. Despite 
progress in public finance and tax discipline, there lacks an effective frame-
work of tax risk management. According to assessments presented in the 
Reports, the extent of tax fraud in Croatia is 35% of net tax revenues, while 
the extent of tax fraud is 24% in Poland, and 18% in Hungary, all above the 
EU average of 14% (SWD 76, 2017; SWD 86, 2017; SWD 82, 2017). The 
Report shows that various factors, including the weaknesses in tax policy, 
corruption, uninsured labour force, informal employment, unfair compe-
tition, non-enforcement of laws, organized crime, and tax fraud, reduce 
public revenues and strengthen the informal sector. In Serbia, tax evasion 
is also affected by the lack of harmonization of tax legislation with the 
code of conduct for business taxation. Weak institutions and the informal 
sector in Albania have resulted in an informal exchange of assets, which 
leads to disputes that further burden the courts and cause additional loss 
of tax revenues. “However, patterns of tax fraud are constantly changing as 
fraudsters adapt to new rules, exploit loopholes and move to new sectors. 
The objective of the changes is to improve tax collection and simplify tax 
obligations for taxpayers via consolidation of tax and customs administra-
tions” (SWD 86, 2017: 17). 
Countries that record high rates of unemployment also have high par-
ticipation in the informal sector. In Serbia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, Macedonia and Kosovo, more than one fifth of the working age pop-
ulation is unemployed. With limited employment opportunities, informal 
employment is a strategy for survival. Furthermore, “Informal employ-
ment includes work without a formal contract, but also under-reported 
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remuneration (‘envelope wages’) or evasion of social security contribu-
tions” (SWD 68, 2017: 31). There is an important difference between 
registered (statistical) labour force data, and the informal labour market, 
which is highlighted in the EU Reports. In Montenegro, every third per-
son works in the informal sector, which is not included in statistics. Simi-
larly, in Macedonia, it is estimated that over 20% of employees work in the 
informal sector, and in Albania about 40% work in the informal sector 
(SWD 360, 2016; SWD 362, 2016; SWD 364, 2016). In Bosnia and Herze-
govina, the active population rate is 44%, and the employment rate is 32%, 
this difference of 12% indicates a high level of employment in the infor-
mal sector (SWD 365, 2016). There is a similar situation in Bulgaria and 
Romania where the rate of undocumented workers ranges between 15% 
and 20%. In Romania, “undeclared work remains prevalent, also reduc-
ing both labour supply and fiscal revenue. National data estimate people 
in the informal economy at around 1.2 million” (SWD 88, 2017: 2, 20). 
Countries that have become full members of the EU have lower unem-
ployment rates. Cyprus and Croatia have the highest unemployment rates 
of 13%, followed by Slovakia and Latvia with 10%: the unemployment rate 
in each of these countries is above the EU average (SWD 78, 2017; SWD 
76, 2017; SWD 90, 2017; SWD 79, 2017). In the Czech Republic, Esto-
nia, Malta, and Poland, unemployment rates are below the EU average. 
In Latvia, the payment of wages in the “envelope” is in decline, although 
estimates demonstrate that participation is still high (18% of real wages 
in 2015). In these countries, there is frequent and increasing migration 
to other EU countries. While this reduces unemployment, it also results 
in shortages of qualified labour. In the case of Poland, 2.4 million Poles 
migrated out of the country, with no intention of returning. 14% of Bul-
garian citizens live abroad. Labour shortages are “compensated” by migra-
tion from other countries. The Reports show that all countries are facing 
the problem of unemployment of vulnerable groups. The largest number 
among the unemployed are young people, women, “low skill” workers, 
elderly, women with young children, and Roma people. In Serbia, only 
18.5% of Roma people aged 20 to 64 were engaged in “paid jobs,” in Slo-
vakia 25%, and in Bulgaria 26% (SWD 361, 2016; SWD 90, 2017). The 
difference between the participation in employment of women and men 
indicates that labour market conditions are still unfavourable for women. 
The unpaid work of women remains a challenge. “The absence of state 
services for child care in rural areas increases women’s unpaid household 
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work” (SWD 364, 2016: 54). Unemployment benefits the informal sector 
that further affects job creation, including those for young people, “Infor-
mal work concerns especially young workers and long-term unemployed” 
(SWD 362, 2016: 28). 
It can be concluded from the Reports that legal insecurity, distrust 
in state institutions and predictability of regulatory, tax, and other poli-
cies discourage investors and contribute to lower growth rates. “Legal 
certainty, trust in the quality and predictability of regulatory, tax and 
other policies and institutions are important factors that could allow an 
increase in the investment rate. The rule of law and an independent judi-
ciary are also essential in this context” (SWD 86, 2017: 2). This presents 
a systemic threat to the rule of law, creates legal insecurity, and supports 
informal practices. Legal uncertainty has a negative impact on entrepre-
neurship and the development of the private sector. “The private sector is 
underdeveloped and hampered by weaknesses in the rule of law” (SWD 
361, 2016: 25). Moreover, “the low trust in the judicial system and public 
institutions hinders private investment” (SWD 68, 2017: 3). In addition 
to the legal uncertainty of the studied countries, they also face the prob-
lem of the quality and efficiency of the judiciary, as is stated in the case of 
Cyprus: “the low quality of Cypriot regulations and inadequate enforce-
ment due to lengthy administrative and court proceedings weaken the 
effectiveness of Cyprus’ legislation and overall legal certainty” (SWD 
78, 2017: 45). However, the judiciary is not only slow and inefficient, 
it is also faced with the lack of responsibility of judicial officers and is 
subject to undue political influence. “The judiciary is still vulnerable to 
undue political influence and rule of law institutions suffer from lack of 
funding and human resources” (SWD 363, 2016: 5). Insufficient political 
support for reform, as well as fragmentation of the public sector, hinder 
efforts towards institutional and legislative reforms. The Reports con-
clude that all countries have an obligation to improve their judicial sys-
tem and make it independent and efficient. “Intensified efforts are needed 
to strengthen the rule of law to ensure that regulatory improvements 
translate into an improved investment climate” (SWD 360, 2016: 26). In 
many countries of the Western Balkans, the legal framework is still not 
in line with European standards, leaving room for political influence on 
the recruitment and appointment of judges and prosecutors. The present 
public comments on investigations and current cases, including those at 
the highest political levels, further aggravate the judicial independence: 
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“Bulgaria is among the weakest in the EU in terms of accountability, rule 
of law and control of corruption” of all full EU members (SWD 68, 2017: 
38). According to the Reports, declared political commitments to fight 
against corruption have not shown sufficient concrete results. 
Altogether weak rule of law, widespread corruption and inefficient 
administration continue to harm the business environment. “Trust in the 
public institutions is undermined by a high perceived level of corrup-
tion” (SWD 78, 2017: 30). Repeated survey findings highlight the percep-
tion that patronage, bribery or abuse of power are significant problems in 
public administration (World Bank, 2015). Institutions are especially weak 
when it comes to indicators of competitiveness, due to weak protection 
of property rights, the protection of intellectual property, as well as the 
independence of the judiciary and the transparency of government policy 
(Bulgaria and Romania). The unstable regulatory environment is one of 
the biggest obstacles to doing business in Hungary. In Slovakia “shortcom-
ings in public administration have been identified as one of the obstacles 
to improving the business environment” (SWD 90, 2017: 33). 
In almost all countries, the inefficient judicial system and the lack of 
qualified labor force negatively impacts the investments needed to support 
growth and convergence. “The business environment in the Czech Repub-
lic is characterised by a heavy regulatory burden and numerous adminis-
trative barriers, which act as an impediment to both private and public-
sector investment” (SWD 69, 2017: 24). Malta successfully implemented 
reforms and established an acceptable business environment. As a result, 
newly established companies can start working within two or three days 
by filing a short electronic form on an online portal after a two-step pro-
cess. Unlike Malta, in Bosnia and Herzegovina “the business environment 
remains difficult: business registration procedures remain cumbersome 
and costly, and the requirement for a company to register in both entities 
if it has a commercial presence has not been addressed” (SWD 365, 2016: 
53). Estonia achieves the best performance in digital public services, which 
is evidenced by its shift from fourth place in 2015 to first in 2016. In WB 
countries, “elections are seen as an opportunity to achieve political con-
trol over wider administration, including independent institutions” (EC, 
2016: 6). Despite updated civil service legislation, the structure of public 
administration in most countries remains complex and does not provide 
sufficient accountability. There is a crucial influence of political interest on 
the election or appointment of the management positions of regulatory 
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bodies,. This hinders the achievement of a high quality regulatory envi-
ronment guaranteed by independent and responsible oversight. Therefore, 
citizens’ rights to good governance, access to information, and administra-
tive justice are limited. The introduction of e-government services remains 
a priority, as it can be a key factor in increased transparency, speed, and 
consistency in public services. Based on the Reports, it can be concluded 
that all countries have made progress in strengthening the institutional 
framework and business environment, but there are still many challenges 
that each country needs to resolve and eliminate in order to bring the busi-
ness environment to an acceptable level.
Conclusions and Policy Implications Presented  
in the EU documents
High levels of corruption, tax policy weakness, underdeveloped labor mar-
kets, legal insecurity and inefficient administration in the studied coun-
tries are indicators of underdeveloped formal institutions. Strengthening 
formal institutions and eliminating weaknesses remain among the main 
challenges for all countries. Many countries, through formal procedures 
and institutions, have adopted various strategies for eliminating related 
problems, but their implementation is still inefficient and insufficiently 
effective, sometimes even counterproductive in terms of diverging from 
the EU acquis. In order to ensure the reduction of informal practices that 
detract institutional effectiveness, additional and comprehensive measures 
are needed. 
Control of corruption is a key challenge for all countries. The stated 
political commitments in the fight against corruption have not been trans-
lated into concrete actions. The Reports recommend that all countries 
should establish independent and specialized anti-corruption institu-
tions. Corruption in all forms should be legally and publicly sanctioned, 
and property acquired by corruption should be seized and used to finance 
the education system and the protection of socially vulnerable persons. 
Political declarations of commitment to anti-corruption activities should 
be implemented, and instances of non-enforcement must be sanctioned. 
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According to the Reports, corruption is most pronounced in the pub-
lic procurement system. Most EU recommendations go in the direction 
that it is necessary to change public procurement regulations in order 
to strengthen competition and transparency. Procedures must be clear, 
simple, and pre-established. Furthermore, it is necessary to establish and 
strengthen control mechanisms for rapid action and elimination of irregu-
larities in the creation of amendments to existing regulations. Offenders 
should be punished in a timely and effective manner. The fight against 
organized crime in the public procurement system must be comprehensive 
in order to dismantle corrupt networks. Finally, the EU Reports recom-
mend that anti-corruption institutions and authorities have the capacity 
to disclose criminal networks and the power to seize assets and initiate 
systematic financial investigations. 
Apart from corruption, another informal phenomenon emerges as 
frequent in the EU country reports. High unemployment rates are accom-
panied by high levels of participation in the informal employment sec-
tor. Unemployment problems are to be tackled by creating a stimulating 
business environment for entrepreneurship, with attention to the domestic 
and foreign investors. Simplified procedures that are implemented include 
legalizing work, increased access to financial resources, tax relief in the first 
years of business, and advisory and educational assistance for startups and 
small businesses. This will encourage participants in the informal sector 
to formalize their businesses. Growth of investments and reduction of the 
informal sector entails new employment, which reduces unemployment. In 
order to overcome the challenge of employing people in vulnerable social 
categories, state intervention is required through additional education, 
retraining, credit rating, and stimulative systems. As stated in the Reports, 
special attention should be paid to young and elderly people whose rates 
of unemployment are the highest. In the appendix to this chapter, we offer 
an overview of policies the 13 post-socialist countries, now member states, 
have implemented in order to curb the practices related to informal econ-
omy and particularly informal employment. The analysis is sepparated by 
country and serves as an overview of more and less efficient measures that 
have been undertaken recently.
Many countries have improved the business environment by updat-
ing laws on general administrative procedures, but there is still a problem 
of cross-sectoral differences in administrative procedures. The structure of 
state administration, in most countries, is still complex and unresponsive. 
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In the EU Reports, countries are encouraged to find the appropriate balance 
between central, regional, and local authorities to improve the implemen-
tation of reforms in providing services to citizens. Citizens have the right 
to good governance, access to information, and efficient administration. 
Admistrative procedures must be simplified, understandable, and publicly 
available. The introduction of e-government services remains a priority as 
a key factor for transparency, speed, and consistency in public services (as 
demonstrated by the example of Estonia). 
Our analysis of the Reports indicates that informal practices are 
widespread in the studied countries. The prominence of informal prac-
tices results in a very noticeable informal sector that diminishes potential 
economic development opportunities. Political will needs to be ensured in 
order to adopt a comprehensive strategy to tackle negative informalities. 
The gap that appears between the will to pass laws and the will to imple-
ment them indicates the irresponsibility of the ruling political structure 
that governs formal institutions. It is necessary to maintain pressure on 
governing structures to ensure implementation. 
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Policy Measures on Deterring Informal Economy /- Country 
Specific Case Studies
Bulgaria
Since the 1990s, the transition period in Bulgaria has given rise to enor-
mous informal economy to such an extent that it started to undermine the 
stability of official state transfer channels. According to the EC barometer 
survey, it was estimated that more than 35% of the country’s GDP comes 
from informal economic activity (Eurofound Bulgaria, 2009b). The major-
ity of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) were involved in engaging 
employees without employment contracts, especially in the tourism, hos-
pitality and construction sectors. In large companies, on the other hand, a 
significant portion of wages was reimbursed informally (envelope wages) 
creating a crisis in the social security system due to insufficient insur-
ance coverage (Eurofound Bulgaria, 2009a). The following measures were 
implemented by the Government, and supported by NGOs and interna-
tional stakeholders:
• In 2002 amendments to Labour Code, mandatory registration of 
employment contracts with National Social Security Institute were 
introduced,
• The government negotiated a minimum social insurance threshold for 
industry sectors and branches of economy, and for occupational cat-
egories, and since 2003 those thresholds are adopted annually in the 
State Budget Act.
• The results of these changes were that in 2003 about 300,000 addi-
tional employment contracts, alongside close to 60,000 new employ-
ers were registered. The revenues from social security increased by 
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more than 200 million euros. Furthermore, there was a reduction of 
more than 10% in the number of workers who received a higher wage 
than reported.1
As the issues of informal work was not completely resolved, some NGOs 
undertook steps in enabling citizens/workers to educate themselves on the 
matter as well as to file anonymous complaints online. In the first month 
only 121 infringements were reported and forwarded to the appropriate 
institutions, including the state inspectors. However, the campaign did not 
yield the expected results. One of the main reasons for this was low sup-
port from formal institutions. Subsequently the Government through its 
institutions (Ministry for Labour and Social Policy and General Labour 
Inspectorate) introduced an additional campaign called “work legally” in 
2008. In two months (during the peak of the tourism season), some 5,100 
inspections (12% at night) were carried out in about 4,800 companies. 
Close to 25,000 violations of labour legislation were uncovered, and spe-
cial recommendations including deadlines were given. Furthermore, close 
to 190 operations were halted, while some 1,630 persons were levied with 
administrative sanctions.2
The efforts to decrease informal economic activity continued after 
2008. Both government and NGOs took part in a longer-term fight against 
informal work, employing both restrictive measures (i.e. inspections and 
sanctions) as well as social actor-based measures (i.e. changing attitudes). 
First, a “National Rules for Business Centre” project was initiated, and a 
centre was established to monitor informal economy (primarily informal 
work) and promote research and awareness on formal economy. During 
the project three national and 10 branch studies were developed, encom-
passing thousands of respondents and hundreds of interviewees. Also, 
more than a thousand people were educated through a distance learning 
platform. This project was supported by intensified measures from Gov-
ernment through inspections and sanctions. In just 3 years, between July 
2009 and June 2012, close to 150 thousand audits were carried out in over 
1 Eurofound (2009): Mandatory registration of individual employment contracts, Bulgar-
ia. Available at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-eu 
rope/database/mandatory-registration-of-individual-employment-contracts-bulgaria, 
accessed: March 2018
2 Eurofound (2009): ‘Work legally’ campaign, Bulgaria. Available at: https://www.eu 
rofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/work-legal 
ly-campaign-bulgaria, accessed: March 2018
Appendix 171
100 thousand enterprises that employ more than half of all employees in 
the country. As a result of these measures, more than 30,000 employees 
with reported part-time hours have signed full-time contracts, alongside 
more than 10,000 people who were discovered without employment con-
tracts. Apart from intensifying inspections, the Government also enforced 
legislation which envisaged all trade enterprises to issue all of their invoices 
through fiscal devices connected to National Revenue Agency’s central 
computers in real time. This measure further extended control over the 
informal economy. Since more than 300,000 fiscal devices were connected 
in the beginning of 2012, an increase of 10% in declared turnover was reg-
istered compared to the preceding period.3
Croatia
Croatia’s main objectives were related to aligning its legislation with 
the EU acquis, and particularly the European Commission’s require-
ments for transparency, competition and accountability mechanisms 
(Bejakovic et al., 2007; Simic-Banovic, 2015)4. In 2006, the Government 
introduced a project Hitrorez, a part of e-Croatia initiative, which was 
intended to cut the unnecessary regulative and administrative proce-
dures which required more than 40 days to open a business. This admin-
istrative transformation was intended also to tackle the informal econ-
omy, through facilitating the formal way of doing business. Furthermore, 
the project unified and simplified various administrative procedures, 
and introduced the FINA e-card which replaced several e-cards already 
3 Eurofound (2013): Joint effective control on informal work, Bulgaria. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
joint-effective-control-on-informal-work-bulgaria, accessed: March 2018; Eurofound 
(2013): Rules for Business Centre, Bulgaria. Available at: https://www.eurofound.euro 
pa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/rules-for-business-centre-bul 
garia, accessed: March 2018; Eurofound (2013): Connecting fiscal devices to the Na-
tional Revenue Agency, Bulgaria. Available at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/
tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/connecting-fiscal-devices-to-the-nation 
al-revenue-agency-bulgaria, accessed: March 2018.
4 Bejaković, P., Šućur, Z. and Zrinscak, S., (2007), The social dimension in selected can-
didate countries in the Balkans: Country report on Croatia (December 14), ENE-
PRI Research Report No. 39. Available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2027419; Šimić 
Banović, R. (2015). Cutting the red ribbon but not the red tape: the failure of business 
environment reform in Croatia. Post-Socialist Economies, 27(1), 106–128.
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in use, speeded up businesses and business registration processes and 
eliminated unnecessary paperwork. However, although the project was 
implemented, its potentials have not been utilised properly and encoun-
tered many problems entrenched in the traditional way of doing busi-
ness (Simic-Banovic, 2015).5
To tackle high unemployment in the youth population and prevent 
young people from turning to informal work, in 2009 the Government intro-
duced grants to employers who provided working opportunities to young 
people for a period of one year. A total of one thousand young people took 
part in this program, which enabled them access to much needed experience 
and new skills—eventually increasing their employability. Furthermore, the 
Government introduced additional active labour market measures includ-
ing upskilling, requalification, education and public works.6
Undeclared work in Croatia was a constant issue in agriculture. 
Since agriculture is a business heavily dependent on weather condi-
tions, it made little economic sense for employers in the sector to declare 
workers—the taxes and contributions were usually paid on a monthly 
basis, whereas it was not a strange situation that only 5 days of work were 
achievable due to weather conditions. In order to prevent informal work 
in the sector, the Government introduced seasonal work vouchers, which 
included taxes and contributions. Each employer would purchase vouch-
ers from the Employment service and was obliged to give a voucher to 
each employee for each day spent on work. This way, the employers were 
motivated to engage and declare seasonal workers through vouchers and 
the state could prevent the informal work and keep the appropriate taxes 
and contributions.7
5 Eurofound (2013): One-stop shop business registration, Croatia. Available at: https://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/one-
stop-shop-business-registration-croatia, accessed: March 2018.
6 Eurofound (2013): Targeted incentives to register employees, Croatia. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/data 
base/targeted-incentives-to-register-employees-croatia, accessed: March 2018.
7 Eurofound (2013): Seasonal work vouchers, Croatia. Available at: https://www.
eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/season 
al-work-vouchers-croatia, accessed: March 2018.
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Cyprus
The informal economy in Cyprus is most present in the construction and 
tourism sectors, where informal work tends to affect the most vulnerable 
groups of workers, such as migrants and Turkish Cypriots. In this con-
text, sector specific measures have been developed in order to tackle this 
issue. In April 2007, special tripartite commissions—where Government, 
employers and employees were represented—were brought up to tackle 
informal work in the construction sector. The specific objectives of these 
commissions were to understand the issue and examine ways to tackle 
informal work—and detailed lists that emphasize relevant terms in con-
tracts for construction in the public sector were sent to operators of works 
still in progress, so that inspections could be scheduled. The inspections 
were carried out by a joint group of the labour and social security depart-
ments. The second focus was to overcome the issue of Turkish Cypriots 
declaring themselves as self-employed and sole contractors which enabled 
them to avoid registration in the social insurance scheme and evade taxes 
and contributions. The inspections from 2008 showed that close to 4% of 
employers were not enrolled in the social insurance scheme and more than 
27% of employees were not declared for tax purposes. These numbers rep-
resent an improvement from the 2003 data when 11% of employers and 
30% of employees were missing from the social insurance scheme.8
These mixed inspections were intensified in the period after 2009, and 
four teams were operating in the main districts. The focus was again on the 
construction and hospitality sectors. From April 2009 till May 2012, close 
to 7,500 inspections were carried out, 4,300 of which were in the construc-
tion sector.9
Changes in standard contracts in public works and services have also 
been introduced due to an increase of violations in the construction sec-
tor—only 2 public works locations were found to be in full compliance out 
of 26 inspected. The changes included a series of measures like:
8 Eurofound (2009): Tripartite committee to combat informal work in construction 
sector, Cyprus. Available at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal- 
work-in-europe/database/tripartite-committee-to-combat-informal-work-in-con 
struction-sector-cyprus, accessed: March 2018.
9 Eurofound (2013): Mixed teams of inspectors, Cyprus. Available at: https://www.eu 
rofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/mixed-teams-
of-inspectors-cyprus, accessed: March 2018.
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• Contractors who have committed violations of labour legislation (i.e. 
informal employment) will be excluded from public tenders,
• A fivefold increase of penalties for illegal employment,
• Informing relevant bodies of engagement of employees in advance.10
To help the inspectors carry out their work, the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Insurance introduced amendments to the Social Insurance Law in 
2012. The most prominent amendment imposed on employers the obli-
gation to submit a certificate of employment to the nearest Social Insur-
ance Service for each of their employees by the end of the month in which 
the employee started working. Violations were fined with 200 euros, while 
repeated violations were fined with an additional 400 euros per worker.11
Czech Republic
Illegal and informal employment of foreign workers was always a bigger 
issue than informal employment of domestic workers in Czech Repub-
lic. Therefore, in 2000 a Multi-ministerial Body for Combating the Ille-
gal Employment of Foreign Workers was established, where government 
representatives, social partners and research institutions were brought 
together to monitor illegal employment, produce recommendations for 
legislative improvements, and coordinate and control various activities 
of institutions that are directly involved in the issue of illegal and infor-
mal employment of foreign workers. The establishment of this body con-
tributed significantly to expert debate, raising awareness and knowledge 
about the issue as well as encouraging networking, debate, and exchange of 
ideas. The recommendations of this body influenced amendments to the 
Employment Act in 2007 which tightened restrictions on employment of 
foreign workers in a way that reduced illegal employment. The establish-
ment of this body was influential in terms of inspections and checks that 
were intensified, and which averaged around 10 thousand checks per year 
10 Eurofound (2013): Changes to standard contract in public procurement, Cyprus. Avail-
able at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/da 
tabase/changes-to-standard-contract-in-public-procurement-cyprus, accessed: March 
2018.
11 Eurofound (2013): Amendment to Social Insurance Law, Cyprus. Available at: htt-
ps://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
amendment-to-social-insurance-law-cyprus, accessed: March 2018.
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from 2001 to 2007. However, since the body did not have the legal status of 
a government advisory body or a formal institution, its powers and reach 
were limited.12
The first steps against illegal employment were undertaken in 2004 
when the Employment Act introduced illegal employment as a concept 
and strengthened control and sanction mechanisms. These amendments 
came after a special “Report on certain measures being applied and pre-
pared to restrict the grey economy” was issued by the government. Apart 
from defining illegal employment (informal work), the Act also strength-
ened the jurisdictions of inspection authorities and imposed stricter rules 
on employment of foreign workers (i.e. for the first time foreign workers 
were required to have a working permit). Sanctions were also introduced, 
from up to 360 Euros for foreign workers breaching the Law to up to 73,000 
Euros for domestic natural or legal persons enabling foreign workers to 
engage in these activities. However, it proved difficult to enforce the Act 
and sanctions as the inspection bodies had a hard time determining illegal 
employment—particularly because the phenomenon is a consequence of 
a mutually beneficial verbal agreement between employer and employee, 
and because other legislation allows for short-time informal employment 
that can be arranged verbally.13
Afterward, the focus shifted yet again to the illegal employment of 
immigrants primarily from Ukraine—as Ukrainian citizens make up close 
to 30% of all illegal employees in the country. These high numbers were a 
consequence of an informal institution called the “client system” in which 
workers from Ukraine used informal channels to come and work in Czech 
Republic. The combined project of the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs titled “Assistance system for the employment of 
Ukrainian citizens in the Czech Republic” resulted in setting up a network 
of advice centres—3 in Ukraine and 5 in the Czech Republic. The cen-
tres operated as a mediator between workers from Ukraine and employers 
and institutions in the Czech Republic. Workers were given information 
12 Eurofound (2009): System to improve access to employment for Ukrainian citizens, 
Czech Republic. Available at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-in 
formal-work-in-europe/database/system-to-improve-access-to-employment-for- 
ukrainian-citizens-czech-republic, accessed: March 2018.
13 Eurofound (2009): Employment Act and the fight against illegal labour, Czech Repub-
lic. Available at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-eu 
rope/database/employment-act-and-the-fight-against-illegal-labour-czech-republic, 
accessed: 22 March 2018.
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about legal employment opportunities, legal entry and residence encom-
passing help with all the administrative procedures. The Ukrainian work-
ers furthermore benefited from the centres which arranged contacts with 
legal employers, acted as mediators, and offered socio-legal consultations 
and help including dealings with embassy. Similarly, consultancy regard-
ing employment of foreigners, administrative improvements and online 
systems for finding workers as well as assistance in dealing with formali-
ties was made available to Czech employers. The initiative was labelled as 
successful, as the message was sent to both employers and workers that 
the “client system” is not necessary to provide work for people coming to 
Czech Republic, as the assistance and advice centres operated in a similar 
way but carried more security and less risk. However, the project was dif-
ficult to administer and coordinate as it covered a wide area of services.14
The employment office of the Czech Republic contributed to the 
struggle against the informal work. Their two-year project implied that all 
the people unemployed and registered at the Employment office should 
regularly (2-3 times a week) report to the “Czech POINT” counter at the 
nearest post office. The project was intended to make it harder for people 
unemployed and registered in the Register of Unemployed to engage in 
illegal work. However, it was found that these measures were non-produc-
tive, and even the Ombudsman demanded a cancellation of the attendance 
obligation which was perceived as violating human dignity.15
Afterwards, the focus was yet again given to inspections—in 2012 the 
total number of planned inspections increased to astonishing 200,000; 
out of which 35 thousand were inspections of illegal work. The legislation 
adopted in 2012 also imposed heavier sanctions for illegal work and evad-
ing employment contracts. The inspections were equipped with moving 
Czech POINT counter office vehicles in order to have all information at 
their disposal. The inspections plan was met in the first six months and the 
14 Eurofound (2009): Multi-ministerial body to combat illegal employment of foreign 
workers, Czech Republic. Available at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tack 
ling-informal-work-in-europe/database/multiministerial-body-to-combat-illegal-em 
ployment-of-foreign-workers-czech-republic, accessed: March 2018.
15 Eurofound (2013): Unemployed attendance scheme, Czech Republic. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/data 
base/unemployed-attendance-scheme-czech-republic, accessed: March 2018.
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inspections discovered several shortcomings of the legislation which were 
used to further improve the legislation.16
Estonia
In January 2005, a roundtable was held at the Estonia’s Tax and Customs 
Board where social welfare organizations, public institutions and social 
security bodies signed an agreement to join forces in trying to prevent the 
practice of informal work, which oscillated around 14% of total workers. 
The primary goal of the agreement was to raise public awareness about the 
negative consequences and losses caused by the informal employment. The 
ten partners that signed the agreement represented a significant portion of 
the Estonian labour market, while the declarative nature of the agreement 
sent a strong message that social welfare organizations, public institutions 
and social security bodies were intensifying their cooperation in order to 
get rid of the informal work. This was to be done through measures which 
spanned from raising public awareness and persuading dishonest employ-
ers to comply, to analysing the legislation and proposing improvements 
while focusing on the industries with acute informal employment prob-
lems, to engaging public agencies and setting up an inter-organizational 
system of information and control. Some indicators suggest that the initia-
tive brought positive results—the wage groups at largest risk of engaging in 
informal employment decreased by 10%, while the wage groups of people 
earning more increased.17
Two more information campaigns were launched in 2005 and 2006. 
In January 2008, a third information campaign was initiated with the aim 
of improving tax compliance and raising awareness about the benefits of 
tax compliance, as well as the social losses caused by tax fraud and evasion. 
Additionally a public debate was initiated to discuss the risks related to 
informal income as well as the large-scale impacts of this practice on soci-
ety. Posters and handouts were distributed in both Estonian and Russian, 
16 Eurofound (2013): Undeclared work inspections, Czech Republic. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/data 
base/informal-work-inspections-czech-republic, accessed: March 2018.
17 Eurofound (2009): Social partner cooperation agreement, Estonia. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/data 
base/social-partner-cooperation-agreement-estonia, accessed: March 2018.
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and TV and radio programmes addressed the issue as well. People were 
invited to report tax frauds and inadequate payment of informal wages. 
However, it is difficult to assess the results and impact of the campaign.18 
The second part of the campaign consisted of personalized appeals/
notification letters sent to companies with below average wage levels 
compared to the business sector they were operating in—a total of 2,000 
employees and 1,000 companies. As a result, 46% of the companies that 
received the appeals adjusted their wage levels, 43% of employers had no 
reaction to the appeals while in 8% of cases tax compliance worsened. The 
letters achieved the strongest results in instances where both employee and 
employer were notified—56% of these notifications resulted in improved 
tax compliance.19 
Information campaigns continued from 2010 to 2012. The later cam-
paigns were based much more on marketing tools and were intended to 
trigger emotions and result in longer-term improvements in tax morality—
i.e., pictures of firefighters were displayed on the back of trolleys with mes-
sages like “Should we take the trolley bus to an emergency call-out? This can 
happen if you do not pay your taxes!” The focus was to improve the volun-
tary tax compliance by concentrating on how taxpayers’ money was used. 
The campaigns were measured in terms of visibility as well as how people 
responded to the messages sent out, and were regarded as successful.20
Apart from information campaigns, Estonia tried to tackle informal 
work by raising the minimum wage. The Estonian Institute of Economic 
Research (year of publication) found that there are much higher risks for 
household members with lower income levels to receive and accept infor-
mal wages than those with higher income levels. Throughout the period 
beginning in 2002 the minimum wage rose rapidly culminating in 2008 
with a more than 20% increase compared to year before. Due to economic 
crisis it remained at the same level until 2011, when the government and 
18 Eurofound (2009): Information campaign on informal wages, Estonia. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
information-campaign-on-informal-wages-estonia, accessed: March 2018.
19 Eurofound (2009): Notification letters from Tax and Customs Board, Estonia. Avail-
able at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/
database/notification-letters-from-tax-and-customs-board-estonia, accessed: March 
2018.
20 Eurofound (2013): Information campaign on tax compliance, Estonia. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
information-campaign-on-tax-compliance-estonia, accessed: March 2018.
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social partners negotiated a raise of close to 5%. However, increases in the 
minimum wage have not been shown to have direct links to reduction in 
informal work.21
In 2012, Estonia also increased inspections to combat tax fraud and 
informal work, and engaged additional inspectors. However, the Estonian 
way of implementing inspections consists of first executing comprehensive 
research to identify the companies practicing informal work. After 1,300 
companies were identified and around 30 million Euros in unpaid tax 
from those companies was estimated, notification letters were distributed 
in order to give companies the opportunity to improve their tax compli-
ance on their own. The inspections were carried out only in the companies 
that either did not improve their compliance or did not give satisfactory 
explanations for their business activities. In the end, only 500 inspections 
were carried out, while an increase of 11 million Euros in tax income was 
registered.22
Hungary
With over 80,000 micro and small enterprises, the construction sector in 
Hungary is highly susceptible to informal work. Some observers estimate 
that close to 200,000 employees engage in informal work activities, which 
is greater than the number of people legally employed in companies with 
four and more employees. The common practice among employers was to 
report their employees at minimum wage and supplement the difference 
through envelope wages. In order to combat this practice, trade unions 
and employer organisations in the construction industry negotiated a 
sectoral collective agreement in November 2005. The agreement involved 
changes to legislation in order to restore order in the industry and make it 
attractive again for young employees and apprentices. The core of changes 
concerned the compulsory tariff wage system which set wages above the 
national minimum. Some 20 pay levels were adopted for employees, with 
21 Eurofound (2013): National minimum wage agreements, Estonia. Available at: htt-
ps://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/na 
tional-minimum-wage-agreements-estonia, accessed: March 2018.
22 Eurofound (2013): Targeted control of enterprises for informal work, Estonia. Available 
at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
targeted-control-of-enterprises-for-informal-work-estonia, accessed: March 2018.
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minimums set for all unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled workers. The col-
lective agreement was renewed for 2006, 2007 and 2008, while the gov-
ernment introduced a new system, in which labour costs in public ten-
ders were calculated on the basis of the minimum hourly wage set by the 
employment contracts. In two reports, the Ministry of Finance deemed the 
above measures as successful. However, the collective agreement did not 
set up any mechanisms for monitoring and control, meaning that no social 
partner was able to control the effective implementation of the collective 
agreement in the workplaces.23
Apart from the construction sector, the agriculture and tourism are 
also prone to informal work in Hungary. Both require a large seasonal 
work force, and the previous regime was tolerant towards people mak-
ing money in the grey economy. This made the agriculture and tourism 
highly prone to informal work, as there were few incentives motivating 
employers to declare their employees. In order to address this problem, 
the government adopted a simplified employment act in order to sim-
plify the complicated and slow administrative procedures required for 
employing workers. The new legislation simplified employment registra-
tion by allowing employment to be declared by a short SMS text after the 
initial registration in the system. Furthermore, fixed amounts of taxes 
were set on a daily basis for both industries, which furthermore sim-
plified the procedure and motivated employers to declare their work-
ers. However, during simplified employment workers were not eligible 
for full social security—only accident health care services and job seek-
ing allowances—and the pension eligibilty for this type of employment 
was restricted. Nonetheless, the simplified employment institution was 
largely used and in July 2010 more than 500,000 simplified employments 
were registered.24
Simplified employment brought many benefits to seasonal work-
ers but has not eradicated the practice of informal work. Notification 
of authorities was not always easy and smooth, either due to geographi-
cal locations without internet connection or due to the unwillingness of 
23 Eurofound (2009): Reducing informal work in construction sector, Hungary. Avail-
able at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/
database/reducing-informal-work-in-construction-sector-hungary, accessed: March 
2018.
24 Eurofound (2013): Labour Inspectorate campaign, Hungary. Available at: https://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/la 
bour-inspectorate-campaign-hungary, accessed: March 2018.
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employers to declare their seasonal workers. In order to curb these obsta-
cles, the Labour Inspectorate undertook inspections and published yearly 
reports with objectives, changes in regulations and employer-employee 
wrongdoings on which to focus in the coming year. The inspections focus 
on the legal formalities of declaring employment, existence of written 
contracts, breaches of obligations, discovering discrepancies between 
legal and informal work and issuing penalties and fines. Penalties span 
from 100 Euros to 35 thousand Euros, and from the point of view of the 
Inspectorate, they have achieved significant success in tackling informal 
work. Since 2007, when the inspections of informal work began, decreas-
ing trends of discovering informal work have been recorded: from more 
than 16 thousand companies with over 70,000 involved employees in 
2007 to some 4 times fewer companies and 5 times smaller number of 
employees in 2011.25
Latvia
In 2004, the shadow economy in Latvia was anywhere between 17%, as 
estimated by the Central Statistical Office, and 25% of GDP according to 
Ministry of Finance estimate. The pivotal issue in the shadow economy 
was informal work as it deprived workers of social security and other ser-
vices and restricted budget revenue and fair competition. The key ingredi-
ents facilitating informal work were identified as: 
• A complicated taxation system, 
• Inadequate controls, 
• A lack of cooperation among the authorities, 
• An increase in economic crime, 
• The possibility to register fictitious companies, 
• Unemployment, and 
• A low level of public awareness regarding labour law.
25 Eurofound (2013): Simplified Employment Act, Hungary. Available at: https://www.
eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/simpli 
fied-employment-act-hungary, accessed: March 2018.
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The government came up with a strategy to combat this issue through four 
groups of measures: (i) increasing the capacity of the State Labour Inspec-
torate, (ii) improving cooperation between inspection authorities, (iii) 
increasing public awareness, and (iv) education of pupils and students.26
Greater coordination between controlling authorities implied improv-
ing cooperation and exchange of information among organizations, which 
eventually led to establishing a coordination mechanism in 2005 for infor-
mation exchange to tackle informal work at an early stage. However, it took 
some time for the coordination mechanism and activities to yield signifi-
cant results. For instance, in a 2007 Assessment of informal work report 
published by University of Latvia it was concluded that despite improve-
ments, coordination activities were still poor while complicated databases 
held by agencies involved in the struggle against informal work were often 
non-compatible and useless to other agencies. On the other hand, no single 
agency was keeping records on details from employment contracts or work 
regimes.27
The State Labour Inspectorate (VDI), the agency with the respon-
sibility to control and repress informal work, has the authority to pro-
pose amendments to legislation in order to improve working conditions. 
‘Measures for the prevention of illegal employment’ were drafted with key 
principles to improve the capacities of VDI to control companies, espe-
cially those in construction, wholesale and retail, forestry, beauty and 
heath care. The insufficient staff and low salaries of inspectors were con-
sidered as important factors hampering the VDI’s capacity to decisively 
tackle informal work, and it was proposed to enhance salaries through 
additional funding from EU structural funds. Since 2004, VDI submit-
ted several amendments to improve legislation and most were adopted, 
except the proposal to temporary prohibit engagement in business activi-
ties to employers who consistently fail to declare their workers. In 2006 
the decision was made not only to penalise employers but also employ-
ees who accept work without a contract. However, despite the legislative 
improvements and increased capacities of VDI, as well as the frequency 
26 Eurofound (2009): Control measures to limit illegal employment, Latvia. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
control-measures-to-limit-illegal-employment-latvia, accessed: March 2018.
27 Eurofound (2009): Improved cooperation between inspection authorities, Latvia. Avail-
able at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/da 
tabase/improved-cooperation-between-inspection-authorities-latvia, accessed: March 
2018.
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of inspections and penalties, informal employment did not decrease but 
rather showed signs of increase. Still, an additional 31 thousand people 
were registered as employees, which increased the budget revenue by 
some 8 million Euros.28
Another measure from the key principles was the intensification of 
information campaigns meant to raise awareness and educate people on 
the requirements of labour law and the importance of having employment 
contracts. Also, the consequences of informal work were communicated 
to both employers and workers. In June 2006, the State Revenue Service 
(VID) sent around nine thousand letters to companies asking them to 
increase salaries to their workers based on the assumptionan that part of 
their remuneration was distributed through envelope wages. In 2007, VID 
launched additional campaign to enhance public awareness and educate 
people on the harm caused by receiving envelope wages—over 100 thou-
sand people received black envelopes containing strong messages as well 
as explanations on the losses caused by accepting envelope wages. Since 
2007, VID also started naming the offenders/companies that were giving 
envelope wages to warn workers about possible breaches of their rights. In 
2008, VID launched yet another extensive media campaign to explain the 
negative consequences of receiving envelope wages—like restrictions on 
getting loans, ineligibility for unemployment benefits and social services, 
and lower retirement remuneration. However, it was recorded that the 
campaigns organised by the VID were seldom aggressive and were annoy-
ing to wider public.29
In 2010, the government adopted the “Action plan for combating shadow 
economy and ensuring fair competition for 2010–2013,” which included a 
total of 63 measures aimed at particular industry sectors. The plan was to 
make shadow economic activities as unattractive as possible, and increase 
the attractiveness of the formal economy. The measures included:
• Simplification of tax regime and consolidation of multiple taxes into 
one micro-enterprise tax,
• Obligatory declaration of material possessions (including cash and 
valuables) of the population,
28 Ibid.
29 Eurofound (2009): Awareness-raising campaigns, Latvia. Available at: https://www.eu 
rofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/awareness-rais 
ing-campaigns-latvia, accessed: March 2018.
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• Paying mandatory tax and social contributions to previously informal 
income visible through mandatory declaration of material posses-
sions,
• Increasing employers’ responsibilities for declaring workers (and 
hence informal work)—i.e., if it was not possible to determine the 
starting date of a work contract the tax authority was authorised to 
charge 3 months of taxes and contributions for each violation.
The results of the above action plan were visible from the start, as the 
increased responsibility of employers resulted in decreasing levels of 
shadow economy and informal work in 2011 compared to the preceding 
year.30 
In addition to the Action plan, the Latvian Employers’ Confederation 
launched a nation-wide campaign titled ‘Against the shadow economy—
for fair competition’. The campaign was implemented over a period of two 
months, and the results were presented and discussed at a related busi-
ness conference. The campaign was multi-layered and provocative, start-
ing by displaying slogans “I spit on it!” in yellow letters on black tape over 
a white background—the uncovering of which in the later stages stirred 
public debate on the effects of shadow economy. “I spit on it!” over “Happy 
childhood?”, “Young families?” and “Well provided old days?” gained a lot 
of attention and was subject to various discussions—from media to social 
networking platforms. An online tool was introduced where each individ-
ual could calculate its own participation in the shadow economy, while 
public engagement campaigns operated in central squares and were cov-
ered in the media. While envelopes were distributed to citizens passing 
by—more than 50% of whom expressed greater interest in being engaged 
on minimum salary and receiving higher wages through envelopes than 
regular salaries. The campaign took place simultaneously with the govern-
ment’s Action plan activities, so it is hard to distinguish its independent 
impact, but it is clear that the campaign attracted public attention and 
engagement.31
30 Eurofound (2013): Action plans to combat informal work, Latvia. Available at: https://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/action-
plans-to-combat-informal-work-latvia, accessed: March 2018.





The Free Trade Union Confederation of Latvia also contributed to 
the struggle against the shadow economy and informal work by organis-
ing national competitions for students in 2011 and 2012. The pupils and 
students competed in knowledge of labour law and work safety regula-
tions, and the winners in all categories were motivated by individual and 
team prizes. Measures like these proved to be especially valuable in the 
long term, as they also served as opportunities to produce effective study 
materials as well as to increase the interactivity of target populations—i.e. 
students appreciated videos on labour rights and safety at work and took 
an active part in their dissemination.32
Lithuania
The economic transition provided a fertile ground for the shadow econ-
omy in Lithuania. Undeclared work was widespread, peaking in the period 
1999–2000. A response from the government of Lithuania was to issue a 
‘Decree on the Coordination of Undeclared Work Control’ in 2001, which 
authorised the State Labour Inspectorate (VDI) with the coordination of 
overall control and inspection operations in the country concerning infor-
mal work. The central coordination group for the control of informal work 
was set up, comprised of experts from various institutions, including the 
police force. The primary objective of the control group was to execute 
more efficient control and prevention of informal work through coordina-
tion of the efforts of different institutions. The group was also authorized 
to undertake research and analysis of various causes of informal work, set-
ting up an agenda for prevention, approval of general ways of accounting 
for informal work, and analysis of international practices and experiences. 
Although no special evaluation was carried out, it appears that the system 
brought about prevention of informal work.33
Inspections of informal work in Lithuania have been in place since 
1997, and since 2006 around two thousand inspections were carried out 
32 Eurofound (2013): SMARTS student competition, Latvia. Available at: https://www.
eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/smarts-stu 
dent-competition-latvia, accessed: March 2018.
33 Eurofound (2009): Coordination of informal work control, Lithuania. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
coordination-of-informal-work-control-lithuania, accessed: March 2018.
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every year with the aim of uncovering and preventing informal employ-
ment. 80% of the inspections are carried out directly by State Labour 
Inspectorate, and 20% by other partners in consultation with the VDI. 
Each year, approximately 900 informal workers are discovered—30% to 
40% of whom are employed in construction. While 150–300 cases end up 
in court hearings, a majority of them receive administrative penalties. In 
the case of Lithuania, it seems that the inspections serve as a positive meas-
ure to raise awareness aimed at combating informal work.34
Inspections were carried out in the core centre of Vilnius, where the 
Tourism and Promotion Division of the Culture and Education Depart-
ment has been organising campaigns and inspections to prevent informal 
work in the tourism sector since 2002. Tour guides operating in the city 
had to be certified and carry proper licences. Informal tour guides when 
discovered were fined, but also instructed on how to obtain the tourist 
guide licence. This programme succeeded in decreasing number of ille-
gally working tour guides, and also safeguarding the market for officially 
certified ones.35
The economic crisis of 2009 exacerbated problems of low income and 
wages and aggravated the heaviness of tax burden, indirectly contributing 
to an increase in informal work as well. In order to tackle this new wave of 
informal work, the State Labour Inspectorate started to shift its focus from 
performing inspections to business consulting, public information and 
awareness raising campaigns with the hope that increased public aware-
ness about the consequences of informal work would change public atti-
tudes toward it. The campaigns were implemented through various media 
channels which were used to also disseminate the secure line for members 
of the public to report informal work. According to VDI, this approach 
yielded positive results evident in the increased number of reports made 
by the citizens.36 
34 Eurofound (2009): Preventing informal work among tour guides, Lithuania. Available 
at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/data-
base/preventing-informal-work-among-tour-guides-lithuania, accessed: March 2018.
35 Eurofound (2009): Inspection of informal work, Lithuania. Available at: https://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/inspec 
tion-of-informal-work-lithuania, accessed: March 2018.
36 Eurofound (2013): Information and awareness-raising campaign, Lithuania. Available 
at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
information-and-awareness-raising-campaign-lithuania, accessed: March 2018.
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In 2011, VDI set up standing groups to control and inspect for infor-
mal work in the five largest cities. Each standing group included of two 
VDI inspectors (lawyers) and was equipped with a car and video and 
photography devices. These groups were authorized, once they discovered 
informal work, to record everything and build up a court case against the 
offenders, as well as to represent the public interest during the court pro-
cess. According to VDI, in 2011 alone the detection of informal work dou-
bled compared to a year before.37
Due to special relationships between Lithuania and Latvia, some of 
the companies operating in both countries tried to seize the opportunity 
of labour and capital mobility and engage in informal work to reduce costs. 
The control of one company with headquarters in another country was dif-
ficult and problematic. Therefore, the Lithuanian and Latvian State Labour 
Inspectorates joined forces to exercise control on one anothers’ behalf in 
their respective countries to reduce cross-border violations. Although no 
informal workers were discovered in little inspections that were carried 
out, the message was sent that borders were not an obstacle in tackling this 
informal phenomenon.38
Malta
Malta’s problems with informal work were felt most through abuse of the 
social security benefits intended for people without jobs. In 2005, the Min-
istry for the Family and Social Solidarity set up a Benefit Fraud and Inves-
tigation Directorate, whose purpose was to investigate abuses of the social 
benefits system. The director of this institution was authorized to appoint 
inspectors, who analysed the financial documents submitted to other insti-
tutions and had the authority to demand all necessary documents for con-
ducting on-site investigations, and if necessary involve the police. In 2007, 
the Directorate conducted over 1,780 on-site inspections where various 
 
37 Eurofound (2013): Standing groups to control illegal work, Lithuania. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
standing-groups-to-control-illegal-work-lithuania, accessed: March 2018.
38 Eurofound (2013): Cross-border cooperation, Lithuania. Available at: https://www.eu-
rofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/cross-border-co 
operation-lithuania, accessed: March 2018.
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cases of unemployment benefits abuses were discovered and prosecuted—
ending up with a saving of around 3.5 million Euros annually. The key 
factor in success was the collaboration between the Directorate and private 
and public entities.39
In order to prevent unemployed people from claiming social benefits 
while at the same time working without contracts, the Employment and 
Training Corporation (ETC) undertook a variety of initiatives to reduce 
and prevent informal employment. One of its pivotal measures was to 
introduce obligatory courses for the unemployed, which indirectly serve as 
an early warning signal for detection of informal work. Through maintain-
ing an updated register of unemployed people and providing obligatory 
skills improvement and retraining courses, the ETC could monitor infor-
mal employment by observing people avoiding taking the courses. Every 
unemployed person is assigned to an employment adviser with whom they 
regularly meet with the aim of setting up a Personalized Action Plan, which 
identifies the appropriate training for the individual in order to improve 
his/her skills and make them more attractive in the labour market. The 
unemployed are obligated to follow the training regime specified, and if 
they fail to do so they are required to provide proper justification for their 
absence. If it is determined that the reasons are not justified (particularly 
if there are indications of informal work) the person is eliminated from 
the unemployed register and from receiving unemployment benefits. This 
makes it more difficult for people employed in the informal sector to abuse 
the system over the long term.40
Malta’s ETC and its Law Compliance Unit try to identify jobseekers 
who are receiving unemployment benefits and are registered as unem-
ployed and ready for work, but at the same time work in the informal 
economy. The ETC and LCU organized intensive media campaigns to raise 
awareness about informal work and empower the general public to report 
abuses through a free telephone service, which was widely advertised. 
Over 1,270 people were reported and found to be violating the law—they 
were receiving unemployment benefits while working informally. How-
ever, 57% of those people since declared their employment, and a further 
39 Eurofound (2009): Benefit fraud and investigation directorate, Malta. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
benefit-fraud-and-investigation-directorate-malta, accessed: March 2018
40 Eurofound (2009): Obligatory training for unemployed persons, Malta. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
obligatory-training-for-unemployed-persons-malta, accessed: March 2018
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39% stopped claiming unemployment benefits. Many of the reports that 
were received turned out to be false. One lesson from Malta’s information 
campaigns is that they have greater impact if they last for periods of three 
months or longer.41
The most recent problem with informal work in Malta concerned 
immigrants from Africa, who were exploited as cheap and easily dis-
missed labour. Until 2012, individuals holding refugee status as well as 
those granted protection or humanitarian status, could participate in for-
mal economy with an employment licence. However, illegal residents were 
obstructed from participation in the formal economy. In an effort to sur-
vive, these individuals would get involved in informal work and could be 
exploited as a cheap labour force. In order to curb this activity, ETC and the 
government introduced new rules and legislation regarding the minimum 
standards for employers of illegally staying third-country nationals. This 
regulation prohibited employment of illegal migrants, and put obligations 
on employers to take action to prevent informal employment. Sanctions 
were put in place for breaching the legislation.42
Poland
In 2004, informal economy in Poland was a permanent feature of its labour 
market. Sarzalska and Szydlowski43 estimated that between 764 and 1,317 
thousand people were involved in informal employment. In order to reduce 
these numbers, the Polish government tried to limit the informal economy 
and shift the economic, social and cultural factors that determine its scope. 
In achieving the shift from omnipresent to limited informal economy, the 
government relied on traditional measures like increased inspections of 
companies, employees and their organizations (trade unions and employer 
organizations). Many institutions were involved – from customs, social 
41 Eurofound (2009): Media campaign to curb informal work, Malta. Available at: https://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/media-
campaign-to-curb-informal-work-malta, accessed: March 2018.
42 Eurofound (2013): New rules against employing third-country nationals, Malta. Avail-
able at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/da 
tabase/new-rules-against-employing-third-country-nationals-malta, accessed: March 
2018.
43 Sarzalska, M. and Szydlowski, A., ‘Praca niejawna w gospodarce’ [Hidden work in the 
Polish economy], in Zatrudnienie 2006, Warsaw, MPiPS, 2007, p. 178.
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insurance office, police, to ministries and public employment offices. 
Inspectors were authorised to issue fines, demand fulfilment of legal 
requirements or propose prosecution. However, the inspections yielded 
limited results.44
After failing to limit informal economy with inspections, the efforts 
were shifted to understand the causes of the phenomenon. Research on 
the informal economy confirmed that households were frequent users of 
services that weren’t reported to the tax and social security authorities, 
according to survey implemented by Central Statistical Office in 2004. 
In an effort to shift these activities to formal economy, the government 
introduced amendments to the employment act in 2005 which offered 
tax deductions to households that report such employment engagements. 
On the other side, the unemployed persons were only liable to be engaged 
through “activation employment contract,” and thus become part of the 
formal economy. However, due to other conditions, like one prescribing 
that contracts be signed for at least one year, these proposals met a wave of 
public criticism, which later proved to be appropriate as most of the poten-
tial beneficiaries remained in the informal economy.45
Youth below 25 years old were also identified as highly susceptible to 
engaging in the informal economy, as in 2002 almost 25% of the unem-
ployed were from this age category. Therefore, the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Policy designed the ‘First Job’ programme, intended to protect the 
high school students from unemployment. On the demand side, the pro-
gramme primarily targeted companies that were not willing to employ 
youth without experience. In the three years up to 2005 in which the pro-
gramme was operational, around 800,000 beneficiaries were involved. 
However, due to scale it was hard to measure the real employment after 
the programme completion, and thus the impact it had on reducing the 
informal economy.46
44 Eurofound (2009). Employment legality controls, Poland. Available at: https://www.
eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-undeclared-work-ineurope/database/employ 
ment-legality-controls-poland, accessed: March 2018.
45 Eurofound (2009). Regulations for legalising domestic work, Poland. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-undeclared-work-ineurope/database/
regulations-for-legalising-domestic-work-poland, accessed: March 2018.
46 Eurofound (2009). First Job programme, Poland. Available at: https://www.eurofound.
europa.eu/data/tackling-undeclared-work-ineurope/database/first-job-programme-
poland, accessed: March 2018.
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When the ‘First Job’ programme ended, the government initiated the 
‘First Business’ programme in 2005. ‘First Business’ focused on support-
ing and promoting entrepreneurship and self-employment among young 
people. The programme involved training on setting up and maintaining a 
business, particularly the financial part of it including taxes, as well as sub-
sidies intended to cover part of the establishment and maintenance costs. 
The programme still operates, and it has been providing around 25,000 
young people with self-employment opportunities each year, promoting 
entrepreneurship culture in the formal economy.47
In 2007, new legislation regarding the National Labour Inspectorate 
(NLI) was introduced. The change in legislation assigned responsibilities 
related to the informal economy to institutions like the Customs Service, 
Border Guard, Social Security Institution, Fiscal Control and Police, which 
operated under the supervision of NLI in regard to informal employment. 
It also sought to improve efficiency of control over informal employment. 
With the consolidation of responsibility over informal employment con-
trols, the inspectors from any of the included institutions gained authority 
to order the companies to pay employees appropriately, and to settle debts 
for taxes and contributions accordingly—something that was reserved to 
NLI inspectors before that. However, despite increased capacities, the legal 
framework (i.e. ability to employ someone on trial period on informal 
basis) limited the expected results. Further improvements were suggested 
by NLI, especially with regard to foreign workers.48
Following the enlargement of the EU in 2004, Poland efficiently closed 
its borders to non-EU residents from neighbouring countries who sought 
informal employment, but was later forced to reverse this decision due to 
workforce shortages. In 2006, the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy 
enaceted conditions for short-term employment of foreigners without work 
permits. The conditions stipulated that the foreigners were able to work 
in Poland for up to three months in every consecutive six months, while 
this condition was further relaxed in 2008 in favour of foreign citizens to 
six months of work every year. The main objective was to attract foreign 
47 Eurofound (2009). First Business programme, Poland. Available at: https://www.euro 
found.europa.eu/data/tackling-undeclared-work-ineurope/database/first-busi 
ness-programme-poland, accessed: March 2018.
48 Eurofound (2009). Coordinated approach to fight against undeclared work, Poland. 




workers to Poland, but also to reduce the probability of engaging in infor-
mal economy. This policy permitted foreign citizens to reside in Poland no 
longer than three months per year without a working contract and permit.49
Following the pressure from civil society organizations and economic 
experts, the Polish parliament passed a law legalising the illegal residents 
in Poland and giving them social rights. As illegal immigrants could not 
take formal employment, they were pushed towards informal economy 
by default. In 2011 the government offered an overall amnesty of illegal 
migrants to legalise their stay first temporarily, and in the long run to inte-
grate them into the society and formal economy. The action lasted for six 
months in 2012, and anyone could submit an application to legalise their 
stay. Later on, concerns were raised with regard to the intentions of resi-
dence permit seekers.50
In 2010, the Ministry of Finance introduced cash registers which reg-
istered every sale electronically. While business operators initially objected 
to the change in legislation, the decision was eventually regarded as justi-
fied and successful. The main objective of cash registers were to improve 
efficiency in collecting taxes and curb tax evasion. However, the immediate 
effect was less than expected as only a third of entrepreneurs bound by the 
law notified the tax administration about implementing the cash register. 
However, the introduction of these procedures was well received by wider 
public who saw it as a just and appropriate way to improve equality under 
the law for all companies. Therefore, the government opted to increase 
fiscal pressure and double down the minimum limit on annual revenue 
above which adoption of cash register was required.51
In 2011, the government passed another law that allowed parents to 
choose for their infants and children an alternative path to public day care, 
such as hiring a babysitter. Apart from the social component, the envis-
aged effects of the law were twofold: first, to give mothers higher labour 
49 Eurofound (2009). Employment of migrant workers without work permits, Poland. 
Available at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-undeclared-work-in 
europe/database/employment-of-migrant-workers-without-work-permits-poland, 
accessed: March 2018.
50 Eurofound (2013). Amnesty for illegal migrants, Poland. Available at: https://www.
eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-undeclared-work-ineurope/database/amnes 
ty-for-illegal-migrants-poland, accessed: March 2018.
51 Eurofound (2013). Mandatory cash registers for entrepreneurs, Poland. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-undeclared-work-ineurope/database/
mandatory-cash-registers-for-entrepreneurs-poland , accessed: March 2018.
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market mobility, and second to introduce informal nannies and babysitters 
into the formal economy. The law stipulated signing the activation contract 
between the parents and nanny, and while the incentive for parents was to 
be available for the labour market and have higher mobility and flexibility 
at home, nannies were motivated to receive paid health and pension insur-
ance by the state, whereas they had to cover their income tax themselves. 
Even though the exact number of nannies has never been established, the 
initial proposition was that more than 25% of them would be interested in 
using the benefits this law provided. However, in the end only 5% of the 
estimated number of nannies were registered with the social security in the 
aftermath of the new legislation.52
Romania
The Romanian Labour Inspectorate (IM) is a specialised government 
agency established in 1999 whose main aim is to ensure that employers 
comply with their obligations related to labour relations, working condi-
tions, and financial reporting. It has an office in each county of Romania. In 
the period to 2009, almost half of the fines issued were related to informal 
work. In order to tackle the problem more effectively, the IM focused on 
employing its resources based on industry sectors, so that staff could be 
specialized in particular sectors. Sectoral inspections seem to have yielded 
positive results, as the trend of issuing informal-work-related penalties and 
fines declined over the years—also due to the fact that sectoral inspections 
raised awareness of risk among employers. However, the problem of infor-
mal work is still widespread in Romania, as the head of IM stressed: “this 
is due to the ‘complicity between the victim and their executioner’—the 
employer and employee cover each other by refusing to testify in court.” 
Savings on taxes and social security contributions get divided between 
employer and employee through declaring minimum wages and paying 
the difference in cash.53
52 Eurofound (2013). Crèches Act to legalise childcare workers, Poland. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-undeclared-work-ineurope/database/
creches-act-to-legalise-childcare-workers-poland, accessed: March 2018.
53 Eurofound (2009): Builders’ Social Fund, Romania. Available at: https://www.euro 
found.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/builders-social- 
fund-romania, accessed: March 2018.
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The largest problem of informal employment in Romania lay in the 
textile, retail and food industries, but most importantly in the construction 
sector, as confirmed by many studies on informal work (Stanculescu and 
Ilie, 2001). Trade unions and employer organisations in the construction 
sector are aware of and confirm the issue with informal work, estimating 
that one in three workers in the sector is without a contract. In 1998, the 
Construction Workers’ Social Fund (CSC) was established—the members 
of the Fund were construction companies and producers of construction 
materials, and the Fund offers welfare services to its members which pro-
vide an alternative to winter seasonal unemployment between November 
and March. After signing a sectoral agreement with the Romanian Asso-
ciation of Employers in Construction, the Fund was given a pivotal role. 
Measures have been applied to ensure that no single contribution to the 
Fund could be used to remunerate welfare to other contributors. Distinct 
records for each member of the CSC have been created, thereby prevent-
ing informal workers from receiving welfare during the off season. This 
joint initiative enabled social partners to jointly tackle the issues in the 
construction sector.54
In order to further the understanding of informal work in Romania, 
the OECD commissioned a study on informal employment. The report 
came out in 2008 and it analysed the incidence and characteristics of 
informal employment in Romania, which according to the report ranged 
between 20% and 50%, depending on how the phenomenon was defined. 
The results were debated at a seminar with invited experts in the field, 
where high government officials stressed the importance of the report for 
future struggles in dealing with informal employment.55
Only a year later, the Romanian government signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding with the European Commission with the purpose of imple-
menting mechanisms for monitoring, controlling, and reducing illegal work. 
The aims of the mechanisms were to appropriately measure the extent and 
diversity of illegal work, continuously monitor its development, and coordi-
nate actions to efficiently channel prevention, inspection and control activi-
ties. First, an Inter-ministerial Committee Against Undeclared Work was set 
54 Eurofound (2009): Sectoral campaigns of the Labour Inspectorate, Romania. Available 
at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
sectoral-campaigns-of-the-labour-inspectorate-romania, accessed: March 2018.
55 Eurofound (2009): Report on informal employment, Romania. Available at: https://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/re 
port-on-informal-employment-romania, accessed: March 2018.
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up in 2010, followed by a national strategy to reduce the rate of informal 
work and the drafting of an accompanying Action and Implementation Plan 
for 2010–2012. Amendments to the existing legislation were adopted with 
the aim of increasing awareness of the negative effects of informal work, but 
also of increasing the fines for both employers and employees in order to 
prevent their engagement in informal work. Consequently, reports indicated 
increases in both individual and joint inspections, as well as improvements 
in their efficiency.56
The National Trade Union Bloc implemented a two-year project 
to enhance understanding and improve the level of information on the 
labour market and orkplace related issues. The project outlined that there 
was no organization in Romania that represented the workers’ perspective 
in drafting studies and strategies related to labour market. Consequently, 
Observatory was set up as a platform through which social partners’ voices 
could be heard, and one of the first things initiated through this platform 
was a report on the informal economy and its impact on the labour mar-
ket. The study revealed that in Romania around 2.9 million people were 
employed in the informal economy, which accounted for around 32% of 
the workforce. More than 87% of those informally employed work in agri-
culture, forestry and fishing. Informal labour was found to be more fre-
quent among people with low educational attainment, unskilled and low-
skilled workers, young, elderly and retirees. The study also estimated that 
if only 20% of the informally employed shifted to the formal economy, the 
related budget revenues (not counting the declared business revenues and 
wages) would account for 1.2% of GDP.57
Slovakia
Prior to 2000, informal work was only controlled through labour inspectors 
and regulation of working conditions on site. However, in 2000 a law on 
labour inspection was adopted and the inspection activities needed to be 
56 Eurofound (2013): National strategy to reduce illegal work, Romania. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
national-strategy-to-reduce-illegal-work-romania, accessed: March 2018.
57 Eurofound (2013): Trade union study on the informal economy, Romania. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
trade-union-study-on-the-informal-economy-romania, accessed: March 2018.
196  Appendix
coordinated. In 2001 an agreement was signed by the Ministry of Labour 
and Ministry of Interior and their departments in order to implement 
coordination of regulations and jurisdictions in cooperation with local 
governments and employer organisations. In 2005 and 2006 additional leg-
islation was adopted concerning informal employment and labour inspec-
tions. Inspections are conducted each year by Slovakia’s labour authorities, 
and based on the information from labour inspectorate offices it seems 
that the majority of employers comply with the legislation on informal 
employment. This is mainly due to strong sanctions for breaches of the law 
on informal work, which include barring employers from receiving state 
assistance and from participation in public procurement.58
As of 2005, every company is obliged to register their employees with 
the Social Insurance Agency before the beginning of employment. The 
obligation begins one day before the actual start of work by the employee 
agreed in the employment contract. Each day overdue was chargeable at 
3.5 Euros, and since 2004 the Agency has been authorised to issue fines 
of up to 16.600 Euros. In just one year, more than 5 million registrations 
and withdrawals were recorded. There were some issues, however. Some 
employers argued that the requirement was burdensome, a problem that 
was addressed by allowing the registration to be performed electronically. 
However, since there were issues with electronic signatures and certificates, 
the registration was performed via text message or electronically without 
electronic signatures, and printed registrations were sent by post or over-
the-counter submission within 3 days of the electronic registration. This 
implies that the innovative solutions like electronic registration are often 
dependent on broader changes and amendments to the legislation, for 
example establishment of an agency to certify electronic signatures.59
In 2004, new legislation on employment services and amendments to 
the labour law addressed informal employment. First, employment ser-
vices were introduced as intermediaries between employers and employ-
ees, with employers engaging an agency who would send workers where 
personnel had been requested. This accelerated the process of job broker-
ing, where the employer would get workers and the agencies would pay 
58 Eurofound (2009): Coordination of inspection activities at workplaces, Slovakia. Available 
at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
coordination-of-inspection-activites-at-workplaces-slovakia, accessed: March 2018.
59 Eurofound (2009): Registration system for work contracts, Slovakia. Available at: https://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/registra-
tion-system-for-work-contracts-slovakia, accessed: March 2018.
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social insurance contributions. The second amendment allowed external 
work contracts, by which employers were not obliged to pay the full taxes 
and contributions amounting to 35% of the employees’ wages, but only 
1.05% for accident insurance. Reducing labour costs enabled the employ-
ers to engage a larger number of workers and contribute to dealing with 
unemployment and informal work. However, there has been a significant 
rise in external contracts since 2009.60
During the crisis in 2009, GDP dropped by almost 5% while unem-
ployment grew, with a simultaneous increase in informal employment. In 
order to address the trend of growing informal work legislative measures 
of tightening control and sanction mechanisms were introduced. First, the 
employers’ obligations to report employees have been expanded, so that 
apart from the Social Insurance Agency employees from 2009 were required 
to be reported to Labour Inspectorate as well. An increase of power and 
authority of the inspectors followed: inspectors were authorized to report 
illegal employment to prosecutors, lists of entities violating laws were cre-
ated and inspectors were given the authority to suspend external work and 
arrangements through employment agencies. Fines were also increased, 
and inspectors’ field of work was broadened geographically, while police 
were also included in the inspection activities. The overall objectives were 
achieved—labour records and administration improved and the number 
of cases of informal work decreased.61
In 2011, specific measures based on the EU directive on illegal migration 
were adopted to suspend illegal employment of migrants, especially from 
Ukraine and the Balkans. Minimum standards for sanctions and measures 
against employers of third-country migrants have been adopted in compli-
ance with the EU legislation. Employers became liable to inform the Office 
of Labour, Social Affairs and Family within a short period of time. Illegally 
working migrants could be expelled from the country and fined up to 330 
Euros, while their employers were subject to penalties between 2 and 200,000 
Euros. This is one of many examples where transposition of EU directives in 
60 Eurofound (2013): Tighter control over informal work, Slovakia. Available at: https://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/tight 
er-control-over-informal-work-slovakia, accessed: March 2018.
61 Eurofound (2013): Measures to curb employing migrants illegally, Slovakia. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/
measures-to-curb-employing-migrants-illegally-slovakia, accessed: March 2018.
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national legislation has strengthened domestic institutions and increased the 
risks for employers engaging in illegal employment of immigrants.62
Slovenia
The extent of informal economy in Slovenia is somewhere between 15% 
and 25% of GDP according to various estimates. In 1997, Slovenia adopted 
a programme for detecting and preventing informal work, which foresaw 
introduction of relevant legislation as well as more stringent monitoring 
activities. A Commission for detecting and preventing illegal work and 
employment has been established, with representation from experts from 
relevant ministries and also from relevant Inspectorates, Tax administra-
tion, Customs administration, and the Uniformed Police Department. 
These efforts did not replace the existing inspections, but rather improved 
and strengthened them, including intensifying cooperation between the 
actors involved. The Labour Inspectorate introduced an automated tele-
phone service to enable reporting potential illegal employment. The inten-
sified inspections yielded in sharp decrease in irregularities and breaches 
of regulations—in 2005, compared to two years earlier, the rate of discov-
ered illegal employees fell by more than 31%.63
In 2000, Slovenia adopted the Act on Prevention of Illegal Work and 
Employment, which was amended in 2006. It provided the legal framework 
for the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs to implement policies 
to tackle informal work. It introduced the categories of personal supplemen-
tary work, short-term work and small work. Personal supplementary work 
includes activities like carrying out supportive tasks in the household, pick-
ing and selling forest fruits and herbs, and under certain conditions mak-
ing craft products. It may be carried out on the condition that the annual 
income derived from this work is below the minimum annual salary in Slo-
venia. Short-term work is defined as working occasionally (up to 40 hours 
a month) in a family business with fewer than 10 employees. Small work 
62 Eurofound (2013): Promoting external work contracts, Slovakia. Available at: https://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-informal-work-in-europe/database/pro 
moting-external-work-contracts-slovakia, accessed: March 2018.
63 Eurofound (2009): Measures to turn undeclared work into regular employment, Slovenia. 




on the other hand is a work carried out by someone who is not full-time 
employee and does not receive a pension. This type of employment is regu-
lated by an employment contract with maximum of 20 hours a week or 40 
hours a month.64
The introduction of these types of employment was meant to decrease 
the frequency of informal work. From the data collected, it was estimated 
that about two thousand persons a year were registered to perform per-
sonal supplementary work. The major factor behind this achievement was 
the simplification of the registration procedure. On the other hand, strong 
suggestions were made to limit further increases in registering supplemen-
tary workers, as it was found that this measure was easily abused in a way 
that people registered for occasional work were performing this work con-
tinuously over the year.65
The simplification of procedures for registering employment, in 
particular for foreigners and seasonal workers, motivated the Slove-
nian Government to pursue further improvements in removing admin-
istrative barriers and simplifying rules and procedures. The Ministry of 
Public Administration was assigned with creating a more efficient and 
user-friendly public administration, which lead to the adoption of the 
“Programme of measures for the reduction of administrative burdens” in 
2005. These efforts focused on two objectives: removing administrative 
burdens, and systematic examination of all new regulations to prevent 
additional administrative burdens. Apart from cutting down administra-
tive burdens, the goal was to design a legislative environment which would 
meet a positive reaction from companies and individuals. In 2006, 15 out 
of 34 measures the Programme envisaged were implemented. Also, the Act 
on Prevention of Illegal Work and Employment was updated to reduce 
the quantity of documents needed for registering employment. Compared 
to the previously requested 15 pieces of documentation, the amended act 
requested only 4 documents to be submitted when employing a foreign 
worker. Another significant improvement was the lifting of mandatory 
notification of the Employment service. It was found out that the Health 
Insurance Institute was already notified about employment and changes 
64 Eurofound (2013): Mandatory employment contract for undeclared workers, Slovenia. 





in employment, and a system of data sharing has been set up, relieving 
employers of the obligation to register workers twice.66
In December 2006, the Act on Prevention of Illegal Work and Employ-
ment was further amended to protect workers. This amendment is accom-
panied by a simplified procedure for proving the elements of employ-
ment relationship, which made the inspection process easier for Labour 
Inspectorate. The protection of workers was a particularly focus of the new 
amendments. If the employer was found with workers on informal basis, 
they would be obligated to declare their workers within three days, and to 
declare their employment as permanent. Failure to comply would allow the 
worker to pursue judicial protection.67
In 2008, Slovenia amended the Kindergarten Act aimed at reducing 
unregistered childcare work, meaning that the individuals can provide at 
home child care services only upon registering with the Ministry of Edu-
cation and satisfying the relevant conditions. Otherwise, home child care 
was deemed as illegal. The following audit on the availability of pre-school 
education concluded that registration reduced the number of childcare 
providers in the informal sector.68
In 2010, the Ministry of Labour, Family and Social Affairs in coop-
eration with supervisory authorities and social partners launched a pub-
lic campaign “Let’s stop informal work!” The campaign lasted several 
months, and involved posters, brochures, radio ads, ads in business mag-
azines and web banners. It was encouraged by the discussions and con-
clusions of the parliamentary Labour, Family and Social Affairs Commit-
tee on informal work in 2009. The specific focus of the campaign was to 
bring the following messages to the general public, businesses, workers 
and consumers:
66 Eurofound (2009): Simplification of administrative procedures, Slovenia. Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-undeclared-work-in-europe/database/
simplification-of-administrative-procedures-slovenia, accessed: March 2018.
67 Eurofound (2009): Joint action to detect and prevent undeclared work, Slovenia. Avail-
able at: https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-undeclared-work-in-europe/da 
tabase/joint-action-to-detect-and-prevent-undeclared-work-slovenia, accessed: March 
2018.




• Inform about the benefits of paying taxes and social security contri-
butions, and the dangers posed by informal work does to the welfare 
state and public services,
• Raise awareness of consumers—i.e. no warranty for goods purchased 
on informal basis,
• Promote a culture of compliance and respecting the rules,
• Stress the negative effects of informal work such as unfair market 
competition.
Considering the harsh economic conditions that followed the economic 
crisis, a decrease in number of registered unemployed persons in 2011 was 
considered a success for the campaign.69
69 Eurofound (2013): Let’s stop undeclared work campaign, Slovenia. Available at: https://
www.eurofound.europa.eu/data/tackling-undeclared-work-in-europe/database/lets-
stop-undeclared-work-campaign-slovenia, accessed: March 2018.

Notes on Contributors
Jovan Bliznakovski is a PhD candidate in political studies at the Net-
work for the Advancement of Social and Political Studies (NASP), based at 
the Department of Social and Political Sciences of the University of Milan; 
and associate researcher at the Institute for Democracy ‘Societas Civilis’ 
Skopje (IDSCS). He holds an M.Sc. in political science from the Univer-
sity of Ljubljana. His current research is focused on the sub-variations of 
political clientelism in the societies of the Western Balkan. In the past, he 
has published academic and policy studies on the language policy towards 
linguistic minorities in Macedonia. In the period 2014–2016 he served as 
programme director of IDSCS.
Ivan Damjakovski is an Associate Professor at the Department of Politi-
cal Science, Faculty of Law, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje. 
His research interests include Europeanisation of candidate countries, EU 
enlargement, Eu integration theory, political theory and ethnic identity 
politics. 
Adnan Efendic is Associate Professor of Economics at the School of 
Economics and Business, University of Sarajevo. He is an affiliate fellow 
at CERGE-EI, Prague and CISAR, Sarajevo. His current research interest 
is focused on the formal and informal institutions in the Western Balkan 
region. He has published number of papers and several books with inter-
nationally recognized publishers. 
Borjan Gjuzelov is a PhD candidate at Queen Mary University of 
London and associate researcher at the Institute for Democracy ‘Socetas 
Civilis’ Skopje (IDSCS). His main academic and professional interests are 
related to democratization of the post-socialist societies, good governance 
and informality. He has authored several articles and policy analyses on 
social capital, anticorruption and participatory policy-making. Gjuzelov 
holds MA in European Studies from the University of Flensburg, Germany 
and BA in Political Studies from the “Ss Cyril and Methodius” University 
in Skopje, Macedonia.
204  Notes on Contributors
Eric Gordy is Professor of Political and Cultural Sociology at the School 
for Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London. His 
research concentrates on Southeast Europe, especially the states of the for-
mer Yugoslavia. His first book, The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nation-
alism and the Destruction of Alternatives, represented an effort to offer 
an understanding of nationalist-authoritarian government and its staying 
power that concentrated not on political leaders and preconceived “ethnic” 
categories, but on the experience of everyday life, blockage and distraction 
under conditions of constraint. This bottom-up approach to large-scale 
political events was developed further in Guilt, Responsibility and Denial: 
The Past at Stake in Post-Milošević Serbia, which explored ways in which 
dialogue about public memory and understanding of the wars of the 1990s 
both moved forward and met obstacles, and both efforts at opening dis-
cussions of memory and efforts at denial were transformed in response 
to ongoing events. He is currently coordinator and principal investigator 
for the research project INFORM: Closing the Gap Between Formal and 
Informal Institutions in the Balkans.
Armanda Hysa is an anthropologist, project leader of the Center for His-
torcial and Anthropological Research (CHAR) team for the Horizon 2020 
project Closing the gap between formal and informal institutions in the 
Balkans (INFORM). She is co-founder of CHAR. She has been a researcher 
at the Department of Ethnology, Institute of Cultural Anthropology and 
Study of Arts, Centre of Albanological Studies. From October 2012 to 
October 2014 she has an Alexander Nash Fellow in Albanian Studies, at 
School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London. 
Her research interests include also urban Ottoman heritage, with specific 
focus on Balkan old bazaars, identity and ethnic relations in Macedonia, 
and interethnic relations between Serbs and Albanians, with specific focus 
on the recent phenomenon of mixed marriages between Serbian men of 
Southern Serbia with Albanian women of Northern Albania.
Gentiana Kera is a historian at the Department of History, Faculty of 
History and Philology, University of Tirana and co-founder of the Center 
for Historical and Anthropological Research, Albania. She is co-editor of 
the volume Albania. Family, Society and Culture in the 20th century (2012), 
together with Enriketa Papa-Pandelejmoni and Andreas Hemmung. Her 
Notes on Contributors 205
research interests include demography and history of the family, social and 
urban history of Southeast Europe and contemporary history of Albania.
Rudi Klanjšek holds a PhD in Sociology and works as an associate pro-
fessor at the Department of Sociology and as a researcher at the Center 
for the Study of Post-Socialist Societies (CePSS), University of Maribor, 
Slovenia. He specializes in cross-cultural studies in the area of values, devi-
ance, religiosity, poverty, inequality and economic development, focusing 
on countries that transitioned (or are still in transition) from socialism to 
market economy and democracy.
Marko Kmezić is an Assistant Professor at the Centre for Southeast Euro-
pean Studies at the University of Graz (Austria). He is the author of “EU 
Rule of Law Promotion: Judiciary Reform in the Western Balkans” (Rout-
ledge: 2016), and co-editor of “Stagnation and Drift in the Western Balkans” 
(Peter Lang: 2013) and “The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans: A 
Failure of EU Conditionality?” (Palgrave: 2018). His works are focused on 
Europeanisation, rule of law, democratisation, and minority rights.
Vjollca Krasniqi is a sociologist. She teaches at the Faculty of Philosophy, 
University of Prishtina. She is the chair of the University Programme for 
Gender Studies and Research. She holds a PhD from the University of 
Ljubljana, an MSc degree in Gender, Development and Globalization 
from the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), and a 
BA degree in Philosophy and Sociology from the University of Prishtina. 
Her research interests are gender, nation and collective memory, state-
building, peacebuilding and post-war reconstruction. She has published 
numerous articles, book chapters and reports on these issues, including 
War, Law, and Justice in Kosovo in International Criminal Tribunals as 
Actors of Domestic Change: The Impact on Institutional Reform edited by 
K. Bachmann et al. (forthcoming 2018); The Topography of the Construc-
tion of the Nation in Kosovo in Strategies of Symbolic Nation-Building in 
South Eastern Europe edited by P. Kolstø (2014); Another Report on the 
Banality of Evil: The Cultural Politics of the Milošević Trail in Kosovo, in 
The Milošević Trial: An Autopsy edited by T. Waters (2013); and Imagery, 
Gender and Power: The Politics of Representation in Post-War Kosova in 
Feminist Review (2007). 
206  Notes on Contributors
Ismet Kumalic is a Professor of International finance and EU Monetary 
policy at PIN University, Banja Luka. He has rich experience in both the 
private and governmental sector, working as director of several banks and 
private-owned companies and governor of Una-Sana Canton. He authored 
and co-authored over 20 papers and books in various fields of economic sci-
ence – from banking, through management to fiscal policy. He was a team 
leader and senior researcher at Swiss National Science Foundation funded 
research project (SCOPES research grant). His research interests include 
social economy, institutional economics, and economic development.
Miran Lavrič holds a PhD in Sociology and teaches social research 
methods and sociology of religion at the University of Maribor. He has 
worked in a number of research projects focusing on the post-socialist 
countries of Central and Southeastern Europe, ranging from youth studies 
and religious studies to areas such as social security or social values and 
attitudes. His academic work has been published in the following academic 
journals like: Rationality and society, Politics and religion, Field methods, 
European journal of social psychology, Journal of church and state, Journal 
of religion and health, Journal for the scientific study of religion, Journal of 
comparative family studies, and Child indicators research.
Alena Ledeneva is Professor of Politics and Society at the University 
College London School of Slavonic and East European Studies, United 
Kingdom. She is an internationally renowned expert on informality and 
governance in Russia. Her latest co-edited volumes include Innovations 
in Corruption Studies (2017) and The Global Encyclopedia of Informality 
(2018). She is a founding director of the Global Informality Project (www.
in-formality.com). 
Ilina Mangova is program director of the International Republican Insti-
tute in Macedonia and associate researcher and member of the Institute 
for Democracy ‘Societas Civilis’-Skopje. She does research and has pub-
lished on the topics of democratic governance, public opinion, transpar-
ency, political parties and elections. She has also been a coordinator for 
Macedonia for the international scientific research project ‘Varieties of 
Democracy’, which conceptualizes and measures democracy in 113 coun-
tries and she has lectured in ‘Political Systems and Global Relations’ at 
the Skopje based School of Journalism and Public Relations. She holds an 
Notes on Contributors 207
M.Sc. degree in Comparative Politics and Democracy from the London 
School of Economics and Political Science (LSE) and BA in political stud-
ies at ‘Ss. Cyril and Methodius’ University in Skopje.
Nenad Markovikj is an associate professor at the political science depart-
ment of the Law Faculty ‘Justinian I’ – Ss. Cyril and Methodius University 
in Skopje. He has obtained his MA degree at the European Regional Mas-
ter Programme in Democracy and Human Rights in Southeast Europe 
(ERMA) – University of Sarajevo/University of Bologna in 2003. Professor 
Markovikj defended his Ph.D. thesis in 2010 at his home university entitled 
‘The impact of civil society organizations on the democratic transition and 
consolidation in the Republic of Macedonia.’ He is founder and a senior 
researcher in the Institute for Democracy ‘Societas Civilis’ – Skopje and a 
member of the editorial board member of the quarterly magazine Political 
thought. He is the president of the Macedonian Political Science Associa-
tion (MPSA). His main interests are political theory, political philosophy, 
nationalism, civil society, political culture and myths. 
Mirza Mujaric is a researcher at CISAR. He holds master’s degree in 
economics obtained at the School of Economics and Business in Sarajevo 
(SEBS) in 2014 and has started his PhD studies at SEBS. His research inter-
ests include informal and undeclared economy, institutional economics, 
international aid, and sustainable development. He (co)authored several 
policy papers, briefs and reports.
Enriketa Papa-Pandelejmoni is a historian at the Department of History 
at University of Tirana. She is also and Director of the Albanian Center for 
Historical and Anthropological Research in Tirana. Her interests include 
contemporary history of Europe and Albania, social history, gender, com-
munism and memory. She is a co-author of the edited volumes, Myths 
and Mythical Spaces. Conditions and Challenges for History Textbooks in 
Albania and South-Eastern Europe (2018); The Call for Freedom. Studies 
on Totalitarianism and Transition in Albania (2016) and Albania. Family, 
Society and Culture in the 20th Century (2012).
Misha Popovikj is research coordinator at the Institute for Democracy 
‘Societas Civilis’ Skopje. He holds MA in Identity, Culture and Power at 
the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at the University College 
208  Notes on Contributors
London and BA in political studies from the University ‘Ss Cyril and 
Methodius’ from Skopje, Macedonia. His current focus is in the areas of 
corruption and informality and he has published policy briefs, papers and 
reports on these issues. Previously he has published papers and chapters in 
the areas of civic and political participation, nationalism, political culture 
and resistance to social change.
Reana Senjković holds a PhD in Cultural Anthropology and is a sen-
ior researcher at the Institute of Ethnology and Folklore Research, Zagreb, 
Croatia. Her research interests cover the area of popular culture, cultural 
and anthropological theory, anthropology of (post)socialism.
